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ABSTRACT
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MAY 1989

ISHTIYAQUE

H.

HAJI, B.A., SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

M.A., SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
Ph D
.

.

,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by:

Professor Fred Feldman

Do the requirements of morality and those of rational

self-interest dictate performance of the same acts in every

particular situation?

In this thesis

I

examine and

evaluate various proposed answers to this age-old

philosophical question.

I

focus on a particular kind of

situation in which the two sorts of requirement seem to be
at odds with one another.

These are situations of

contract-keeping that are prisoner's dilemma-like.

In such

situations, if you are moral, then it appears that you

should comply with an agreement to do the "cooperative
If you are rational,

thing."

then it seems that you will

do best for yourself if you refrain from cooperating.

Reformulating the central question of this essay, is it
rational in some sense of 'rational' to do the cooperative

thing in, and so to "escape" a prisoner's dilemma?
I

begin with Hobbes and submit he would answer in the

negative.

In analysing Hobbes' position,

I

critically

discuss Jean Hampton's and Gregory Kavka's views on Hobbes
v

.

on state-of-nature cooperation.

I

then consider more

recent replies paying particular attention
to David
Gauthier's
I argue that his defense
of an affirmative
reply - the desirable reply - is flawed.
I arrive at a
similar verdict about Edward McClennen's
opinion.
Finally,
.

I

advance my own conclusion

which people must act in

a

irrational

vi

-

there may be situations in

way that is either immoral or
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
1

.

1

Two Problems

Clarifying the nature of the relationship between

morality and rational self-interest is

a

perennial

philosophical issue, one that has been debated by

philosophers from Plato to the present.

Of the numerous

problems that arise in its discussion, there are two that
find especially intriguing.

I

The gist of the first is

captured by the question of Hobbes' Fool and the ethical
sceptic:

Do morality and rational self-interest require

performance of the same acts in every situation?

Of

course, the sophisticated sceptic might readily concede

that morality is superior to immorality, as a general

policy

,

from the viewpoint of rational self-interest.

But

what about those special cases where an immoral act seems

advantageous and where duty fails to have "the visage of
sweetie or a cutie?"
pay to be immoral?

1

Does it not,

a

in these situations,

If reason construed as the maximization

of one's self-interest is accepted as unproblematic, an

affirmative response to this question, the sceptic may
initially insist, has the consequence that

morality is

a

chimmera

-

a

rational

that morality, as Thrasymacus

seems to have believed, is simply

a

fool's game.

perhaps, the sceptic has spoken too quickly.
1

But here,

That his

judgment might be rash becomes somewhat more evident if we
turn to the second problem:

While accepting reason, the sceptic shuns the

constraints imposed by morality on the pursuit of
individual interest.
"validation,

foundation."

"

Morality, he believes, lacks a

or a "justification," or a "rational

The issue of what we mean when we say that

a

moral principle is justified is highly contentious.

According to one prominent tradition

-

the contractarian

one - noteworthy patrons of which are Hobbes and the

Hobbesian contemporary, David Gauthier, moral principles
are "generated" as a result of agreement among rational

persons.

They are justified for us because they impose

demands which are, or would be, rational for each of us to
accept.

In other words,

the validation of a morality, as

the contractarian sees it, is to proceed by demonstrating

that rational self-interested individuals, the moral

sceptic included, would voluntarily choose to be moral.

Assume this conception of moral justification sound and
assume a set of moral principles so justified.

Then the

sceptic cannot relegate morality to the refuse heaps

comprised of such dubious principles as those of astrology
and voodoo.

anything,

I

These assumptions, however, would do little if
think, to alleviate the first problem

-

whether

the dictates of duty are coincident in all circumstances

2

with those of rational self-interest.

contractarian project

a

success

-

Indeed, assuming the

assuming a set of moral

principles justified for everyone, may lead to an even more
formidable third problem:

if the prescriptions of morality

and those of rationality are not concurrent under all

conditions, and if both duty and interest provide us with

reasonable grounds for action, then in cases of conflict
does duty take precedence over, or give way to, rational

self-interest?
In this thesis

I

focus primarily on the first problem,

secondarily on the second, and not at all on the third.

discussing the first,

I

In

chiefly confine attention to

situations of contract-keeping that are prisoner's dilemmaIn these situations the requirements of morality and

like.

those of rationality often seem at loggerheads.

relation to them the focal question is this:

In

Is the

appearance of conflict between duty and interest merely
that

-

sheer appearance, or is the conflict real?

inclined to side with Hobbes' Fool.
optimistic.

Before

I

I'm

Others are more

can assess their positions and defend

mine, the terms in which the problem is formulated must be

clarified.

In particular,

I

must explain the conception of

rationality as "straightforward maximization."
say something about prisoner's dilemmas.

sections deal with these issues.

I

I

must then

The next two

will then be in a

position to show that while it appears morality requires
3

that one keep one's contract to do the "cooperative thing"
in a prisoner's dilemma,

rationality seems to sanction

violation.
1.2

Straightforward Maximization

(SM)

Assume that at each moment of choice a person has
several alternatives among which to choose.

Assume,

further, that for each alternative there is an outcome.

The outcome is what would occur if the alternative were

performed.
agent.

2

Assume that each outcome has a value for the

Her choice among her "timewise identical"

alternatives is to be dictated by the value-f or-her of the
outcomes that would result if they were performed.
There are different conceptions about the value of
.

outcomes for agents.

utility of an outcome

I

.

.

.

.

will distinguish two:
o,

of some action,

agent, s, be the value of o for s.

a,

3

Let the

for some

On one view, the value

of an outcome is an objective measure of how beneficial or

harmful that outcome would be for the agent.

One and the

same outcome may be objectively beneficial to

a

certain

degree, and objectively harmful to a certain degree,
agent.

for an

Assume that the net objective value of an outcome

for an agent can be ascertained.

agent-util itv (or s-utilitv

)

On this approach, the

of an action

4

,

a,

for agent,

s,

is simply the net objective value of the outcome
that would

result were

s to

do a.

On a second approach, an outcome that has value has
it

relative to a person purely in virtue of the fact that the

person has

preference for the outcome.

a

believe that only
relevant to
Gauthier,

a

a

certain class of preferences is

determination of an agent's values.

for example, supposes that only considered

preferences are germane.

Considered preferences, he tells

are those "that would pass the test of reflection and

us,

experience."

(M by A,

s-u tility of action,
as

Some theorists

a

a,

31,

21-46)

for agent,

On this second view, the
s,

can be conceptualized

measure of s's preference for the outcome that would

result if

s

were to do

a.

Assume either one of these axiological approaches.
Then on one variant, SM is the theory that for any act,
and any agent,

s,

a

a,

is rational for s if and only if none

of its alternatives has a higher s-utility than it has.

There is a more complicated variant of SM:
that for each alternative there is

could result if it were performed.

a

Assume

set of outcomes that

The complex variant

requires that an agent weigh not only the utilities of

outcomes realizable in action but also the probabilities on
her evidence that they will occur.

It requires that a

rational agent endeavor to maximize the expected aqent-

5

utility of her actions.
in the following way:

This parameter is to be understood
Take some course of action,

performed by some agent,

s.

a,

to be

Consider all the posible

outcomes of a that could result if it were performed.

Of

these, restrict attention to the subset of outcomes that

would affect the welfare of

For each of these, take the

s.

agent-utility of the outcome, U(oi), and the probability of
the outcome given the action, P(oi,a), and multiply U(oi)

and P(oi,a).

Find the sum of the products.

expected agent-utility of

The sum is the

On this variant, SM permits

a.

an agent to perform an action if and only if none of its

alternatives has

a

higher expected agent-utility (or

"expected utility" as

1

.

3

I

shall abridge) than it has.

Prisoner's Dilemmas (PDs)
The prisoner's dilemma is named after a story about

two prisoners.

Here's an illustrative tale:

and Sundance have been arrested for voyeurism.

Suppose Butch
There is

enough evidence to convict them on the charge for this
felony, but the DA is after bigger game.

have robbed

a

He suspects they

bank together, and he believes he can get

them to confess to it.

Assume both felons are interested

solely in spending the least time in prison and that the DA
knows this.

The felons are held in different cells and

cannot communicate with one another.
each with this proposition:

The DA approaches

"I'm going to offer your

6

"

partner the same deal, so listen carefully.

If one of you

confesses to the bank robbery but the other does not,

Confessor gets one year, and Sealed Lips gets thirty.

If

you both confess, I'll see to it that each of you lugs

a

ball and a chain around for a decade.

If neither of you

confesses, then each of you will enjoy the hospitality of
the slammer for two years

-

Sam Maquerrie's wife has sworn

under oath that you Peeping Toms violated the rights of
Betty Loo Hot Lips.

confession

I'll be back in a while - for your

.

The situation of the two prisoners can be represented
by this matrix:

Butch

Remains silent

Confesses

Sundance
Confesses

10,10

1,30

Remains silent

30,1

2,2

Figure 1.1

The Prisoner's Dilemma

Each "box" depicts an outcome of a pair of actions, one

performed by each prisoner.

The numbers indicate years-in-

prison with Sundance's jail terms listed first.

7

If each is to act as a straightforward maximizer
(SFM)

,

confessing is the best policy

- no

matter what the

other does each does best if he confesses.

In the

terminology of game theory, the act of confessing dominates
for each player.

however,

The outcome of mutual confession,

is not optimal

an outcome being optimal if and

.

only if there is no alternative outcome that both gives
some person a greater payoff and no person

a

lesser payoff.

Each prefers mutual silence, an optimal outcome, to mutual

confession.

But this mutually preferred outcome lies

beyond the reach of the SM-rational felons.
It is difficult to state precisely just what

conditions must be satisfied in order for this situation to
count as a PD.
.

Following Professor Feldman, let's assume
.

.

.

minimal set of conditions:
(i)

a

4

The actions of the interacting agents must be

independent in the sense that "no matter what choice either
makes, he would still make that choice no matter what

choice the other makes."

5

This

"

counter factual

independence condition " rules out, for instance, the

possibility that Butch can somehow force Sundance to remain
silent and then confess himself.

Were the actions of the

two literally interdependent in this way, it would not be

true as it is in an authentic PD, that although confessing
is individually rational,

it is collectively irrational.

8

)

(ii)

There are no hidden choices.

confess or remain silent.

Each can either

It is not open for either,

for

example, to bribe the DA or to break out of prison.
(iii)

There are no hidden payoffs.

We assume that

the payoffs shown exhaust what each felon stands to gain or
to loose from each of the four possible outcomes.

We

assume, then, that each cares solely to minimize his

prison-term.

It isn't the case,

for example, that Butch

swayed by feelings of comradeship, is willing to sacrifice

himself by remaining silent if Sundance confesses.

If he

were to be so moved, the payoff '1,30' in the upper right

would be misleading.
The matrix representing the preferences of each felon
for each outcome is this:

preferences

(Higher numbers indicate lower

.

Butch

Remains silent

Confesses

Sundance
Confesses

3,3

1/4

Remains silent

4,1

2,2

Figure 1.2

The Prisoner's Dilemma Preference Matrix

9

(iv)

The last condition is simply that the relevant

persons' preferences for outcomes, resulting from sets of

combined possible actions, one performed by each person,
are ordered as in the above matrix.

Let's stipulate, perhaps redundantly, that a

prisoner's dilemma is any two- or more-person situation
that satisfies conditions (i),
Butch and Sundance, in
the DA correctly predicted.

(ii)

a PD,

,

(iii),

and (iv ).

6

both end up confessing as

If only somehow they could

curtail the pursuit of their own advantage and refuse to
confess, each would be better off.

It might be thought

they could do this by cooperation:

Suppose prior to the

bank robbery the two make an agreement with each other to
the effect that should they be captured each would not

confess, since each is aware of the DA's tactic to get

felons to confess, and is aware that the outcome of mutual

silence is better for each than the outcome of mutual
confession.
matters.

But this pre-crime compact will not help

Merely having made such an agreement on

prudential grounds does not provide any reason for
comply with it when the time comes for doing so:

a

SFM to

Although

optimal, the "agreement outcome" is not in eguilibrium.

An

a set of actions,

one

equilibrium outcome is the product of

for each interacting person, such that for each such

person, there is no alternative action that this person

would prefer, the actions of all the others being fixed.
10

.

If Butch does his part - if he complies with the agreement
-

Sundance can do better by defecting.

Since both are SFMs

and since positions are symmetric, it seems that compliance

with the pre-crime agreement would be rationally
unjustified.
1.4

A Possible Conflict Between Duty and Interest

The inability of SFMs to adhere to mutually

advantageous agreements requiring self-sacrifice in
situations like the PD can be used to illustrate what seems
to be a conflict between morality and SM:

Assume morality

requires that one adhere to a prudentially undertaken

agreement even if adherence compromises one's own
interests.

Morality, we assume with Gauthier, imposes

constraints on the direct pursuit of self-interest.

If

Butch and Sundance were moral, they would adhere to their

pre-crime agreement if caught, but as SM-rational agents,
they could not.

It seems that whereas in such a situation

morality constrains behavior in the direction of
optimality, rational self-interest leads to a suboptimal
outcome.

Morality and SM, it appears, are therefore

incompatible
Call the outcome that would result if Butch and

Sundance were each to keep silent the "cooperative
outcome."

To do the "cooperative thing" is for each felon

11

:

to remain silent.

The focal problem of this thesis can now

be formulated in this way:

rational

of

thing?

'
,

Is it rational,

in some sense

for each party in a PD to do the cooperative

Do the prescriptions of morality and those of

rationality coincide in PDs?

Yet alternatively, can

rational agents "escape" the PD by doing the cooperative
thing?

If not,

does the dilemma vindicate the charge of

Hobbes' Fool?
The rest of this chapter is synoptic.

what

I

1.5

Hobbes on Rational Cooperation

I

summarize

undertake to show in each of the ensuing chapters.

Hobbes seems to have been among the first to recognize
the significance of PDs to the issues of whether there is

harmony between the dictates of morality and those of selfinterest, and to whether morality can be conceptualized as
a

"product" of rational agreement.

Thus Professor Kavka

writes
Hobbes's very point about the state of nature is
that it has this multiparty prisoner's dilemma
For so long
structure and hence must be abandoned.
as individuals remain in that state and act
rationally, they will inevitably produce worse
outcomes for themselves than they could obtain
(K,113)
under other conditions.

Gauthier traces the roots of his response to the
Fool's contention that injustice may sometimes pay to
Hobbes.

(M by A,

Chapter VI, section 1.3)
12

In consequence,

it is only proper to begin with a

consideration of what this venerable English philosopher
had to say on state-of -nature cooperation.

Chapters

2

and

In Chapter
a

I

devote

to this task.

3

2

I

do two things.

First,

(a)

show that

I

careful examination of his views on state-of-nature

cooperation reveals that it is controversial, contrary to
popular assumption, whether Hobbes himself believed that

natural-state individuals really are in

a

multiparty

prisoner's dilemma.
Suppose, in light of this uncertainty, we overlook

-

in a judicious manner - certain passages in Leviathan and
in other relevant Hobbesian texts.

Then it is possible to

interpret Hobbes as arguing for the point not infrequently

attributed to him:

The state of nature is one big PD.

Hobbesian individuals in that multiparty dilemmatic
situation would there reap suboptimal outcomes.

Their very

rationality prevents them from adhering to the interest-

constraining dictates of morality

-

in particular,

to the

third law of nature, a moral principle requiring compliance

with covenants rationally made

escaping the dilemma.
advocating
Institute

a
a

-

and so prevents them from

Hobbes may then be taken to be

"political" solution to their predicament:

sovereign who sees to it by his might that it

13

is no longer advantageous for each in the state of nature

to violate the constraints of duty.

Second,

(b)

fails:

I

suggest that this political solution

Sovereign institution itself seems to involve PD-

like problems that Hobbesian individuals are unable to

overcome.

It should be noted that even if this solution

did succeed, by invoking it Hobbes appears to abandon any

hope of reconciling duty and self-interest.

The covenants

enforced by the sovereign that enable rational agents to
"escape" PDs are no longer interest-constraining.

"Cooperation" is straightforwardly rational.
In discussing (a)

and

(b)

,

I

will comment on some of

Kavka's views on Hobbes on state-of-nature cooperation. 7
.

.

Jean Hampton takes issue with what

Chapter

2.

g

I

propose in

She believes that although Hobbesian

individuals are psychologically incapable of instituting

a

sovereign, the inauguration of the sovereign does not

involve any PD-like problems.

In fact,

she argues that it

is SM-rational for Hobbesian individuals in the state of

nature to subjugate themselves to
she is mistaken on both counts.
In doing so,

I

a
I

sovereign.

I

believe

show this in Chapter

will explain why her views on Hobbes on

natural-state cooperation are not cogent.

14

3.

1.6

Gauthier on Rational Cooperation
Chapters

4,

5,

6,

and

7

are devoted to a critical

examination of Morals By Agreement

Gauthier launches
theory of ethics

a full
-

In this work,

.

David

scale defense of a contractarian

his aim is none other than to show that

morality can be "derived" from rational agreement.

If

successful, this ambitious undertaking would accomplish

number of desirable goals:
a

It would,

for example, provide

response to the moral sceptic's demand for

justification for being moral:

a

non-moral

Moral principles, the

contractarian might volunteer, are
practical rationality.

a

a

reguirement of

As Gauthier says, moral principles

are "a subset of rational principles for choice," so that
"To choose rationally, one must choose morally."
4)

It would,

(M

by A,

rise to Hobbes' Fool's challenge

in addition,

that injustice may sometimes "stand with that reason which

dictateth to every man his own good."

Gauthier's brand of

contractarianism attempts to defuse this challenge in
particularly engaging fashion:

a

Gauthier attempts to show

that SFMs can escape the PD without the brandishing sword
of the sovereign.

He first argues that SFMs will bargain

with each other on the basis of the principle of minimax

relative concession (MMRC)
us,

is a moral principle.

justice.

.

This principle, Gauthier tells
It's a principle of distributive

MMRC requires SFMs to do the interest15

constraining cooperative thing in

a PD.

He then argues

that it is rational for SFMs to change their very

conception of rationality.

Given a choice between

straightforward maximization and constrained maximization
(CM)

,

it is SM-rational for SFMs to become constrained

maximizers.

however, requires compliance with

CM,

agreements that it is SM-rational to make.

Since it is SM-

rational to agree to cooperate in a PD, it is CM-rational
to comply with such an interest-constraining agreement as

well.

The PD, Gauthier concludes, is escapable after all.

Professor Gauthier's contractarianism raises many
intriguing issues.
(1)

I

concentrate on these:

The "Bargaining Problem."

Assume cooperation

makes possible a surplus of goods that would not be

forthcoming if the prospective cooperators were to act
independently.

The generation of such a surplus creates

problem of distribution:

a

how is the surplus to be alloted

among those who produce it?

More specifically, on what

principle will SFMs agree to apportion the cooperative
surplus?

Gauthier argues that there is

a

unique principle

that governs the relevant distribution, the principle of

minimax relative concession, or its twin principle, maximin
relative benefit.

In Chapter 4,

I

question this claim.

argue that SFMs will not necessarily minimax in many

bargaining situations.

They may well reach agreement on

16

I

some other basis.

So there is no unique solution to the

bargaining problem.
Bargaining theory presupposes that what one brings to
the bargaining table

settled or fixed.

-

one's prebargaining endowment

-

is

A "Lockian Proviso," Gauthier argues,

defines a system of property rights that constrains one's
initial endowment.

Since each agent is entitled to her

initial endowment as a matter of right, only the surplus,
if any,

generated by cooperation is subject to

distribution.

I

mention this crucial aspect of Gauthier's

theory only to set it aside.

The difficult and highly

interesting problems it raises will not be discussed in
this thesis.
(2)

The "Compliance Problem."

Suppose the bargaining

problem solved and solved in the direction Gauthier
recommends.

It would then be rational according to the

principle of MMRC to agree to do the cooperative thing in
PD.

a

There is, however, still a problem of compliance:

Suppose Butch and Sundance have made

a

rational pre-crime

agreement to remain silent if captured and questioned.

Why

After

should they comply when the time comes to perform?

all, the outcome of mutual silence is not in equilibrium.
If one complies the other will do best by reneging.

Gauthier's answer is that it is rational for them to comply
-

not SM-rational

,

of course, but "PR-rational."

theory that an act is rational if and only if it
17

PR is the

expresses" a rational disposition of choice.

"A

disposition is rational if and only if an actor holding it
can expect his choices to yield no less utility than the
choices he would make were he to hold any alternative

disposition."

(M by A,

183)

Gauthier limits choice to two

decision-making strategies, SM and CM.
and not SM is the rational disposition.

He argues that CM

Any SFM, he

claims, confronted with a choice between SM and CM will
(under specified conditions) choose the latter.

CM

requires compliance with prudentially rational agreements.

Assuming PR is unproblematic the compliance problem,

Gauthier thinks, is solved.
I

believe the "choice argument" is not sound:

false that SM is not utility maximizing.

show this in Chapter
(3)

I

It is

endeavor to

5.

Assessing Theories of Rationality.

I

do,

however, concede that it is CM-rational (under certain

conditions) to abide by agreements that it is SM-rational
to make.

But this fact should not by itself impress a SFM.

With the failure of the choice argument, some rationale is
needed to establish the superiority and so the

preferability of CM to SM.

In an earlier work,

Maximization," Gauthier proposes

a

"Reason and

"self-support" criterion

of adequacy for theories of practical rationality.

His

claim is that although CM is self-supporting, SM is not.

18

.

CM is therefore a better theory than SM.

The criterion and

variants of it are developed, discussed, and rejected in
Chapter

6

The Justification of Principles of Practical

(4)

Reason.

I

said earlier that the contractarian attempts to

answer the moral sceptic by showing that reason requires

acknowledgment of at least some moral constraints.

This

way of answering the sceptic assumes that although there is
a

problem about the justification of morality, there is no

anlaogous problem about

a

theory of practical rationality.

Gauthier's project is particularly attractive because of
its implicit rejection of this assumption.

The project

offers a unified scheme for the justification of both

morality and
scheme

I

a

theory of practical rationality.

call "abstract choice theory."

a

That

In Chapter

7

I

argue against the rational credentials of choice theory.

Gauthier's contractarianism,

I

conclude, cannot

deflate the Fool's challenge.
1.7

McClennen on Rational Cooperation
In the penultimate chapter,

I

examine Edward

McClennen 's view that "resolute" agents are rationally able
to secure cooperative outcomes that are optimal in PD-like

cases.

^

This view,

I

believe,

is once again questionable:

resolute choosers fare no better than SFMs in the relevant

dilemmatic situations.
19

I

conclude that there are cases in which persons must

act in a way that is either immoral or irrational.

challenge of Hobbes' Fool has yet to be answered.

20

The

Notes

1.

In Morals By Agreement (1986), Oxford:
Press, p. 1, Gauthier informs us:

Clarendon

The unphilosophical poet Ogden Nash grasped the
assumptions underlying our moral language more
clearly than the philosopher Hume when he wrote:
'0 Duty!

Why hast thou not the visage of a sweetie or
a cutie?'
We may lament duty's stern visage but we may not
deny it.
For it is only as we believe that some
appeals do, alas, override interest or advantage
that morality becomes our concern.
2.
In strategic contexts in which an outcome for an agent
depends in part on the actions chosen by other persons,
this assumption does not hold. The account of SM presented
in this section is standard for parametric contexts.
But
it should, nevertheless, facilitate an understanding of the
reasoning of straightforward maximizers in the strategic
context of the prisoner's dilemma.
3.
See Chapter 7, section 1.4 of this thesis, for an
elaboration of these two theories of value.

Fred Feldman, "On The Advantages of Cooperativeness,"
forthcoming in Midwest Studies in Philosophy section 3.

4.

.

5.
Fred Feldman, "On The Advantages Of Cooperativeness,"
section 3.

Professor John Robison has indicated that whether or
6.
not two individuals like Butch and Sundance in the real
world are in a PD partly seems to depend on how we
If each has the choice of
characterize their alternatives.
either confessing or remaining silent, then (providing the
relevant conditions just adumbrated are satisfied) it seems
But after
that the two felons are indeed in a PD.
consulting with Butch, the DA could egually well have
apprised Sundance that he, Sundance, could either match
whatever Butch did (Butch can either confess or remain
or he could fail to match
silent, Sundance is informed)
,
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0

.

the action of his partner. With Sundance's alternatives
characterized in this way, the felons don't appear to be in
a PD, as matrix 1.3 illustrates.
One might perhaps object
Butch

Confesses

Remains silent

Sundance

Confesses

1,1

9,9

Remains silent

0, 10

10

Figure

1.3

,

Robison's Matrix

that whereas confessing is a real action - it's something
Butch can do, matching isn't.
But there's an easy reply
here:
Why not suppose that to match Butch's actions,
Sundance must place a token in a basket. Placing a token
in a basket seems to be as real an action as confessing it's certainly something Butch can do.
What may be deep and interesting implications of
Professor Robison's point await further study.

Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory
Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
(K,
Page references to this work are given in this way:
page number)
7.

(1986),

Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition
Cambridge University Press.
(1986), Cambridge:

8.

See Edward F. McClennen, "Constrained Maximization and
9.
Resolute Choice," forthcoming in Social Philosophy and
Policy Edward F. McClennen, "Dynamic Choice and
Consistency," forthcoming; and Edward F. McClennen,
"Prisoner's Dilemma and Resolute Choice," in Paradoxes of;
Rationality and Cooperation (1985), eds., R. Campbell and
The University of British Columbia
L. Sowden, Vancouver:
;

Press, 94-104.
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CHAPTER

2

THE SYMMETRY ENIGMA
2

.

1

The Symmetry Problem

Are the requirements of morality and those of rational

self-interest coincident in every particular situation?
Hobbes confronted this question
this work

-

-

the central question of

amonqst other places, in Leviathan

1

In

.

discussinq it he devoted serious attention to situations of

covenant-keepinq of an hiqhly interesting nature:

The

situations, it appears, can be depicted by the game

theoretic matrix of the PD.

Since we are concerned with

precisely these sorts of cases, it is well worth
considering what Hobbes has to say about them.

More

specifically, my principal aim in this chapter is to

attempt

a

clarification of his views on the rationality and

morality of contract-keeping in these dilemmatic
situations.

Having declared this ambitious aim, let me

immediately admonish the reader that the chapter will not
prove very illuminating in this respect.

However,

I

will

have some things to say about what Hobbes' views on the

relevant issue could not have been, or perhaps, should not
have been.
I

begin with a brief summary of the "logical form" of

Hobbes' laws of nature which constitute the moral

principles of his ethical system.
23

This will help in

)

apprehending his third law "that men perform their
covenants made."

(MW,

3

,

A covenant of mutual trust

15 130)
,

is an agreement in which both parties are required to

discharge their covenantal obligation, in sequence, at some
time after the contract is made.

(MW, 3

,

14

,

120-121 124
,

The brief explication of the third law should enable at

least a rudimentary understanding of Hobbes' views on the

morality of contract-keeping.

I

then present passages in

which Hobbes seems to affirm that it is not rational in the
state of nature for covenant-parties who have to perform
first

-

"first-party members"

-

to keep their agreements,

although it is rational for "second-party members" to do so
if first-parties have already performed.

These views on

the rationality of agreement-keeping give rise to the

"symmetry" problem:

precisely what is the asymmetry

between the situations of first-parties and second-parties
in the state of nature that brings it about that whereas it
is irrational for first-parties to cooperate,

it is

rational for second-parties to do so?
The significance of the symmetry problem is striking:
On the one hand, assume as has often been done, that

persons in the state of nature are in

a

multiparty PD.

If

we now also assume that these individuals are rational,

Hobbes can be read as undertaking the fascinating project
of demonstrating how such persons could escape their

24

predicament.
success.

One might be sceptical of his prospects of

If Hobbes'

rational egoists really are in an

authentic PD, it appears they would have to remain there:

cooperation on

a

voluntary basis seems impossible

2

It

.

would take no less than an "extra-natural state" savior who
saw to it that state-of-nature denizens would in fact

maximize their advantage by "cooperating," if these persons
were to have any chance to leave the state of nature.
Hobbes' sovereign, not being an "extra-natural" being,

could not assume this role.

For the sovereign,

if he were

to be inaugurated, would be so by a social contract.

State-of-nature inhabitants would covenant to set up their
savior whom they would select from within their own ranks.

Matters are here further complicated in this respect:

If

the social contract is "interest-constraining" and so

significant from the point of view of rational cooperation,
then it appears that it would be beyond the reach of
rational egoists.

If,

alternatively, it requires no

restraint whatsoever on maximizing activity, then it is

questionable whether effecting such

a

contract could in any

way further the ends of natural-state individuals, and also

questionable whether such individuals are in

a real

PD in

the first place.

Suppose on the other hand that state-of-nature

dwellers are in some sort of situation

variety of iterated PD

-

-

possibly some

in which cooperation is rational.

25

Then Hobbes' views on cooperation become,
engaging.

think,

I

far less

On this alternative, Hobbes could profitably be

interpreted as recommending how less-than-rational persons
like "real world" people could be brought to see, maybe

with the help of

a

benevolent sovereign, that it is in fact

in their long-term interests to cooperate,

cooperation

being conducive to "commodious living."
I

suggest that the correct interpretation of Hobbes'

project in Leviathan and the prospects of its success
depends on a resolution of the symmetry enigma.

of-nature habitants really in

a PD as

first-parties suggest, or are they in

Are state-

Hobbes' remarks on
a

situation in which

cooperation is rational, as his comments on second-parties
intimate?

I

consider

a

view on this issue that has

recently been defended by Gregory Kavka.

I

argue that it

is not cogent.

2

.

2

Hobbes on the Morality of Contract-keeping
Persons in Hobbes' state of nature have as their

primary end their own self-preservation and their
individual well-being.

3

The ought-principles

-

the laws of

nature, Hobbes tells us, prescribe actions that these

persons must perform as means to the fulfilment of their

primary goal.

26

)

A LAW OF NATURE,
is a precept or general
rule, found out by reason, by which a man is
forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his
life, or taketh away the means of preserving the
same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may
be best preserved.
(MW, 3 14 116-117
,

,

,

These precepts are, in fact,

conclusions or theorems [of correct reasoning]
concerning what conduceth to the conservation and
defence of [men].
(MW, 3 14 147)
,

,

What may be called the "logical form" of these laws,
as both Kavka 4 and Hampton 5 indicate,

LF:

One ought to do some action,

a,

is this:

provided others are

doing so as well.
There is a question, of course, of how the qualifying

clause of these laws is to be construed.

relevant others?

Who are the

Is one freed from one's duty to do what

is prescribed by a law's principal clause just in case a

few of these others, or a substantial number of them, are

not conforming?

Furthermore, is one so freed when the

appropriate number of relevant others are violating merely
the law in question or a number of other laws, or both?
For our purposes, we can safely ignore these complications.

Textual support for LF is provided, among other
things, by Hobbes' statement of the first three laws,

particular the second, and

a

passage in which he

27

in

"

)

)

distinguishes between laws holding "in foro interno " and
those holding

"

in foro externo

.

The first law tells us that

every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he
has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain
it, that he may seek, and use all helps, and
advantages of war.
(MW, 3 14 117
,

,

It would be to no avail to seek peace unilaterally.

Hobbes

may consequently be taken to be advocating that persons
seek peace by putting an end to the state of war only on

condition that enough others are willing to do so as well.
The second law specifies what must be done if peace is
to be attained.

Each person must

for peace,
be willing, when others are so too,
and defence of himself
to lay down [his] right
to all things; and to be contented with so much
liberty against other men, as he would allow other
(MW, 3 14 118
men against himself.
,

.

The right in question is the "right of nature" or
the liberty [i.e. the moral permission] each man
hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for
the preservation of his own nature; that is to say,
of his own life; and consequently, of doing any
thing, which in his own judgment and reason, he
shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
(MW,

3

,

14

,

116)

So the second law avers that the moral permission

attributed by Hobbes to each person in the state of nature
to do whatever he believes is necessary to preserve and to

28

enhance his life, is to be relinquished provided others are

willing to do so as well.

Unilateral capitulation of this

right would simply result in the relevant person's making

"himself a prey to others."
But how is universal restraint to be attained?

way is by agreement.

One

Persons are to covenant to constrain

their pursuit of individual self-interest; they are to
agree, Hobbes might say, to be moral.

Entering into this

sort of agreement, however, even if necessary for being

moral is clearly not sufficient:

To be moral requires that

it not only be rational for persons to make the interest-

constraining agreement but that it also be rational for
them to keep that agreement.

introduces what he needs

-

For these reasons, Hobbes

the third law which enjoins

compliance with one's valid covenants.
On the face of it, the two-part structure of the third
law is not obvious.

That it has this logical form becomes

fairly evident on considering an important passage in

Leviathan

.

The passage strongly intimates that every law

of nature exemplifies the logical form in question.

It

also suggests that each law requires concurrence with the

prescriptions of its principal clause, or binds "in foro
externo," if and only if others are concurring as well.
The laws of nature oblige in foro interno that is
to say, they bind to a desire they should take
but in foro externo that is, to the
place:
For he that
putting them in act, not always.
;

;
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:

should be modest, and tractable, and perform all he
promises, in such time, and place, where no man
else should do so, should but make himself a prey
to others, and procure his own certain ruin,
contrary to the ground of all laws of nature, which
tend to nature s preservation. And again, he that
having sufficient security, that others shall
observe the same laws towards him, observes them
not himself, seeketh not peace but war; and
consequently the destruction of his nature by
violence.
(MW, 3 15 145)
'

,

The third law,

,

in light of this passage,

is to be

understood as requiring that one adhere to one's rationally
made agreements if and only if the relevant others are

doing so as well.

In the event that they are not,

then

non-compliance is morally sanctioned.
It should be noted,

although the issue is

controversial, that the third law holds even in the state
of nature.

Thus,

At least that's what

I

believe Hobbes believed.

for instance, he claims that the "laws of nature are

immutable and eternal," (MW,

3

,

implying that their

15 145)
,

injunctions hold in every situation, the state of nature
included.

Furthermore, there is a passage that seems to

lend unequivocal support to the view

I

am attributing to

Hobbes

Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of
For example, if I
mere nature, are obligatory.
covenant to pay a ransom, or service for my life,
for it is a
to an enemy; I am bound by it:
contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of
life; the other is to receive money, or service for
it; and consequently, where no other law, as in the
condition of mere nature, forbiddeth the
(MW, 3 14 126performance, the covenant is valid.
,

127)
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,

Finally,

in his reply to the Fool soon to be considered,

Hobbes again seems to embrace what is here being ascribed
to him.

2

.

3

6

Hobbesian Stooges in a Prisoner

7

s

Dilemma

It has recently occurred to many that persons in

Hobbes

'

state of nature are in

represented by

a

a

PD-like matrix.

situation that can be
As

I

Kavka seems to think that this is so.

indicated earlier,
Jean Hampton

believes that
in the state of nature people will
tend to
mistakenly treat PD games as one-time occurrences
rather than as members of a series.
(H, 80-81)

To support their views, such authors interpret Hobbes
as giving a description of the state of nature and its

inhabitants that makes it possible for us to understand the

situation in which the latter find themselves as
such description is this:

a PD.

One

7

"Hobbesian individuals," have four features that are

particularly important for our purposes:

(i)

They are

rational egoists, unrelentingly seeking to maximize the

satisfaction of their desires.

8
(

ii

)

As noted, they have

as their predominant desire their self-preservation and

their individual well-being.

(iii)

Each has desires that

conflict with the desires of others so that the
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satisfaction of one person's desires frequently interferes
with or precludes the satisfaction of another person's
desires.

This results primarily from the short supply of

natural resources required to satisfy their needs and
wants. 9

They are roughly equal in their physical and

(iv)

intellectual capacities so that no one individual is

advantaged over any other in his quest for resources
required to ensure his well-being. 10
In attempting to satisfy their needs, Hobbesian

individuals exert their power.

An individual's power is

"his present means; to obtain some future apparent good."
In so doing they inevitably come into

(MW, 3, 10,74)

conflict over the appropriation of the same goods as goods
are in limited supply.

Since there is no common power to

adjudicate conflicts in the state of nature, Hobbesian
individuals are left to their own wits to retain the goods

already appropriated and to acquire more of the same to
ensure continuance of their well-being.

Each person is

well-aware that every other is in the same competitive
It is therefore probably in an individual's

situation.

interest to make

a

preemptive strike.

In Hobbes' words;

[T]here is no way for any man to secure himself, so
reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force or
wiles, to master the persons of all men he can.
(MW,

3

,

13

,

111)

32

If we now limit ourselves to any pair of such individuals,

the dilemmatic nature of the situation in which they are

becomes more-or-less evident.
to do so.

nor loses.

Each either attacks or fails

If both resist attack and lie low,

neither gains

If both attack, neither vanquishes the other

but both suffer small losses.

If one attacks while the

other lies low, the aggressor makes large gains but the
other seriously jeopardizes her well-being.

Assuming

symmetric payoffs, the game-theoretic matrix depicting
their situation is something like this.
Mo

Attacks

Lies low

Attacks

1,1

10,0

Lies low

0,10

Larry

Figure 2.1

9,9

Two Stooges in the State of Nature

The numbers in the matrix represent expected utilities with

Larry's utilities ranked first.

(Numbers in forthcoming

matrices in this chapter, unless otherwise specified, are
In such a situation,

to be similarly interpreted.)

no

matter what the other does, an individual does best if she
attacks.

Since positions are symmetric, the strategy of
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attack is dominant for either player.
entire state-of-nature population.

Consider, now, the

With respect to it,

universal restraint is better for all than universal
agression, but each does best by attacking no matter how

many others are lying low or doing otherwise.
in Hobbes

'

So persons

state of nature are in a multiparty PD, or so

some have supposed.
I

emphasize that

I

do not claim this description of

the state of nature and its inhabitants is correct or even
complete.

But it is helpful in providing a framework to

understand Hobbes' views on state-of-nature cooperation.
2.4

Hobbes on State-of-nature Cooperation
To attempt to clarify these views let's first suppose

that two characters in the natural state, Larry an Mo, have

made a defense covenant, which we assume is a covenant of
mutual trust, that each will come to the aid of the other
in case the person or property of that other is attacked by

some third party.

Recall that a covenant of mutual trust

for Hobbes is an agreement calling for the parties to

perform one after the other at some time after the
agreement has been consummated.

11

Is it rational for

Hobbes first discusses

either to keep his agreement?

whether it is so for the party who has to perform first:
If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the

parties perform presently, but trust one another;
34

in the condition of mere nature, which is a
condition of war of every man against every man,
upon any reasonable suspicion, it is void: but if
there be a common power set over them both, with
right and force sufficient to compel performance,
it is not void.
For he that performeth first, has
no assurance the other will perform after; because
the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's
ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions,
without the fear of some coercive power; which in
the condition of mere nature, where all men are
equal, and judges of the justness of their own
fears, cannot possibly be supposed.
And therefore
he which performeth first, does but betray himself
to his enemy; contrary to the right, he can never
abandon, of defending his life, and means of

living.

(MW,

3

,

14

,

124-125)

Hobbes seems to be claiming that with no power to enforce
agreements, and so with no assurance that the other party
will comply, it would not be rational for first-party

members in the state of nature to comply.
Assume, plausibly, that Larry and Mo each ranks his

preferences for outcomes from most preferred to least in
this way:
(3)

(1)

Unilateral violation;

mutual violation;

(4)

(2)

mutual compliance;

unilateral compliance.

Then

Larry and Mo are in a PD that can be represented by matrix
1.

(See page 36 below.

Numbers in parentheses depict

preference strengths, higher numbers indicating stronger
preferences.

Numbers not enclosed within parentheses

portray absolute values of outcomes for agents.)
situations representable by

a

Call

matrix of this kind in which

outcomes are valued by either party in the manner shown,
"matrix 1" situations.

Since noncompliance is dominant for
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)

Mo

Keeps the
agreement

Breaks the
agreement

Larry

keeps the
agreement

(

Breaks the
agreement

2

,

2

(4,1)

)

10,-2

0,0

(1,4)

Figure

either party in

- 2,10

6,6

a

matrix

(3,3)

2.2

1

Matrix

1

situation, if Larry and Mo are

in fact in this sort of situation in the state of nature,

then Hobbes' conclusion about first-party's noncompliance

makes eminent sense.
Hobbes enunciates his views on compliance with respect
to second-parties in responding to the objection of the

atheistic Fool.
The fool hath said in his heart, there is no
such thing as justice; and sometimes also with his
tongue; seriously alleging, that every man's
conservation, and contentment, being committed to
his own care, there could be no reason, why every
man might not do what he thought conduced
and therefore also to make, or not
thereunto:
make; keep, or not keep covenants, was not against
He does
reason, when it conduced to one's benefit.
not therein deny, that there be covenants; and that
they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that
such breach of them may be called injustice, and
but he
the observance of them justice:
may not
quest ioneth, whether injustice,
sometimes stand with that reason, which dictateth
(MW, 3 15 132
to every man his own good;
,

36

,

I

take the Fool to be objecting to a thesis about the third

law he ascribes to Hobbes, that it is sometimes rational to

keep one's covenants even when the expected costs of doing
so exceed the expected gains, as in a matrix

1

situation.

Hobbes replies in this fashion:
For the question is not of promises mutual,
where there is no security of performance on either
side; as when there is no civil power erected over
the parties promising; for such promises are no
covenants:
but either where one of the parties has
performed already; or where there is a power to
make him perform; there is the question whether it
be against reason, that is, against the benefit of
the other to perform, or not. And I say it is not
against reason.
For the manifestation whereof, we
are to consider; first, that when a man doth a
thing, which notwithstanding any thing can be
foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to his own
destruction, howsoever some accident which he could
not expect, arriving may turn it to his benefit;
yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely
done.
Secondly, that in a condition of war,
wherein every man to every man, for want of a
common power to keep them all in awe, is an enemy,
there is no man who can hope by his own strength,
or wit, to defend himself from destruction, without
the help of confederates; where every one expects
the same defence by the confederation, that any one
and therefore he which declares he
else does:
thinks it reason to deceive those that help him,
can in reason expect no other means of safety, than
what can be had from his own single power. He
therefore that breaketh his covenant, and
consequently declareth that he thinks he may with
reason do so, cannot be received into any society,
that unite themselves for peace and defence, but by
the error of them that receive him; nor when he is
received, be retained in it, without seeing the
danger of their error; which errors a man cannot
reasonably reckon upon as the means of his
and therefore if he be left, or cast out
security:
of society, he perisheth; and if he live in
society, it is by the errors of other men, which he
could not foresee, nor reckon upon; and
37

consequently against the reason of his
preservation; and so, as all men that contribute
not to his destruction, forbear him only out of
ignorance of what is good for themselves.
(MW, 3 15,133-134)
,

Hobbes' idea seems to be this:

A second-party could

not expect violation of the agreement to be advantageous.
He could not because a consequence of violation that is

both highly probable and substantially costly is exclusion
from civil society

potential benefit.
society

-

-

a

cooperative enterprise of great

Since the alternative to entering civil

remaining in a perpetual war of each against each
second-party could ill afford to cultivate

-

is so bleak,

a

reputation of untrustworthiness by breaking

a

nature covenant.

a

state-of-

For founders of the society to come, the

passage suggests, would exclude from their joint enterprise
such untrustworthy others.

12

If this is a correct construal of Hobbes' reply to the

Fool, then it seems that persons in the state of nature

couldn't be in

a

matrix

1

situation.

Matrix

1

fails to

take into account the serious consequence of violation just
described.

When the expected costs of this consequence are

tallied, perhaps the correct matrix representing the

situation in which individuals in the state of nature
really are is the one illustrated in Figure 2.3 on the next
page.

In a "matrix 2" situation, compliance is dominant.

Hobbes would then be right in his insistence on the
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6

Mo

Keeps the
agreement

Breaks the
agreement

Larry
keeps the
agreement

6

Breaks the
agreement

5,-2

-2,5

,

Figure

-5,-5

2.3

Matrix

2

rationality of second-party compliance.
Hobbes' reply to the Fool is curious.
as construed it isn't really a reply:

It's so because

Cooperation in

matrix

2

this.

But surely we may charitably interpret him as

situation is rational.

a

The Fool needn't deny

demanding to know why cooperation is not against reason in
matrix

sorts of cases.

1

Perhaps Hobbes introduces the

Fool as an expedient to clarify his views on cooperation:
He introduces the Fool, has the Fool attribute to him a

thesis about cooperation, and then gives

response which

a

shows he does not ultimately endorse the thesis in
question.

Reason cannot prescribe keeping the kinds of

agreement that would enable persons to escape
Hobbes,

I

a

PD.

believe, clearly saw this.

Be that as it may, we now have a vexing problem.

state-of-nature individuals really are in
39

a

matrix

2

If

situation, cooperation is rational for either party, and it
is rational for each no matter what the other is doing.

The rationality of the second-party's cooperating does not,
as Hobbes seems to believe, depend on whether the first

party has performed.

Hobbes might well be right, given the

views of morality he endorses, to hold that it would be

morally permissible for

a

second-party not to perform if,

for some reason, the relevant first-party did not.
a case,

In such

the requirement of the qualifying clause of the

third law would presumably not be satisfied, thus freeing
the second member from her duty.

But it could not be

rational for a second-party to fail to cooperate, any more
than it could be for

a

first-party to do so.

Notice,

further, another potential worry if Hobbesian individuals

are in a matrix

2

situation.

Suppose the explanation of

warfare in the state of nature requires that it not be
rational for Hobbesian individuals to cooperate in that
situation.

another?

If cooperation is rational why war with one

Then once again it would seem that Hobbesian

individuals couldn't be in
though,

a

matrix

2

situation.

Hobbes,

is pretty emphatic that cooperation is rational for

second-party members in cases where first-party members
have already performed, even though it is not rational for

first-party members to have performed.
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2

.

5

Unsuccessful Attempts to Avoid Symmetry
What's to be done?

Are we required to ascribe to

Hobbes the position that sometimes parties in the state of

nature are in matrix

1

they are in matrix

2

situations?

further problems.

For one thing, suppose we accept what

situations whereas at other times
This would only engender
I

think is Hobbes' explanation of the irrationality of

second-parties failing to cooperate

-

they risk

nonadmittance into the society to come.
is really a cost,

If nonadmittance

and a substantial one at that, then it is

difficult to see how persons in the state of nature could
be in a matrix

1

situation.

Such a matrix incorrectly

reflects the alleged costs and benefits.
thing, even if there were matrix

1

For another

situations in the state

of nature, Hobbes would have to maintain that it would be

rational for second-parties in these situations to fail to
cooperate, despite irrational first-parties having done the

cooperative thing.

He does not say so.

A second, and perhaps more promising possibility,
this:

is

It's clear, or so it may be thought, that you cannot

represent the costs and benefits for each party as being
the same as those of each other.

It should,

in

consequence, be pretty obvious that one symmetrical matrix
will not suffice to depict the payoffs that first-party and

second-party players may reasonably expect.
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Rather, there

.

are two decision problems and so two matrices that need to
be considered separately:
on the choice question:

One matrix is required to focus

qoing first/violating first;

a

second different matrix is required to focus on the choice
question:

going second when someone has gone

first/violating at this stage.

Maybe the first matrix will

be a PD, and the second won't be.

In this way,

it might be

possible to account for Hobbes' views on state-of-nature

cooperation
Let's explore this possibility more closely, beginning

with the choice problem:

going first/violating first.

Larry rears horses and his neighbor, Mo, farms cattle.

Suppose they have made

a

defense pact agreement; each has

pledged to aid the other in case that other is attacked by
a

third party.

One fine morning, as each is brewing coffee

on his porch, each spots a band of notorious cattle bandits

fast approaching Mo's ranch.

Their intention is clear

raid on Mo's establishment is imminent.
do?

- a

What should Larry

Should he come to the aid of Mo as called upon by the

defense pact?

Let's distinguish a few possible scenarios.

First, assume each knows that the other is rational.

Assume,

in addition,

that each is transparent to the other:

each is aware not only of the rational disposition of the

other but also of how that other will act on each occasion
of choice.

Assume, also, that "the force of transparency
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extends through time:"
player.

Suppose Larry is first-party

Each is so transparent to the other that prior to

performing, Larry then knows, or at least has very good

reason to believe, that having performed, Mo will keep his
part of the agreement.

If he performs, he now has

assurance that Mo will perform in the future.

Each

player's true colors reveal themselves across time.
Assume,

further, that transparency is irreversible.

Under

these conditions Mo can count on Larry coming to his aid
it's straightforwardly rational for Larry to do so:

each is transparent, neither can dissemble.

Larry,

-

Since
for

example, cannot enter the agreement with the intention of
not later performing:

Mo would know of Larry's intention,

and would refuse to negotiate the agreement in the first
place.

Larry,

in turn, would know this.

Under conditions

of transparency it seems that each would come to the aid of

the other if and only if the other were to do the same.

If

Larry were to aid Mo, he could expect Mo to reciprocate.
If he were to stay put, he could expect Mo to do the same.

Transparency, it appears, forges a link between the actions
of the two players.

What each does seems at least partly

to "determine" what the other does.

With their actions

interdependent in this way, it would be forthrightly
rational for each to honor the terms of the defense pact.
If all this is correct,

then Larry's decision matrix in

this case does not seem to be a PD.
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The assumption of transparency is unrealistic.

let's next assume that Larry and Mo are "opaque."

should Larry do?

So

What

If he adheres to the agreement, he can

expect Mo to renege:

It seems Mo would do better to renege

than to reciprocate in the event that Larry's farm were
raided.

If Larry reneges, he can once again expect Mo to

renege.

It would be foolish for Mo to comply unilaterally.

Whatever he does, Larry can expect Mo to renege.

Knowing

this,

it seems it would be rational for Larry to renege as

well.

Perhaps in this second case, Larry is in a genuine

PD,

and that the game in which the two find themselves,

a

game that can only be completed in two consecutive moves

-

first player plays first/second player plays second, is

itself PD-like, as diagram
Finally, consider

a

1

on the next page illustrates.

third case.

Again, assume opaque

But this time assume also that forays of the kind

agents.

described are commonplace in the state of nature, so that
both can expect to find themselves in a similar situation

many times over.

Assume neither knows how many times over.

Opacity, as the second case suggests, lends credence to the

view that Larry is in

a PD,

of two consecutive moves,

and that each game consisting

is itself PD-like.

The third

case differs from the first two in that each game is only
one in

a

series of such games.

We're dealing, in other

words, with some variety of iterated PD.
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Assume (as both

.

Larry: Moves First

Mo: Moves Second

Preferences
for outcomes
after Mo's
second move
Larry

Mo

Keeps the pact

5

5

Breaks the pact

0

10

Keeps the pact

10

0

Breaks the pact

l

1

Keeps the
defense pact

Breaks the
defense pact

The numbers represent
expected utilities,
higher numbers
indicating stronger
preferences

Figure 2.4

Diagram

1

Kavka and Hampton do) that in these kinds of situation, the

rational thing to do is to abide by the defense pact
agreement.

Then Larry will help Mo fight the bandits.

These results are not very encouraging, at least not
from the perspective of the defender of Hobbes:

First,

it

is only in the second case that it is rational for first-

party Larry to renege.

In the other two cases,
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the

rational thing for Larry to do is to abide by the defense
pact.

Second, and more importantly, symmetry is all

pervasive:

Consider the second choice question.

Assuming

Larry has abided by the agreement, should Mo come to his
aid, this time let's suppose, to fight off some horse

thieves?

In a one-shot transparent situation, the answer

seems to be that he should, for reasons analogous to those

already considered:

Rational Larry would not have abided

had he known or had he had good reason to believe that Mo

would fail to abide in the future.

Since, by assumption,

Larry did abide he must have had good reason to believe

that Mo would also abide.

We can therefore conclude that

Mo will abide as well.

Now consider an opaque, one-shot situation analogous
to the situation in which players' preferences are

represented by diagram

1.

As the diagram clearly

indicates, second-party Mo, just like first-party Larry,

would do best for himself if he were to renege.

Of course,

if Larry did for some reason or other abide in this

situation, then he failed to act rationally.
Finally, assume players are in an iterated dilemma,

each game of which terminates only after two consecutive

moves
I

-

think,

Larry going first, Mo going second.

In this case,

it would also be rational for second-party Mo to

adhere to the defense pact.
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The twin matrix manoeuvre won't save Hobbes.
A third possibility is to take Hobbes to be

distinguishing between two states of nature, an ideal state
with all agents fully rational, and

a "real

world" state

with an admixture of agents, some rational, others
irrational.

If all agents in the ideal state are in a PD,

then rational cooperation remains a dream.

With respect to

the real world state, the question is whether cooperation
is rational given the presence of the two sorts of agents.

If rational Spock were transported from rational man's

heaven (hell, perhaps?) to the real world state, what
should he do?

will shortly consider a real world

I

situation of this type. 13
.

.

.

For now it suffices to note that

if first-parties in a real world natural state are in a

matrix

1

situation, and second-parties in a matrix

2

situation, then the presence of irrational parties makes no

difference whatsoever to the rationality of cooperation in
these situations.
complies.

Suppose irrational first-party Larry

Hobbes advises second-party Mo to reciprocate on

pain of being excluded from civil society.

simply recurs:

The old problem

If founding members of the society to come

don't take kindly to second-party violators, shouldn't they
also frown upon first-party violators, thereby calling into

question whether first-parties really are in a matrix
situation?

1

Aren't untrustworthy first-parties just as bad

as second party exploiters?
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As

I

see it, then, an interpreter of Hobbes is forced

to come to terms with the "symmetry" enigma:

If persons in

the state of nature are in some sort of PD, then Hobbes'

views on first-party covenant-keeping seem reasonable.
These persons, if in
reneging.

If,

a PD,

would do best for themselves by

on the other hand, they are in a situation

in which doing the "agreement required thing" is dominant,

then his remarks on second-party covenant-keeping also seem

well-founded.

The trouble is that first-parties and second

parties seem to be in the same sort of situation.

Each

seems to stand to gain or to loose whatever each other

seems to stand to gain or to loose by cooperating.

payoffs to each appear to be symmetric.

Yet,

The

their

positions in the state of nature must not be symmetric if
Hobbes' views on the rationality of natural-state

cooperation are to be believed.

In light of the symmetry

problem, how are these views of Hobbes' to be accounted
for?

2.6

Let's consider Professor Kavka's reply.

Kavka on Symmetry
Kavka commences his chapter on cooperation by

introducing the notion of

a

defensive cooperative.

A

defensive cooperative
consists of an explicit agreement, among some group
of individuals in the state of nature, that each
will come to the aid of any other in the group
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)

whose person or property is attacked or threatened.
(K, 127

Each individual member of such a group must grapple with

problem of compliance.

a

Is it rational to act in accord

with the terms of the agreement when called upon to do so?
In discussing this problem, Kavka tells us that we can

represent

a

typical state-of-nature agreement by a PD

matrix analogous to matrix

(K,138)

1.

Since in such

a

situation violation is dominant, it would not be rational
for first-party members to comply.

Indeed, he claims

Hobbes apparently accepts this reasoning, agreeing
(with the Fool) that the first party should not
perform.
We may say that Hobbes approves of
defensive violations of state-of-nature agreements,
that is, violations motivated by the desire to
avoid being taken advantage of, to avoid becoming a
unilateral compiler.
(K,139)

What about compliance on the part of second-party members
given that "some naive first party" (K,139) has performed?
Should he

"

offensively violate," thereby securing his

maximum payoff?

The Fool, Kavka tells us, thinks so, but

Hobbes refuses to endorse offensive violations.
He refuses, according to Kavka,

those

I

(K,139)

for reasons similar to

suggested earlier:

The Fool, looking only at the immediate payoffs
available, sees the situation depicted in [matrix
as the most
He therefore proclaims breach
1].
views the
however,
Hobbes,
reasonable response
effects
long-term
second party's response as having
cooperation
on that party's prospects of future
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f

with others.
Specifically,
that a particularly
vital sort of cooperation, inclusion in defense
confederations will be denied known offensive
violators of agreements, since other members will
not trust them to keep their promises of
a id
The danger of being excluded from future
cooperative defense arrangements
here
transforms a situation in which
noncooperation is a dominant strategy into one in
which cooperation is dominant.
(K,140)
If this is the correct explanation of Hobbes' views, Kavka

plainly faces the symmetry problem:
objection to Hobbes's reply to the Fool,
raised by Jean Hampton, is more serious
I
Hobbes is right that it is rational for second
parties to keep state-of-nature agreements, then it
must be rational for first parties to keep them as
well.
The argument is that the latter, following
the logic of Hobbes's argument, will not expect
rational second parties to cheat them, and that
even if they are cheated, first parties can expect
to gain more than compensating advantages by
proving themselves trustworthy partners in future

A[n]

[

14
defense cooperatives or commonwealths.
.

]

(K,147-

148)

Although the problem to which this passage alerts us is not
quite the symmetry problem, it's very close.

Let's

consider what Kavka has to say about this objection.
First, he proposes that

The clear response to the first part of
Hampton's objection, suggested by passages in
chapter 14 of Leviathan is that first parties to
state-of-nature contracts cannot count on second
It is in the long-term
parties acting rationally.
comply with state-ofto
parties
second
interest of
to the Fool shows,
reply
the
as
agreements,
nature
strong
(and
interests
but their short-term
course.
different
a
dictate
greed)
passions, like
,
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Given the frequent tendency for people to be
carried away by short-term interests, it is not
safe to be a first-party complier with a state-ofnature agreement because of the substantial risk of
irrational noncompliance by the second party.
(K,

148,153)

Hampton objects that if it is rational for secondparties to perform, first-parties would know this, and

would therefore expect compliance from these parties.

But

since each does better if everyone complies, first-parties

would themselves do best by complying.

Hampton should

insist that mutual compliance has the result that there is

probably no conflict in the state of nature.

Kavka rejoins

that although it is rational for a second-party to comply
if a first-party has done so, most second-parties because

of shortsightedness will not comply.

First-parties,

cognizant of the irrationality of many or perhaps even most

second-parties cannot, in consequence, expect secondparties to comply.

So first-parties will refrain from

complying as well.
Kavka 's response, it seems to me, is not very

compelling:

Suppose most Hobbesian individuals in the

state of nature are shortsighted.

Then

I

think we can

assume this of both first-parties and second-parties.

It

would be arbitrary to suppose that only second-parties are
shortsighted and that only firsts are rationally perfect.
Now let's distinguish two cases.

(i)

Suppose Hobbesians

can identify who's rational and who isn't.
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Kavka admits,

or would admit, that it is rational for a rational second-

party to perform if

a

first-party has done so.

A rational

first-party, knowing this, would expect a rational second-

party to perform.

So if he is interacting with a rational

second, he would comply.

comply.

in this instance, both would

There would then probably be no conflict between

these two.

But a rational first cannot expect an

irrational second to comply.

So when interacting with such

an agent, a rational first would fail to comply.

The

irrational second-party would probably not comply either.
So neither would comply and neither would get out of the

state of nature.
(ii)

Consider the second case.

Again, assume a "real

world" natural state, with an admixture of agents, some
rational, others irrational.

Suppose Hobbesians cannot

tell who's rational and who isn't.

Suppose it is generally

known that in this natural state there is

a

"frequent

tendency for people to be carried away by short-term
interests and immediate passions."

So even if such

irrational parties were in an iterated PD in which

cooperation is rational, they would be swayed by their
short-term interests and would fail to cooperate in each
round.

Suppose, since there are many irrational people in

this real world state, that the probability that one's

prospective interactive partners are irrational is high.
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Suppose,

finally, that if a person abides by a defense pact

agreement while the others do not, the outcome for the

person is bleak.

Call such a state of nature an

"adventurous" one.

irrational

-

I

In an adventurous state compliance is

think

-

for a first-party.

irrational first has performed.

second-party do?

Now suppose an

What should the relevant

It would be rational for a second-party

to comply if Kavka's claim that a high cost of violation on

the part of second-parties, exclusion from defense

confederations, is correct.

But would such confederations

exist in an adventurous state of nature?
issue:

That's a moot

Kavka informs us that many such confederacies are

formed by tacit agreement or explicit agreement.
If such confederacies exist, then,

126)

it must be rational to

make and honor "defense confederacy agreements."

pages 55 and 56 below.)

(K,

(See

But even if it were rational to do

these things, since many in an adventurous state of nature
are irrational, these irrational persons would fail to

appreciate the advantages to be had by upholding such
defense covenants.

So it's likely that few,

defense confederacies would exist.

confederacies could then not be

a

if any,

Exclusion from such
substantial cost second-

parties in an adventurous natural state could anticipate
were they to renege.

15

So in this second case, even

rational second-parties would not comply.
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Kavka's second response is far more engaging because
it meets the symmetry problem head-on.

He suggests that

first-party and second-party members suffer differential
costs when they violate their covenants.
[D]efense group members are likely to react
differently to first-party and second-party
violators of state-of-nature agreements. In
particular, the defender of Hobbes's view must
believe that defense-group members will regard
first-party violators as more reliable and
desirable partners than second-party violators.
(K,

149-150)

Kavka then adduces what he takes to be some "plausible

grounds for this belief."

Assume he is right about this.

It is still not quite clear what matrix (or matrices)

correctly depicts the situation he has in mind.

probably wouldn't, for instance, be matrix

It

3.

Mo

Breaks the
agreement

Keeps the
agreement

Larry
keeps the
agreement

Breaks the
agreement

10,10

- 2,8

8,-2

5,5

Figure

2.5
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Matrix

3

In a matrix

3

situation neither party, if each is

a

rational egoist, could decide on the rational course of

action without further information.

Supply the required

information and the matrix no longer remains the same.

If

no such information is available, each might elect to

maximin

-

outcome.

to do whatever will result in the best worst
If they did maximin, both in this situation would

do the noncooperative thing.

None of this, though, shows

that Kavka's "differential cost" reply is problematic.
I

But

think it is:
The term 'defense group,' Kavka tells us, is "intended

to encompass both commonwealths and state-of-nature

defensive groupings."

(K,149)

In the present context,

term presumably refers to the latter.

the

He further informs

us that defense groups in the state of nature may originate
in sundry ways

-

"by family ties, conquest and submission,

tacit agreement, explicit agreement, or some combination

thereof."

(K,126)

Defense alliances formed by conquest

and submission, we are told, are probably unreliable,

unstable

(K,

108-119-120) and arguably their existence in

the state of nature is not "even highly likely."

(K,141)

Family ties may prove tenous, and even if they are not, we
may simply treat each family as an individual and inquire

whether cooperation amongst such individuals is rational.
Ignoring the last category, this leaves the two of interest
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to us - defense groups formed by tacit or explicit

agreement.

Among rational individuals, however, no such

"defensive cooperative groups" could exist unless it were
rational both to enter into and keep a "defensive

cooperative group agreement."

After all, that's how such

groups are formed.
Now reconsider Kavka's differential cost reply.

As

Kavka is himself aware, an objection to this kind of reply
is that it assumes the viability of defensive cooperative

groups in the state of nature.

(K,141)

stressed enough, if at all, is this:

What has not been

If the reply assumes

the existence of such defensive cooperative groups, it must

also assume, as has just been explained, the rationality of

keeping defensive cooperative group agreements:

If it is

irrational to keep such defense covenants, rational agents

could not expect rational parties to keep them; no such

covenants would be rationally honored, so no defense

confederacies that depend upon the rationality of keeping
such covenants would exist.

Clearly, however, the reply is

not entitled to this assumption since one of its objectives
is to show that agreement-keeping,

parties,

at least by secondIn addition,

is rational in the state of nature.

in a real world adventurous natural state as we saw,

seems irrational

-

irrational for any party

to keep a defense pact agreement.
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-

it

to make and

In the interests of accuracy,

considers this kind of objection

-

let me add that Kavka

the objection concerning

the viability of defensive cooperative groups

-

in a

slightly different context, namely, in his exposition that

second-party violators are really in
in a matrix

1

sort of situation.

appealed to the idea that

a

a

matrix

2

rather than

Recall that he there

serious cost of violation is

exclusion from defense confederations in the state of
nature.

(See pages 49 and 50 above.)

However, the same

kind of objection, as we have seen, can be directed against
the differential cost reply.

Kavka has a response.

Again the response is meant to

parry the objection raised in connection with accounting
for the rationality of second-party adherences to state-of-

nature agreements.

But presumably, Kavka would offer a

similar response as far as present matters are concerned.
So let me first cite the passage containing Kavka 's

response to the former objection and then indicate how it

might be adapted to explain the differential costs incurred
by first-party and second-party violators of state-of-

nature agreements.

The relevant passage is this:

doubts that state-of-nature
[S]uppose one
viable
and can provide
are
pacts
defense
In that case one
benefits.
security
substantial
the reply to the
in
'society'
read
simply
may
Fool as standing for civil society, or the
Then Hobbes may be viewed as
commonwealth.
pointing out that founders, or preserving members,
of a commonwealth will not accept unreliable
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parties, such as offensive violators of agreements,
as members.
Second-party state-of-nature agreement
violators are thus not simply risking future
membership in shaky state-of-nature defense
cooperatives, they are risking their chances of
permanent escape from the state of nature via the
only effective mechanism thereof, membership in a
commonwealth.
(K,141)

Adapted to present concerns, rather than claim "defense
group members are likely to react differently to firstparty and second-party violators of state-of-nature

agreements," Kavka might claim "founding members of the

society to come are likely to react differently to first-

party and second party violators."
But once again the response,

I

believe,

is

questionable.

Assume all persons in the state of nature

are rational.

It appears that even these fully rational

agents should be sceptical about their prospects of

entering civil society.

If this is true - if Hobbesians

are unable to leave the state of nature, then these natives

cannot really be "founders, or preserving members, of

commonwealth" to come.

a

Exclusion by any state-of-nature

founder from any future commonwealth could not then be any

threat to anyone:

Suppose escaping the state of nature, as

Hobbes believes, does require the instituiton of
sovereign.

a

Doing this, in turn, minimally seems to require

that it be rational for each party both to make and to keep
an agreement to surrender his right of nature to the

sovereign and to obey the sovereign's commands.
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But the

.

sort of agreement (or agreements)

in guestion here seems

analogous to defensive cooperative group agreements.

Both

kinds of agreement are mutually advantageous though

reguiring self-sacrifice.

Although it is collectively

rational to keep such agreements, it is not individually

rational to do so.

constraining."

Such agreements are "interest-

So just as a defensive cooperative group

couldn't exist unless it were rational for Hobbesian
individuals to make and keep a defensive cooperative group
agreement, so it seems a sovereign could not be instituted
and,

in consequence,

a

commonwealth couldn't come into

existence, unless it were rational for Hobbesian

individuals to make and to keep a "sovereign-instituting"

agreement 16

2

.

7

More Kavka on Symmetry
It's worth,

I

think, briefly diverting at this point

to note the following:

Leviathan

matrix

1

.

Ignoring certain passages in

suppose Hobbesian individuals really are in

PD in the state of nature.

a

Then we can further

suppose that these individuals, being rational, realize
that the goods they require to satisfy their needs are in
short supply in the absence of cooperation, but would be in

plentiful supply if they could only restrain their pursuit
of self-interest and enter into fruitful cooperative
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ventures.

A a possible way to attain universal restraint

is by the making and the keeping of an "interest-

constraining" agreement.

But if the requisite sort of

agreement really is interest-constraining, then the very

rationality of these rational egoists would inhibit them
from keeping such an agreement.

Perhaps Hobbes saw this,

and in light of seeing this, sought a "political" solution:

Institute a sovereign that penalizes breaches of agreements
so that it is no longer advantageous to violate one's

covenants.

The sovereign's job, in effect, would be to

"transform" the original matrix
like a matrix

2

situation.

1

situation into something

This is one way of

understanding what Hobbes is up to in Leviathan
understanding, the symmetry problem vanishes:

of-nature individual is in the same matrix

1

.

On this

Each statePD.

The discussion in the paragraph preceeding this

diversion, however, seems to cast doubt on the tenability
of even this political solution:

If the very institution

of a sovereign necessitates the making and the keeping of

an interest-constraining agreement, then rational egoists

will be unable to do what is required by the "solution" to

escape the natural state.
Not to be defeated yet, Kavka anticipates and responds
to this sort of worry.
A final problem for Hobbesian social contract
centers on the question of why the
theory
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parties should comply with the social contract once
it is made, why they should obey the orders of the
government created by it. After all, the social
contract is a state-of-nature agreement, and Hobbes
says you should not keep these (as a first party)
since the other party or parties may not follow
suit
The general nature of our solution to the
first party compliance problem [is this:] The
social contract is different from other state-ofnature agreements in that it promises, if
successful, to remove the parties from the state of
nature.
Thus, each has a tremendous amount to gain
by its success.
This means that the risk of being
a unilateral compiler is worth running if it
attaches to a reasonable chance of mutual
compliance.
Further, since others also obviously
have much to gain by the effectiveness of
government, one runs little risk of being a lone
compiler - others will be only too glad to make the
arrangement work once you have set the
example
[Y]ou are almost certainly better off
under [the government's] protection than you would
be returning to the state of nature by refusing to
(K, 243-244)
comply.

With respect to the sovereign-instituting agreement or
the social contract, either first-parties are in a matrix
PD,

or they are not.

1

The passage suggests that it is

individually rational for first-parties to comply with such
an agreement if there is a "reasonable chance of mutual

compliance."
a

But in a matrix

1

situation even if each has

"tremendous amount to gain by its success," keeping an

interest-constraining agreement is not rational.

It would

seem that in connection with the social contract, first-

parties are not in

a

matrix

1

PD.

The situation of these

first-parties is not analogous to the situation in which
f irst — part ies

of other state— of —nature covenants find
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.

themselves.

So let's suppose that in relation to the

social contract no symmetry problem exists, first-parties

just like second-parties are in fact in a situation

perhaps a matrix
rational.

2

situation

-

-

in which compliance is

Then there are two problems:

First, the agreement in question - the social contract
-

despite strong appearances to the contrary, is not

interest-constraining.

Such an agreement, it seems,

imposes no restraint on an individual's exercising her

unlimited right of nature.

As David Gauthier explains

The role of so-called 'moral' conventions [would]
then be not to constrain our behavior, but rather
to enable us to coordinate that behavior to maximal
advantage, effecting, like the perfectly
competitive market, the harmony of non-tuisms 17
The second problem is even more serious:

The social

contract requires at least that each agree to surrender his
right of nature to, and to authorize all the actions of,

sovereign-elect.

(See,

for example, K, 180-181)

a

Kavka

suggests that the reason why compliance by first-parties
(and presumably also by second-parties) with the social

contract is rational is that it increases their chances of

membership in

a

viable commonwealth:

We may see this solution as an extension of
Hobbes's reply to the Fool. There it was suggested
that compliance with a state-of-nature contract is
rational if it increases your chances of later
But surely
membership in a viable commonwealth.
first compliance with the orders of a government

62

newly founded by agreement increases your chances
of membership in a viable commonwealth.
All
problems of commonwealth formation have been solved
at this point, save possibly one:
firmly
establishing general expectations of obedience to
the government.
(K,244)
I

do not here take Kavka to be responding to the unfounded

concern about whether there is

connection with the edicts of
sovereign:

a

compliance problem in

a fully

"empowered"

Suppose the sovereign is somehow established.

Now he's in charge, and he tells me to pay taxes.
rational, I'll pay

penalties on me.

-

If I'm

because he can inflict very serious

Rather, Kavka seems to be responding to

the legitimate worry about whether setting up the sovereign
-

abiding by the agreement that tells you to do whatever is

required to establish the sovereign

-

is rational.

But

what Kavka suggests about why persons in the state of
nature have reason to believe they can escape that state by

entering

a

viable commonwealth seems misguided:

Kavka

apparently assumes that first-parties and second-parties
will incur severe costs in the event that they fail to

abide by the social contract, costs associated with non-

admittance into the commonwealth of the future.

This

assumption presupposes that such a commonwealth is viable.
This,

in turn,

assumes that even if Hobbesian individuals

are able to solve the problem of who among them is to

become sovereign,

there is no compliance problem in

connection with, for example, agreeing to surrender one's
63

right of nature to the sovereign-elect; it is simply

straightforwardly rational to do so.
controversial assumption, one
sustained.

I

This is a strong and

believe Kavka has not

It is at least clearly an assumption that

cannot be defended by supposing that compliance by first-

parties and second-parties with the social contract is
rational, since it improves their chances of membership in
a

viable commonwealth.

It cannot be so defended because

this reason implicitly assumes that compliance is rational:
no commonwealth is viable, because no sovereign would
if it were not rational to surrender one's right to,

exist,

or to authorize all the actions of, a sovereign-elect.
To recapitulate briefly:

Kavka suggests that the

symmetry problem is to be solved by noting that firstparties and second-parties incur differential costs when
they renege on their state-of-nature agreements.

This is

because founding members of the society to come will react

differently to first-party and to second-party violators.
It is obvious that these founding members could be none

other than Hobbesian individuals themselves.
individuals, or at least

a

If these

portion of them, are to react

differently to these violations, they must have reason to
believe that
viable.

a

commonwealth of the future is in fact

They must, for instance, have reason to believe

that the inauguration of a sovereign involves no PD-like
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problems.

Kavka argues that there is no compliance worry

in relation to the social contract.

He suggests that it is

forthrightly rational for first-parties, and indeed for
second-parties, to abide by the social contract.

Doing so

increases your chances of membership, he suggests, in

viable commonwealth.

a

But this reason for compliance

assumes that compliance with the social contract is
rational:

With no such compliance, no sovereign and so no

commonwealth could come into existence.
cost reply, then, at least as

I

The differential

understand it, ultimately

assumes something that is crucial to what it is meant to

establish

-

that compliance with natural-state agreements,

on the part of second-parties,

2

.

8

is rational.

Conclusions
A variety of states of nature are possible.

contain defensive groups that are stable.

Some may

In such states

of nature, Kavka's differential cost reply may well resolve

the symmetry problem.

groups might exist.

In other states of nature no such
In yet others with extant defensive

groups, the groups might be unstable and short-lived.

In

real world states of nature where defensive groups can only

come into existence through the making and keeping of

defensive group agreements or agreements relevantly similar
to them, Kavka's differential cost reply won't solve the

symmetry problem.

What is perhaps even more important is
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that in such states of nature, it appears that Hobbes'

reply to the Fool that it would be rational for second-

party members to keep their state-of nature agreements
isn't very compelling either:

second-party violators, as

I

Suppose both first-party and
argued, have little or no

reason to believe that they will be able to leave the state
of nature and enter the great Leviathan.

Then exclusion

from state-of-nature defensive groups or from civil society

cannot really be taken to be a cost of reneging on a state-

of-nature agreement.

If this in turn is true,

then parties

in the state of nature will probably not find themselves in
a

matrix

2

situation.

They may be doomed to

a

matrix

1

PD.

Interestingly enough, there are worries even if they do
find themselves in a matrix

2

situation in which exclusion

from civil society is a real cost.
be misleading, as Farrell

First,

and Gauthier

it may then well

have emphasized,

to read Hobbes as attempting to "ground," morality on the

basis of self-interest:

The kinds of agreement that it is

rational to make and keep in matrix
in section 2.4,

2

situations, as we saw

do not require constraining one's pursuit

of self-interest.

It may then be charged that such

agreements do not require persons to comply with moral
requirements since moral requirements mandate

a

restraint

on maximizing activity.

Second, we have to reconsider the

matrix for going first.

If it is rational to go second,
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then the matrix for going first probably does not depict

a

PD situation, and there probably is no conflict in the

state of nature.

Maybe a reconstrual of Hobbes' account of state-of-

nature cooperation will make possible a resolution of the

symmetry problem.

Although she does not directly address

this problem, Jean Hampton offers us an account of natural-

state cooperation that is distinctly different from what
has been considered so far.

She also has many interesting

things to say about sovereign institution.

views that

I

now turn.
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It is to these

.

.
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CHAPTER

3

HAMPTON ON HOBBES ON STATE-OF-NATURE COOPERATION AND
SOVEREIGN INSTITUTION
1

.

1

Introduction
In Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition

1

Jean

.

Hampton contends that Hobbes' argument for absolute

sovereignty

-

the argument that self-interested people in

the state of nature would be able to institute a sovereign
- fails.

She tells us that

Hobbes's argument does not fail because he cannot
establish the rationality of creating an absolute
sovereign, nonetheless it fails because he cannot
establish, given his psychology, that men and women
are able to do what is required to create a ruler
satisfying his definition of an absolute sovereign.
(H, 197)

Hampton, as the passage reveals, does not believe the

"sovereignty" argument fails for the reason that what she

identifies as its first premise

-

that it is more in each

sovereign rather

person's interest to be subjugated to

a

than to remain in the state of nature

(H, 148, 186)

-

fails.

Rather, she believes it does not succeed for other reasons.
She acknowledges that if the problems involved in sovereign

institution required that persons be able to escape

a

that they be able to do the cooperative thing in such

dilemmatic situation

-

PD
a

Hobbesian individuals, being the

SFMs that they are, would be unable to overcome them.
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-

Suppose,

for example, the institution of the sovereign

requires each person in the state of nature to make an

agreement to surrender his unlimited right of nature to the
sovereign.

Suppose, as

I

proposed in the last chapter, the

agreement in question is "interest-constraining:"

Each

prefers mutual adherence to mutual violation, but each

would do best if he were to violate unilaterally.

Then

although it would be collectively rational to abide, it
would not be individually rational to do so.

Hobbesian

individuals who were fully rational would therefore, if the
social contract were interest-constraining, be unable to

escape the natural state and to enter civil society.

But

Hampton believes that although the inauguration of the
sovereign requires that Hobbesian individuals be capable of

resolving complex problems, none of these is
(H 136
,

,

138 157 148
,

,

)

I

a PD.

think, however, Hampton's argument

to the contrary notwithstanding, that even the first

premise of the argument for sovereign inauguration is
problematic.

I

believe that it is problematic because

sovereign institution does in the end succumb to the very
kind of PD-like problems Hampton claims it evades.

To see

that this is so, one first needs to understand her views on

Hobbes on natural-state cooperation.
Accordingly, in this chapter

I

begin with a summary of

Hampton's account of Hobbes on state-of-nature cooperation.
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Although highly interesting, this account
afflicted with

a

serious difficulty.

I

-

I

think

-

is

then show how these

views on cooperation undermine her reasoning in support of

what she takes to be the first premise in Hobbes'

sovereignty argument.
1.2

Hampton's Shortsightedness Account of Conflict

Hampton (like Kavka) is concerned, among other things,
to give an account of the state of nature that entitles

Hobbes to his conclusion that in this situation each
individual is at war with every other.

In adducing her

explanation of warfare, she expounds what she takes to be
Hobbes' views on rational cooperation in the natural state.

Hampton begins by suggesting that individuals in the
state of nature are not in
are in an iterated PD (IPD)

a
.

single play PD.

Rather, they

Roughly, an IPD is a complex

game, consisting of a sequence of other games, each game in

the sequence being PD-like.

(H,75)

Second, Hampton tells

us that given certain assumptions, it is rational for

Hobbesian state-of-nature individuals to cooperate in an
IPD.

Even if one of the parties behaves
irrationally by breaking his contractual promise in
[the]
the first game (or successive games)
counsels that the long-run
"iterated PD game"
benefits accruing from faithful contract keeping
will prompt the other party to continue to keep his
part of the bargain for a time in order to try to
"teach" the breaching party to choose the promise,

keeping act. The idea is to make the breaching
party realize that it is in his best interest to
reward rather than punish his partner's cooperative
act, because otherwise he will be forcing his
partner to renege in subsequent games, and a
pattern of contractual breaches will be established
that will deprive both of them of the benefits of
future bargains.
(H, 75-76)

Assume so far so good.
novel idea.

3

Hampton then introduces a

She claims that because of shortsightedness

many in the state of nature will mistakenly take themselves
to be in a single-play PD rather than in an iterated one.

The account [of conflict] would contend that many
people fail to appreciate the long-term benefits of
cooperation and opt instead for the short-term
benefits of noncooperation, and the rest are
legitimately fearful enough of this
shortsightedness afflicting their partners to doubt
that cooperation would have any educative effects.
This worry could then force even a farsighted
person to take a single-play orientation, with the
result that the uncooperative action would
dominate.
(H,81)
We can better appreciate the shortsightedness account
of conflict by briefly summarizing two other accounts of

warfare that Hampton develops, and by understanding her
reasons for rejecting them.

Hampton tells us that Chapter 15 of Leviathan suggests
what she calls the "passions" account of conflict.

4

According to this account, various natural psssions of
Hobbesian individuals like partiality, pride, revenge, and
the passion for glory are responsible for warfare.
49)

(T,48-

On this account, although cooperation among persons in
75

)

the state of nature is generally rational,

will fail to cooperate.

(T,48)

people

They will fail to do so because

some of their natural passions like the ones mentioned will

disrupt many people's reasoning and cause them to
behave irrationally, while the rest [will] fear
this disruption and [will] (rationally) refuse to
cooperate in order to avoid being exploited.
(T , 48

This account of conflict, Hampton argues, engenders

difficulties for Hobbes.

On the one hand,

if these

passions are not widespread among Hobbesian individuals

-

if the actions of these persons are not often disrupted by

them, then these passions in combination with the

predominant desire for self-preservation each Hobbesian
individual has, will at most generate only moderate amounts
of conflict.

The state of nature will then not be a state

of war of each against each.

In consequence,

no sovereign

will be needed to rescue these individuals from a

disastrous plight.

(T,

Suppose, on the other hand,

49-50)

that these passions are sufficiently widespread and deepThen the passions account

seated to generate total war.

seems to conflict with Hobbes' psychological postulate that
the desire for self-preservation is the predominant desire
of Hobbesian individuals.

In addition,

the frequent

disruption of people's cooperative activities by these
passions would make the creation and institution of
sovereign

a

near impossibility.
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(T,

49-50)

a

An appreciation of these shortcomings of the passions
account, Hampton proposes, may have moved Hobbes to present
a

very different explanation of conflict in Chapter

Leviathan

.

13

of

According to this "rationality" account,

conflict in the state of nature is a function of the
rational pursuit of self-preservation by each individual:

5

Hobbesian individuals, who are roughly egual in their
powers and capacities, compete for scarce goods in order to

acquire more of the same, and to ensure that they continue
to live in a "commodious" way.

Each is aware that all the

others are in the same competitive situation.

It is

therefore probably in an individual's interest to strike
preemptively.

as Hampton indicates,

In fact the account,

suggests that each person in the state of nature is in
PD:

a

Each prefers mutual forbearance to mutual invasion,

but each does best by invading unilaterally.

Since

invasion is dominant, each ends up invading.

The result of

invasion for purposes of seizing goods coupled with

invasion for the sake of glory, is
war.

(T,

a

condition of total

50-51)

Hampton explains that the rationality account, just
like the passions account, suffers serious problems.
First,

if Hobbesian individuals in the natural state are

really in
sovereign.

a PD,

they could not cooperate to institute a

Second, she believes that this account does not
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seem to be true.

For persons in the state of nature are

probably in an IPD in which cooperation is rational and not
in a one-shot PD.

(T,52)

The shortsightedness account of conflict, Hampton
urges, seems to have "all the advantages of the passions

and the rationality accounts, but

account's disadvantages."

none of either

The account takes

(T,52)

seriously the idea that Hobbesian individuals are in an IPD
situation.

This fits well with Hobbes' psychology, since

being in an IPD links cooperation as a means of achieving
peace, with the predominant desire for self-preservation

each Hobbesian individual has.

(T,52)

allows for sovereign institution:

The account also

If Hobbesian persons are

in an IPD in which cooperation is rational,

then it is not

impossible for them to cooperate for purposes of

inaugurating

a

sovereign.

Yet at the same time,

(T,52)

Hampton insists, since the numerous shortsighted persons in
the state of nature treat PDs as one-time occurrences

rather than as members of

a series,

"we would be

acknowledging the soundness of the iterated PD argument for

cooperation but still endorsing, in the main, Hobbes's
Chapter 13 account of conflict."

(T,53)

Hampton summarizes the "shortsightedness" account in
this way:
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1.
The iterated PD game argument establishes that
although it is not rational to cooperate in singleplay games, many and perhaps even most cooperative
situations in the state of nature are multi-play PD
game situations in which it is in one's long-term
best interest to cooperate.
2.
The complexities of life in the state of nature
are such that many people will reason, mistakenly,
that it is rational not to cooperate in iterated PD
game situations. This fallacious reasoning will be
common, but not ubiquitous, in the state of nature.
3.
The fear that one's partner is too shortsighted
to appreciate the long-term benefits of
cooperation, or the fear that one's partner will
believe that one is shortsighted, will lead one (a)
not to cooperate in high-risk cooperative ventures
(as dictated either by the maximin rule or by an

expected-utility calculation)
and (b) not to
cooperate in many (although not all) medium and
low-risk cooperative situations, as dictated by an
expected-utility calculation (where the probability
that one's partner will behave uncooperatively is
generally high)
4.
The desire for glory, understood as the desire
to have the power and ability to get one's own way,
is a powerful but subsidiary cause of conflict; and
insofar as it encourages the belief that one is
superior to one's fellows, it leads one to
overestimate one's chances of winning a conflict,
and this encourages the conclusion among people in
this state that (as defined in 3(a) or 3(b)) it is
(H, 88-89)
rational not to cooperate.
,

1.3

Two Natural-State Situations

I

want to indicate

a

problem with this interpretation

by asking whether or not on it cooperation is rational in

the state of nature.

Item

(1)

7

in Hampton's summary tells us that there are

cooperative situations in the state of nature that are IPDs
in which cooperation is rational.
in many,

Item

(2)

tells us that

and maybe even in most, such cooperative
79

situations individuals will fail to cooperate because of

mistaken reasoning.

Item (3), however, suggests that in

many of the cooperative situations in which persons reason
incorrectly, the rational thing to do, "as dictated by an

expected utility calculation" or
to cooperate.

situations as

a

maximin rule is to fail

But if these cooperative situations are IPD
(1)

tells us, then since it is allegedly

rational to cooperate in such situations,

(see item (1))

rationality cannot also prescribe that persons in them do
the noncooperative thing.

The problem can be seen more

clearly if we distinguish between two different sorts of

situation in which Hobbesian individuals in the natural
state might find themselves.

In one of these, what

call

I

In the other -

a

"Cl" situation, cooperation is rational.

a

"C2 " situation - cooperation is not rational.

Cl Situations

Assume that each person in the state of nature is
These persons have true beliefs and reason

rational.

correctly.

iterated PD.

Assume secondly, that they are in a kind of
Here's an illustrative scenario borrowed from

2:

Larry and Mo are two inhabitants of the state

of nature.

Larry raises cattle and his neighbor Mo rears

Chapter

horses.

Cattle and horses are highly coveted by the

numerous bandits who roam the plains.
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Each of our ranchers

.

can expect his establishment to be marauded.

Aware of

this, each makes a defense pact with the other.

The pact

requires that each come to the aid of the other in case the

person or property of that other is attacked by

a

third

party.

Suppose Larry is attacked.
and come to Larry's aid?

Should Mo honor the pact

From a short-term perspective, Mo

might do best by reneging:

If he adheres to the defense

pact agreement, he can expect Larry to renege.

After all,

in the short run Larry would probably do better if he were

to renege than if he were to help Mo,

Mo's farm were raided.

in the event that

If Mo now violates the pact, he can

once again expect Larry to renege in the future.

From a

short term perspective, then, it may seem to Mo that he is
in a genuine PD,

and that the game in which the two find

themselves, a game that completes in two consecutive moves
-

first player plays (or aids)

second,

is itself PD-like,

first/second player plays

as diagram

1

on the next page

confirms
But suppose raids of this kind are frequent so that

each can expect to find himself in "raid" situations many

times over, but neither knows how many times over.

Then

from a long-term perspective, each will probably do best by

upholding the defense pact.

Since each is rational and

neither suffers from shortsightedness, each in this IPD
situation will cooperate.
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.

Larry* Moves First

Moi Moves Second

Preferences
for outcomes
after Mo's
second move
Larry

Mo

Keeps the pact

5

Breaks the pact

0

Keeps the pact

10

0

Breaks the pact

1

1

5

Keeps the
defense pact

10

Breaks the
defense pact

The numbers represent
expected utilities,
higher numbers
indicating stronger
preferences

Figure 3.1

Diagram

1

C2 Situations

Assume,

firstly, that most but not all persons in the

state of nature are shortsighted.

reason badly.

Shortsighted people

They may do so in two distinct ways.

First,

their reasoning may be correct, but nevertheless they
reason badly because their reasoning appeals to beliefs
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that are false.

(H,

82-83)

For instance, these persons

might be in some kind of matrix

cooperation is rational.

situation in which

2

Recall that in such a situation

cooperation is dominant for each.

But they might believe

that they were in a single-shot matrix
rational thing to do in a matrix

1

PD situation.

The

situation, they would

1

reason correctly, is to fail to cooperate.

Since in this

imaginary case, they would (mistakenly) take themselves to
be in a single-round PD, they would not cooperate.

another example, more relevant to
views:

a

Here's

discussion of Hampton's

The persons might be in some kind of situation in

which if they were rational, smart, and farsighted, it
would be an IPD in which cooperation is rational.
it stands,

But as

due to their shortsightedness, it isn't.

Once

again, suppose they believe that they are in a single-shot

matrix

1

Given their mistaken beliefs, they correctly

PD.

reason that in this (hypothetical) case, they should

refrain from cooperating.

might be faulty.

(H,82)

Second, their reasoning itself

They may not, for instance, be

astute enough to ascertain that in an IPD of a certain
type, the rational thing to do is to cooperate.

They may

be incapable of any "reasoning that requires any

sophisticated long-term reasoning ability."

(H,

149)

g

Assume, secondly, that each shortsighted person in the

state of nature does in fact believe that he is in
time matrix

1

PD and will,

in consequence,
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do the

a

one-

.

noncooperative thing.

Assume, thirdly, that each person in

the natural state knows that most persons in this state are

shortsighted and that

a

few are not shortsighted.

Assume,

fourthly, that these Hobbesian individuals cannot determine

whether their prospective interactive partners are either
shortsighted or non-shortsighted
Suppose I'm a non-shortsighted person in this type of
state of nature and it's Thursday.

Suppose,

in addition,

that it's now time to decide whether or not to keep

defensive pact agreement that
should

I

do?

I

I

made on Monday.

a

What

know I'm in a "C2" situation that abounds

with shortsighted people.

Suppose

I

also know that

shortsightedness, as Hampton cautions, "is difficult, if
not impossible to cure."

(H,85)

Now

I

shortsighted persons believe they are in

know that
a

matrix

1

situation and will do the noncooperative thing come what
may.

Since there are many shortsighted people in C2

,

the

probability that my partners are shortsighted is pretty
high.

Furthermore,

I

know that if

I

cooperate while the

others do not, the outcome for me will be either pretty

calamitous or at least fairly damaging.

This, together

with the aforementioned items of relevant information
have about C2

,

cooperation in

I

should be sufficient to convince me that
a C2

situation is not rational.

Assume that

when it comes to deciding whether or not to cooperate, each
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non-shortsighted person reasons in this way.
will be mutual non-cooperation.

The outcome

If this in turn is true,

then we know that a C2 situation cannot be a Cl situation
or an IPD of Hampton's variety; in the latter cooperation
is rational,

in the former,

it is not.

We can allow that this might be true:

Maybe if there

were no shortsighted people, the situation would not be of
the C2 type.

Perhaps it then would be an IPD analogous to

a Cl situation.

It is possible that if everyone were

farsighted, the rational thing to do would be to cooperate.
But even if this is true,

it should make no difference to

whether cooperation is rational in

a

real C2 situation in

which many but not all are shortsighted:

What's rational

to do depends in part on what the others will do.

If most

are shortsighted, it would not be rational for me to behave
as if they were farsighted.

1.4

A Problem with Hampton

'

s

Account of Cooperation

Reverting to Hampton's views on cooperation, some

passages suggest that she believes Hobbesian individuals to
be in a situation relevantly similar to a C2 situation.

For instance, in the (full) passage cited on page 75 above,

Hampton appears to believe that noncooperation will be

dominant for each party.

A second germane passage is this:

Hobbes can make a fairly good case for the claim
that the rationality of cooperation is sufficiently
85

difficult to understand that the number of people
who will reason badly and who thus will fail to
cooperate is high enough to make cooperation
generally too risky.
(H,88)
A third relevant passage occurs later in the book:

the iterated PD game argument is supposed to show
the long-term rationality of performing the
collectively rational act in those prisoner's
dilemmas that are part of an indefinite series; but
as we discussed in chapter 3, in most situations
too many Hobbesian people are likely to be
shortsighted to make it rational for even
farsighted people to trust that their partners will
be true to their commitments.
(H,134)

Other passages, however, indicate that Hampton

believes the appropriate situation is relevantly like
.

.

situation.

Item

.

(1)

.

.

in her summary is a nice example.

a Cl
9

It

should be stressed that Hampton clearly wants to ascribe to
Hobbes the view that in some manner cooperation in the
She believes, as

state of nature is rational:

I

intimated

earlier, that were it not rational, Hobbesian individuals

would be unable to institute
predicament.

(H,

78-79)

a

sovereign and escape their

10

The summary, though, strongly suggests Hampton wants
to have it both ways - that on the one hand, cooperation

really is rational in many cooperative situations in the
state of nature but on the other hand, since such

situations are replete with shortsighted people,

cooperation in them is not rational.
course, be a mistake.

This would, of

In C2-like situations,
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cooperation

is not rational whereas in Cl-like situations,

The problem here, perhaps, is this:
like matrix

1

(or matrix 2)

it is.

11

In some situations

situations, what it is rational

for a party to do does not depend on certain information

about the relevant others.

One needn't know,

for example,

that the other is incorrectly perceiving the situation as

matrix

2

a

situation and will thus probably do the

cooperative thing, in order to know that the rational thing
to do in a matrix

1

situation is to fail to cooperate.

Other situations like matrix

3

situations are not of this
Mo

Keeps the
agreement

Breaks the
agreement

Larry
keeps the
agreement

10,10

-2,8

8,-2

5,5

Breaks the
agreement

Figure 3.2
sort.

Matrix

3

In such situations, depending on what the second

party does, one would do best by adjusting one's actions
accordingly.

Perhaps the state of nature is similar in

this respect to

a

matrix

3

situation:

If,

as

Hampton

believes, it is known that many in the state of nature are
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shortsighted and will do the noncooperative thing, this bit
of information, as cases

1

and

2

intimate, should

considerably influence one's decision as to the rational
course of action.
It is possible that Hampton does conceptualize

matters in

somewhat similar fashion to what has just been

a

suggested.

She may be inclined to the view that knowledge

that many in the state of nature are shortsighted

"transforms" a situation that is initially an IPD into one
that is analogous to C2

.

But even such a view wouldn't

enable her to have her cake and to eat it as well.

either such
it does not,

For

"transformation" occurs or it does not.

a

If

then contrary to summary item (3), an expected

utility calculation should not prescribe noncooperation in
most cooperative situations.

If it does,

then pace summary

item (1), most cooperative situations in the state of

nature will not be IPDs.
Finally, Hampton could say that it's wrong to think of

the state of nature as one big cooperative situation in

which cooperation either is or isn't rational.

Rather,

think of the natural state as abounding with many

cooperative situations, most of which are of the C2
variety, but some of which are of the Cl variety.

(She

could not here reverse the order, supposing an abundance of
Cl situations.

For then in most cooperative situations

cooperation would be rational.
88

The state of nature would,

: .

as a result,

fail to exhibit the kind of conflict Hampton

believes it does.)
The problem with this suggestion is that it is

inconsistent with summary item

(1)

.

Contrary to what that

item tells us, the suggestion now under consideration

proposes that most cooperative situations in the natural
state are of the C2 variety in which cooperation is not

rational
In light of the foregoing,

let's tentatively conclude

that Hampton's shortsightedness account of conflict

supposes Hobbesian individuals in the state of nature to be
in either a C2-like situation or in a Cl-like situation.

now want to show that this conclusion undermines what

Hampton believes is the first premise in Hobbes' argument
for absolute sovereignty.

1

.

5

Hampton on Sovereign- institution
The premise in question is this:
It is in each person's interest to be
1.
subjugated to a sovereign rather than to remain in
(H,186)
the state of nature.

Hampton argues for this premise in the following

passage
If we consider how Hobbes describes the state of

nature and what he says about the reasons people
have for instituting a sovereign, his remarks
89

I

indicate that it is not best characterized by the
matrix in Figure 6.6, but by the matrix in Figure
6.7.
[These matrices are reproduced on page 91
below.]
Actually, this matrix represents an
idealized version of what I will eventually argue
is the real deliberation of the parties regarding
the institution of the sovereign, because it helps
us to clarify what the preferences of the people
are for remaining in the state of nature versus
surrendering their rights to some person or
assembly.
In the matrices of Figures 6.6 and 6.7
we are supposing, for simplicity's sake, that there
are three people in the state of nature, that one
of them person Z, has already been selected by some
process as potential sovereign, and that the other
two people, X and Y, are deliberating whether or
not to surrender their rights to all things to Z.
Suppose that I am individual X and you are
individual Y. Would our preferences match those in
Figures 6.6 or 6.7? In the PD matrix of Figure
6.6, I reason that I would be better off in a
partial state of war (where you have surrendered
your rights to Z but where I have not) than I would
be in either a complete state of war or a complete
state of peace.
However, this does not seem to be
the preference I would actually have if I were
deliberating whether or not to surrender to Z;
instead, it would seem that I would believe, as the
matrix in Figure 6.7 indicates, that I would be
worse off in this partial state of war than I would
In the latter state
be in the total state of war.
there would exist only individuals (i.e. Y and Z)
of strength and abilities roughly equal to my own,
who might be deterred from attacking me because
they would be uncertain of having sufficient
strength to overcome me, or who could be repelled
successfully by me, given their attack, if I had a
But if you should
slight advantage in strength.
did not, there
and
I
right
to
Z
surrender your
powers
in this small
of
consolidation
would be a
significantly
group
the
making
confederacy,
stronger than any single individual like myself.
This confederacy would therefore be likely to
attempt, and be successful in, an attack against
But this means I would perceive my life in
me.
such a partial state of war to be less secure than
in a total state of war, so that I would prefer the
latter to the former.
However, as the matrix indicates, I would
regard being a member of this confederacy in a
partial state of war as preferable to being a lone
90

2

individual in the state of total war.
If I
surrendered my right to all things to Z I would
gain additional security because I could rely on
the support of Z if I were attacked, and the two of
us together would fare better in any preemptive
strike against another individual like you because
of the strength of our numbers.
However, I would
best prefer the situation in which both you and I
would authorize the same person or assembly of
persons as sovereign. My security would be
greatest when there were no other individuals or
groups who were still at war with me, and this
would occur when everyone in the state of nature
had authorized the same person as sovereign.
,

(H,

148-149)
X

Do not

Surrender to
Y

Surrender
to

surrender to

Z

,

4,1

1,4

3,3

2

Z

Z

Do not

surrender
to

Z

Hampton's Figure 6.6

Figure 3.3

X

Surrender to
Z

Y

Surrender
to

Do not
surrender to

1,1

2,4

4,2

3,3

Z

Do not

surrender
to

Z

Figure 3.4

Hampton's Figure 6.7
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Z

The numbers in Figures 6.6 and 6.7 represent preference-

strengths, lower numbers indicating stronger preferences.

Suppose Hampton is right that the matrix in her Figure
6.7

(or as I shall say "matrix 6.7")

correctly portrays

persons' preferences for sovereign institution.

Then it is

straightforwardly rational for Hobbesian individuals to
institute a sovereign.

Her inauguration, contrary to the

discussion in the last chapter, involves no PD-like
problems.

premise

1

I

believe, though, that Hampton's argument for

leaves something to be desired.

Assume, as Hampton does, that the question of who will
be sovereign is settled.

Assume, also, that Hobbesian

individuals are psychologically able to do what is required
In deciding whether or not it is

to create a sovereign.

rational to institute
state of nature,
problems.

I

a

sovereign, each individual in the

think,

faces at least two decision

It is a failure to distinguish these two

problems that is the ultimate source of the difficulty for

Hampton's argument:
Let individuals x, y, and

individuals.

Suppose

I

z

be state-of-nature

am individual x and

I

am

deliberating whether to surrender my right to all things to
the sovereign-elect,

z.

Hampton seems to attribute to me

the following kind of reasoning:

surrenders his rights to

z.

"Suppose individual y

Then y and
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z

will unite in

a

)

defense confederacy.

The confederacy will be stronger than

any lone individual like me.

I

will then in all likelihood

be attacked, because doing so will further the interests of
y and z,

now united in a strong team.

(Assume that if

their attack were successful, they would split the spoils
50-50.

now have the choice of either surrendering to

I

refraining from doing so.
be assailed.

I

If

I

fail to surrender,

enjoy

a

Furthermore,

I

If

I

surrender,

I

z.

or

will

will

will almost certainly be able to

share of the fruits of further raids on lone

individuals by the then enlarged group consisting of
and

,

will be unable to repel the invaders and my

life will be hanging on a thread.
be spared.

I

z

So if y surrenders,

I

x,

y,

do best by surrendering.

Suppose, on the other hand, y does not surrender.

Then if
nature.

don't surrender, everyone remains in the state of

I

That would be bad.

If

I

surrender, then

will unite in a defense confederacy.

support of

z

if

I

I

z

and

I

could rely on the

were attacked, and the two of us together

would fare better in any preemptive strike against another
So if y fails to surrender,

individual like y.

I

do best

by surrrendering.

Hence no matter what y does,
surrendering.

So

I

I

do best by

should surrender."

Notice, however, what this line of reasoning

presupposes.

Hampton's argument that matrix 6.7 correctly
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represents the preferences of individuals in the natural
state "for being in such a PD-prone state versus being in

a

commonwealth (or something in between)" (H,150),
presupposes an affirmative answer to
question:

a

different decision

whether it is rational for an Hobbesian

individual in the state of nature to cooperate with another
such individual in order to form a defense confederacy.^^
It presupposes,

in other words,

of question discussed in section

preceeding chapter

-

an answer to the very kind
(1)

above and in the

whether cooperation in the state of

nature is rational.
1.6

Prior Results Summarized
In the last chapter

I

arrived at some general

conclusions on the rationality of the making and the
keeping of defense pact agreements in the state of
nature.

13

I

argued that in a transparent one-shot

sequential play PD-like situation, it is rational for both

first-party and second-party members to uphold
pact.

defense

a

Hampton, however, eschews considerations of

transparency
impress her.

(H,

218-219).

In an opaque,

So this conclusion would fail to

single round PD-like game,

I

argued that it is not rational for either first-party or

second-party Hobbesian individuals to adhere to
pact.

Again,

I

a

defense

think this conclusion would not perturb
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Hampton since she seems to believe that Hobbesian
individuals in the state of nature are in an IPD.

third conclusion

I

The

assumed is that Hobbesian individuals in

an IPD will find it rational to abide by a defense pact

agreement.

But again, this conclusion may not be very

germane as far as Hampton is concerned, since she believes

shortsightedness to be widespread in the state of nature.
I

assumed,

in endorsing the third conclusion,

that all

individuals in the IPD were rational.
So let's reconsider Hampton's views on natural-state

cooperation and see how they bear on her argument in
support of premise
1.7

1.

Why Hampton's Account of Sovereign- institution Fails
I

concluded section

(1)

by proposing that on Hampton's

views, people in the state of nature are either primarily
in Cl sorts of situation or they are principally in C2

kinds of situation.

Let's examine each possibility.

Assume that raids or preemptive strikes in the state
of nature are common, so that individuals like x and

z

can

expect frequently to find themselves in raid situations in

which they must defend themselves against attack by third
parties.

Well aware of this, neighbors x and

whether to form a defense confederacy.
unreasonable to suppose that
IPD,

a

z

ponder

It is not

situation of this sort is an

or a sort of situation analogous to a Cl situation.
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:

In a situation of this type cooperation is rational.

In

any case, we can assume as Hampton seems to, that it is.
If x,

y,

and

z

are in fact in this kind of situation, then

providing each is rational, it is in the self-interest of
each to make and to keep a defense pact agreement.
Hampton, as we saw, believes many in the state of nature to
be shortsighted.

But let's initially suppose, to simplify

matters, that

x,

individuals.

Then it would seem that each would make

y,

and

z

are fully rational,

farsighted
a

defense pact treaty and would abide by that treaty.
Support that Hampton takes

x,

y,

and

z

to be in this

sort of situation, or at least in a situation in which

cooperation is rational, is found in what she has to say
about the notion of surrendering one's rights to someone
else
An individual authorizes another as sovereign [or
surrenders one's rights to all things to the
sovereign (H,174)] by
participating with the other inhabitants of the
1.
state of nature in a process in which one of them
is selected as sovereign (e.g., in a peaceful
election process or in violent competition for
leadership in which one confederacy emerges as
dominant, followed by an explicit or tacit
agreement that this individual is sovereign) and
obeying the punishment commands (a) of only
2.
this individual (b) to refrain from interfering in
the punishment of another and (c) to actively
assist in the punishment of another, insofar as
these commands are (or have been made by the
sovereign to be) individually rational

these actions involved in authorizing the
sovereign can be performed by Hobbesian people.
[A] 11 of
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]

(H186-187)
[This is because it is
straightforwardly rational for each to perform each
of these actions.
(H, 187-188 207
,

So,

for example,

things" to

z

,

)

if x "surrenders his rights to all

x undertakes an action or a series of

actions, each of which is SM-rational.

If it is rational

for x (and indeed for y) to form a defense confederacy with
z,

then Hampton's argument in support of premise

1

may seem

pretty strong.
However, there's a problem:

If it is

straightforwardly rational for x and

y,

in fact for any

individual, to unite in a defense confederacy with others,

then the state of nature,

substantial warfare. 14

absolute sovereign.

I

think, would fail to exhibit

There would then be no need for an

To put the point slightly differently,

the assumption that it is rational for individuals in the

natural state to make and to keep defense pact agreements
seems necessary to sustain Hampton's argument for premise
1.

At the same time, this very assumption seems to

undermine the shortsightedness account of conflict.
Hampton may object that

I

have assumed that all

persons in the state of nature are rational and that none
is shortsighted.

But she might protest that it is this

very characteristic of Hobbesian persons that is essential
to understanding why the natural state abounds with
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conflict.

She stresses that "shortsightedness makes

warfare inevitable."

(H,148)

So let's consider the second possibility.

Assume that

most individuals in the state of nature are shortsighted.

These persons, being shortsighted, would fail to cooperate.
They would fail to form defense confederacies with others.

They would fail to do so because shortsighted persons, when

deliberating whether or not to enter into

a

defense pact

agreement, would take themselves to be in a one-shot PD in

which cooperation is irrational.

A non-shortsighted person

in this C2 state-of-nature situation would also fail to

cooperate:

Suppose Hobbesian individuals

in this situation.

z.

y,

and

z

are

Suppose x is rational whereas the other

two are shortsighted.

agreement with

x,

On Monday x makes a defense pact

It's now Thursday and x must decide

whether to act in accord with the agreement.

x knows that

the probability that the other two are shortsighted is
high.

He knows that shortsightedness is almost impossible

to cure.

He knows that shortsighted persons believe they

are in a one-shot PD and will not do the cooperative thing,
x rightly concludes that it would be irrational to abide by

the defense pact.
is not rational.

Cooperation in this C2 sort of situation
Since it is not rational for x to adhere

to the defense pact, x will find it irrational to subjugate

himself to

z.

Hampton argues to the contrary.

98

But her

argument assumes that it is rational for x and

defense confederacy.

z

to form a

This is not true in a C2 situation.

Her argument therefore, when the relevant situation in

which

x,

y,

persuasive.

and

z

are is a C2 situation,

is not

15

Perhaps what is needed to solve the problem of the

Hobbesian social contract is
Hobbes

7

a

reconceptualization of

views on rational cooperation.

That is precisely

what David Gauthier gives us.
1.8

Prelude to Gauthier

7

s

Views

Gauthier's views are discussed in some detail in the
next four chapters.

As a prelude to this discussion,

I

think it fitting to conclude this chapter with these

provoking remarks of his on Hobbes:
But 'this specious reasoning is neverthelesse
false. 7 Hobbes has another, and better, reply to
Not
the Foole, in his account of right reason
only morality, but rationality as well, must come
The
within [the] ambit [of conventionalism]
Foole, in appealing to natural reason in support of
injustice, falls into inconsistency, through his
failure to appreciate the tight conceptual
connection between right and reason which is
necessary to Hobbes's thought. The right of nature
If one lays down some
expresses right reason.
portion of that right, then one also renounces the
rationality that was the basis of the right laid
down.
If one lays down some portion of one's right
to do whatever seems conducive to one's
preservation and well-being, so that one may find
peace, then one renounces preservation as the
standard of reason, in favor of peace. The Foole
appeals to that reason which dictates to every man
his own good - to natural reason, so that he may
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.

show injustice to be rational.
But injustice is a
violation of covenant, and, in covenanting, in
laying down one's right, one has renounced natural
reason as the court of appeal, in favor of a reason
that dictates to every man what all agree is
,

good

16
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Notes
1.
See Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract
Tradition (1986), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Page references to this book are as follows:
(H, page

number)
2.
2

See Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition
and 3

.

chapters

3.
The issues of just what an iterated PD is, and whether
cooperation in such a PD is rational, are controversial.
See, for example, David Braybrooke, "The Insoluble Problem
of the Social Contract," in Paradoxes of Rationality and
Cooperation eds., R. Campbell and L. Sowden (1985),
Vancouver:
The University of British Columbia Press, 277306; Peter Danielson, "The Moral and Ethical Significance
of TIT FOR TAT," Dialogue 25 (1986), 449-470; Gregory S.
Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (1986)
Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, pp.
129-136, and J. H. Sobel, "Utility Maximixers in Iterated
Prisoner's Dilemmas," Dialogue 15 (1976), 38-53.
In this
paper Sobel argues that cooperation in an iterated PD is
not rational.
,

Hampton presents the passions account in Hobbes and the
4.
Social Contract Tradition pp. 63-74, and in "Hobbes's
Page references to
State of War," Topoi 4 (1985), 47-60.
7.
(T, page number)
this
paper are given in this way:
.

The rationality account is discussed by Hampton in
5.
Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition pp. 58-63; 74-79;
and in "Hobbes's State of War." It is basically the same
account that I developed in section 2.3 in Chapter 2.
.

6.

In a high risk situation,

one can suffer crippling losses if the other party
reneges and takes advantage of one's cooperation.
[Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract p. 81.
See, also, p. 71 of this same work, and Hampton's
"Hobbes's State of War," p. 53.]
,

Let's ignore the complication of distinguishing, as
Hobbes seems to do, between the rationality of cooperation
with respect to first-party members and with respect to
second-party members in sequential play PD-like games.
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,

,

.

Hampton does not directly address the symmetry
problem.
However, it's abundantly clear that she
attributes to Hobbes certain views on the rationality of
cooperation in the state of nature. Her position on the
symmetry enigma may then simply be this:
If her
interpretation of Hobbes account of cooperation is
correct, then the problem fails to arise.
In other words,
the symmetry problem is to be evaded by reconstruing
Hobbes account of rational cooperation.
7

7

8.
There is a nice discussion of the sources of
shortsightedness in the state of nature in Hampton's
"Hobbes's State of War," pp. 54-56.

It should be clear that Hampton does not intend
'cooperative situation' to refer solely to a situation
where the rational thing to do is to cooperate. So, for
instance, in summary item (3)
she claims that it is not
rational to cooperate in many medium-risk and low-risk
cooperative situations.
9

.

10.
See also, for example, Hobbes and the Social Contract
Tradition pp. 78-79.
11.
The tendency to conflate the two situations seems
apparent in the following passage, this time in "Hobbes's
State of War," p. 58:
12.

According to the shortsightedness account of
conflict, although cooperation is rational, the
prevalence of shortsighted and glory-prone people
will mean one usually cannot risk cooperation
oneself because one cannot be sure enough in most
cooperative situations that one's partner will be
cooperative (or learn to cooperate)
13.

If x and
Braybrooke is sceptical about this.
equally resourceful in the state of nature, then

z

are

why should either have less to fear from utterly
subjecting himself to the other than from entering
into a contract which the other would be free to
[David Braybrooke, "The Insoluble Problem
violate?
of the Social Contract," p. 287]
See Chapter

2,

section 2.5, this thesis.
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:

14.
It's possible that a state of nature will emerge with
multiple defense groups. It might then be tempting to
explain the existence of conflict in terms of interdefense-group warfare. But this suggestion doesn't fare
too well either:
We need only take each group as an
individual and ask whether cooperation among such
individuals is rational. On the possibility now being
entertained, cooperation among natural-state individuals is
rational.
So "group individuals" would cooperate to fend
off third parties, again with the result that there would
be insubstantial warfare in this sort of state of nature.
15.
Richard J. Arneson, in correspondance has suggested
the following sort of reply available to Hampton in defense
of the claim that the existence of natural-state conflict
is consistent with the eventual ratification of the social
contract
It isn't true that if it's rational for individuals to
unite in a defense confederacy with others, the state of
nature would not exhibit much conflict:
,

Given shortsightedness, many individuals would not
form defense confederacies, and these individuals
would be prone to war against each other and they
would also be tempting prey for such defense
confederacies as do form.
If a single defense
confederacy becomes doiminant, and subordinates all
individuals over a large territory, then we have
sovereignty by conquest.
If this does not occur,
we have the state of war, hence the strong motive
Hampton raises
to form sovereignty by institution.
to
rational
would
be
the question of whether it
that
many
knows
submit to a sovereign when one
persons are shortsighted. Her answer is that even
shortsighted people can see their way to
cooperation in this instance, because the payoffs
favor cooperation (submission) even in the very
short term.
Since cooperation is rational in the state of nature
evisaged by Arneson, perhaps we're in a Cl-like situation.
In this sort of situation, raids and preemptive strikes are
Arneson suggests that even
common (see page 95 above)
situation "see their way to"
such
a
in
people
shortsighted
Hobbesians to submit to
these
for
better
is
It
submission.
all this is
Suppose
warring.
keep
to
than
a sovereign
shortsighted
same
very
these
wouldn't
then,
Why,
true.
the frequency
given
confederacies
defense
persons unite in
.
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of raids and preemptive strikes? Surely, if anything, it
is more in their immediate short-term interest to defend
themselves against raiders than to inaugurate a sovereign.
If these shortsighted persons can "see their way to"
submission, they should also, barring any plausible
explanation to the contrary, be able to "see their way to"
forming defense confederacies.
If this, in turn, is true,
I don't see, pace Arneson, how many shortsighted persons in
this state of nature would "not form defense confederacies"
and "would be prone to war against each other."
16.
See David Gauthier, "Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist,"
The Journal of Philsophy 76 (1979), 547-561, pp. 556-557.
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CHAPTER

4

RATIONAL BARGAINING
1

.

1

Gauthier on the Prisoner's Dilemma
The matrix representing Butch's and Sundance's PD is

this

Butch

Confesses

Remains silent

Sundance
Confesses

10,10

1, 30
(b)

(a)

Remains silent

30,1

2

(c)

Figure 4.1

,

(d)

The Felons' Dilemma

The numbers represent years with Sundance's prison-terms

shown first.

Think of

(a)

,

(b)

(c)

,

and

(d)

as "agreement

outcomes," or outcomes that would result if each felon were
to agree with the other to act in a certain fashion, and

were then to act in that fashion at the appropriate time,
(d)

is the "cooperative outcome."

The parts of Gauthier's argument germane to showing

that the dilemma is escapable

-

that in the example, Butch

and Sundance could rationally cooperate and secure optimal

outcome

(d)

-

are essentially two:
105

First, Gauthier argues

.

,

,

,

that as SFMs, agents in the position of Butch and Sundance,

engaged in genuine bargaining over the agreement outcomes,
will settle on

(d)

the outcome selected by the principle

of minimax relative concession.

This principle of

distributive justice, according to Gauthier, expresses the
principle of utility maximization in the context of
bargaining.

(M

by A,

Second, rational bargainers

145,151)

can assure themselves that their would-be partners do not

cheat when the time comes to act on the terms of a rational
agreement, because their "constrained rationality" enjoins

compliance with agreements that are rationally made.
In this chapter

next,

I

I

discuss rational bargaining.

In the

deal with the issue of compliance.

The Bargaining Issue

1.2

Bargaining over "possible PD agreement outcomes" like
(a)

,

(c)

(b)

,

and

(d)

may seem to pose no special problem:

the cooperative outcome,

(d)

seems to be salient.

It

seems to be the one that rational agents should seek to
attain.

So let's for the moment leave Butch and Sundance

and talk about others.

We'll then return to our two

felons

Gazing at the starry skies one night, Tom and Dan
two SFMs

-

are promised by VOICE that if they were

rationally to agree on how to divide $100 between them,
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-

each would find the appropriate sum under his pillow the
next day.

To reach agreement would be to consent to act in

accord with a strategy.

consists in

A strategy - roughly speaking

a set of actions,

-

one for each maximizer.

Since there are many possible splits, Tom and Dan have

available to them many different strategies.

In conformity

with what principle, if any, would it be rational to choose
among these strategies?

If we suppose that in settling on

an option some compromise will be required - neither on the

face of it,

split

-

if rational, will agree to a $100/$0 or $0/$100

then each will have to bargain with the other to

make certain concessions.
David Gauthier proposes that SFMs in such bargaining

situations will settle on

a

compromise in which the largest

concession anyone makes is smaller than it would be in any
other compromise available:

They will choose agreement

outcomes on the basis of the principle of minimax relative

concession (MMRC).

1

In this chapter,

I

begin with a summary of Gauthier's

theory of rational bargaining.

2

This is a theory that

purports to specify the terms of rational agreement.

It

sets aside the issue of whether compliance with an

agreement rationally entered into is itself rational.

I

then argue that SFMs need not bargain on the basis of the

principle Gauthier recommends.
rational,

They would be no less

in certain bargaining situations,

107

to strike

agreement in some other way.

assumption that there is

a

This questions Gauthier's

uniquely attractive principle of

rational bargaining.
1*3

Gauth ier' s Theory of Rational Bargaining
Assume, plausibly, that cooperation often makes

possible a surplus of goods that would be unavailable if
those who cooperate to produce this surplus were to refuse
to interact, and were instead to act independently.

Bargaining theory is addressed to how this surplus is to be

apportioned among those who contribute to its production.

Gauthier tells us that in bargaining it is natural to
think of each person as beginning from

a

base point

- a

prebargaining payoff that is not called into question by
the bargaining situation.

The prebargaining payoff may

initially be identified with what each person could expect
to garner in the absence of any cooperative interaction.

3

Each person then makes a claim reflecting her desire to

gain as much as possible from agreement, subject to the

constraint not to drive others away and not herself to be
excluded from the bargaining table.

Given this constraint

and the desire to maximize payoffs, each person's claim is
the largest slice of the pie he could get consistent with

each other bargainer getting his prebargaining payoff.
the example of our star-gazers, each has a prebargain
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In

payoff of $0 and each will claim $100.

A rational bargain

gives each individual no more than his claim and no less

than his base point.

Incompatible claims will require

bargainers to make concessions if agreement is to be
reached.

Since each wishes to gain as much as possible,

each will endeavor to minimize her concessions.
Now the magnitude of concession is established not
with reference to some absolute scale of utility,
but rather with reference to the particular
bargaining situation; concession is a measure of
the proportion between the part of one's claim that
one abandons, and the entire claim, or gain over
one's base-point payoff, that one originally
advances.
Since the bargainers are equally and
fully rational, the maximum concession - the
greatest proportion of his or her original claim
that any bargainer gives up - must be minimized.
Since all benefit from reaching agreement, some set
of concessions is rational for all to accept, but a
particular set is rational for all only if any
alternative would require a concession at least as
great as the maximum in the given set.
In bargaining, therefore, rational persons
will act on a principle of minimax concession - the

greatest or maximum concession must be

.

.

a minimum.

4

Let's introduce some abbreviations.
is the value of outcome Oi for some agent A.

(1)

UA(Oi)

(2)

UAmin is A's minimum cooperative utility.

It is the

minimum utility she must be guaranteed by any agreement
outcome if she is to choose any such outcome.

5

UAmin is

equal to what A could expect to acquire from her own

efforts in the absence of agreement.
(3)

UAmax is A's maximum cooperative utility or A's claim.
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Suppose the total gains that cooperation may bring to

a

two-person group of bargainers consisting of members A and
B,

gains over and above the base points of A and

quantity

k.

(If k is some good,

B,

is some

assume that bargainers'

utilities are linear with respect to their share of this
good.)

k is the cooperative surplus

.

two bargainers, as in the case of A and
be the whole cooperative surplus.

When there are only
B,

A's claim will

When there are more than

two bargainers, one's claim will be that portion of the

cooperative surplus to which he contributes.

At least for

two-person bargaining situations, it appears that your
claim is equivalent to the maximum amount of utility you
could hope to obtain from cooperation compatible with your

partner receiving her minimum cooperative utility.
(4)

RA(Oi)adv is the relative advantage of Oi to

is any agreement outcome,

UAmin) / (UAmax-UAmin)

g

A.

If Oi

then RA(Oi)adv = (UA(Oi)-

The numerator of this ratio is the

.

difference between the utility

a

person is going to obtain

from cooperation and that person's minimum cooperative

utility.
(5)

7

RA (Oi) cone is the relative concession of Oi to A.

If

Oi is any agreement outcome, then RA(Oi)conc = (UAmax-

UA(Oi) )/ (UAmax-UAmin)

difference between

a

.

The numerator of this ratio is the

person's maximum cooperative utility

and the utility she is going to receive from agreement.

This difference is, therefore, simply the amount of utility
110

a

person forgoes in not getting her maximum

8
.

For any

agent, a, and agreement outcome oi, the sum of Ra(oi)adv

and Ra(oi)conc is one. 9
•

We can now finally formulate Gauthier's principle of

rational bargaining, the principle of minimax relative
concession.
MMRC:

Given a range of agreement outcomes each of which

requires concessions by some or all bargainers if it is to
be selected, an agreement outcome should be selected only
if the greatest or maximum relative concession it requires
is no greater than the maximum relative concession required

by every other agreement outcome 10
.

Think of MMRC in this way:

An agent's actual

concession is the difference between her claim and what she
gets from the outcome eventually agreed to.

Her maximal

concession is the difference between her claim and her

prebargaining payoff.

Her relative concession is simply

a

ratio of her actual concession to her maximal concession,
or what she actually concedes in bargaining relative to the

most she could concede in bargaining.

For each possible

outcome of bargaining, this parameter can be calculated for
each agent.

We can somewhat unrealistically think of

bargainers acting on MMRC as doing the following:
they inspect all possible agreement outcomes.
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First,

Second, they

demarcate the largest relative concession required in each
outcome.
"

LRC

.

"

Call this set of largest relative consessions

Each outcome has an LRC member.

Third, bargainers

select the outcome with the smallest LRC member.
Intuitively, Gauthier's elegant formal machinery is

designed to capture this idea:

bargaining situation.

Assume a two-person

Assume in addition that there is

a

single good, produced in fixed quantity and divisible in
any way among the cooperators. 11

Suppose that by acting

independently, each agent can produce k units of the good.

Suppose that by pooling their resources and cooperating,
they can generate 4k units of this good.

The cooperative

surplus, as we noted, is the difference between what can be

produced by individual activity and what can be produced by
joint activity

-

in terms of our example,

4k-(k+k) = 2k units of the good.

reasons,

this amounts to

Each cooperator, Gauthier

is entitled to her prebargaining payoff,

a share of the

k,

and to

cooperative surplus proportional to the

amount of that surplus that he makes possible.

person cooperative venture, if there is

a

In a two-

cooperative

surplus, each party is equally responsible for its

production.

So in such a case, each cooperator is entitled

12
to an equal share of the surplus (2k/2 = k units).

A down-to-earth example should further help illuminate

Gauthier's intuitions about bargaining:
invest and Bruce has $300.

Fred has $200 to

Investments under $500 earn 5%
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.

and those of $500 and over earn 10%.

Their only options

are to invest separately, or to pool their funds and to

invest jointly.

Investing separately, Bruce can expect a

return of $15, and Fred a return of $10.

their money, they can expect

collective fund.

a

If they pool

return of $50 on the

Joint investment generates a cooperative

surplus equivalent to $50- ($15+$10) = $25.

Without the

cooperation of the other, no such surplus would be
possible.

Each contributes equally to its generation, and

so each, Gauthier proposes,

share.

is entitled to an equivalent

Bruce will end up with a total of [$300 (his

principal) + $15 (his prebargaining payoff) +$12.50 (his

share of the cooperative surplus)] = 327.50; and Fred with
[$200 +$10 + $12.50] = 222.50.

The example highlights what

appears to be Gauthier's conviction that a principle of
rational cooperation must specify, in an acceptable
fashion, how the contributions each makes in a cooperative

endeavor are related to the production of the cooperative
surplus

14

Let's now revert to Butch and Sundance.

Assume their

utility matrix is identical to the one in Figure 4.2 on
page 114 below.

Numbers portray expected utilities so that

more is better.

What each could expect to secure in the

absence of cooperation is one utile.

In other words, Umin

for each is equivalent to this quantity.
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Umax for each =

.

Butch

Confesses

Remains silent

Sundance

Confesses

Remains silent

Figure 4.2
18-1

=17.

1,1

10,0

(a)

(b)

0, 10
(c)

9,9
(d)

The Felons' Utility Matrix

We can now calculate the relative concession

each would make if each "selected" one of the outcomes
(b)

,

(c)

or

UBargainer-min)

to each, then,

Reach

(b)

UBargainer (Oi) / (Ubargainer-max

The relative concession of outcome

.

is

-

(

17-1) /( 17-1)

= 1.

cone = 0.44; Reach (c) cone = 1.1; Reach

concessions:
((1.1,0.44),

prescribes

{(a)
(d)

(d)

-

or (1,1),

(b)

or (0.5, 0.5)}.

(a)

Similarly,

We may represent each outcome as

0.5.

,

The formula for relative concession is

(d)

(Bargainer's claim

this:
-

,

(a)

a

(d)

cone =

set of relative

or (0.44,1.1),

(c)

or

By inspection, MMRC

it recommends that each do the cooperative

thing.

An alternative route to the same result is this:

MMRC

allocates to each his base point and the part of the

cooperative surplus to which he contributes.
cooperative surplus = (9+9) -(1+1) = 16.
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The

Each contributes

equally to the realization of this surplus.
consequence, MMRC awards to each
I

1

+

(16/2)

In
= 9 utiles.

have assumed that if IS is a bargaining situation

with n agents, an agreement outcome may equally well be
represented as

a set of n

each agent of IS.
ASI,

relative concessions, one for

Let S be a bargaining situation and let

/ASi be the agreement strategies available to

members of

S.

A minimax concession in S is a relative

concession that is the maximum concession in the set of
relative concessions (or the agreement strategy) in which
it occurs,

and that is no greater than a maximum concession

in each ASi that is a possible outcome of S.

1.4

An Argument for MMRC

Gauthier argues that rational persons like Tom and
Dan,

bargaining over monetary splits

bargaining over agreement outcomes

-

-

or more generally,

will act on the basis

of MMRC:
If there is to be agreement, then someone must
make a concession at least equal to the minimax.
Now if it is not rational for me to make such a
concession, then, since the policy which is
rational for me is rational for everyone, it is not
rational for any person to make such a concession,
But it is
and there can be no rational agreement.
rational for me to enter into an agreement; hence
it must be rational for me to make a minimax
Furthermore, since agreement can be
concession.
reached without any person making a larger
concession, and since it cannot be rational for me
to make a greater concesssion than necessary, it
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.

)

.

cannot be rational for me to make a concession
larger than the minimax. Hence it is rational for
me to enter into any agreement requiring at most
the minimax concession from me.
Since everyone
reasons similarly, bargaining among rational
persons proceeds on the principle of minimax

concession 16
Let S be a bargaining situation.

Then presented

somewhat more systematically, the argument can be

summarized in this way:
If it is rational for any member of S to make an

1.

agreement (i.e. if it is rational for any member of
select an agreement outcome)

member of

S to

,

S

to

then it is rational for some

make a concession at least equal to the

minimax 17
.

2.

.

It is rational for any member of S to make an

agreement.

agreement
3.

a
4.

(Any member of S stands to benefit from

.

Therefore, it is rational for some member of

concession at least equal to the minimax.

S to

make

(1,2)

am a member of S.

a.

Assume

b.

If it is not rational for me to make a concession

I

at least equal to the minimax in reaching

agreement, it is not rational for any member of
to make such a concession.

Line

(4)

is justified by an appeal to the equal

rationality of all bargainers.
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S

.

5.

Given

,

.

(3)

and (4b), it is rational for me to make a

concession at least equal to the minimax in reaching
agreement.

Notice

(5)

allows the possibility that it would be

rational for me to make a concession larger than the

minimax in selecting an agreement outcome.

To block this

possibility the argument continues in this way:
6.

Rational persons would reject, and they would expect any

other rational person to reject,

a

concession if no one need make such

given relative
a

large relative

concession 18
7.

In reaching an agreement no one need make a concession

larger than the minimax. 19
.

and (7), then (9).

8.

If

9.

In reaching agreement rational persons would reject,

(6)

and would expect any other rational person to reject,

a

given relative concession if it is larger than the minimax.
(6,7,8)

then (11)

10.

If

11.

It would be irrational for any person and so

(9)

irrational for me to make a concession larger than the

minimax in reaching an agreement.
(12),

(13),

(9,10)

and (14) complete the argument.
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.

If it is rational for me to make a concession at least

12.

equal to the minimax but no larger in reaching an

agreement, then it is rational to make an agreement

requiring at most the minimax concession from me.
Therefore, it is rational to make an agreement

13.

requiring at most the minimax concession from me.
14.

(5,8,9)

Since all rational agents reason similarly, bargaining

among such agents proceeds on the principle of MMRC
1.5

MMRC

'

s

Premise

First Competitor

(6)

is crucial in establishing the

irrationality of any bargainer making
than the minimax.

a

concession larger

But this premise imposes an arbitrary

constraint on rational bargaining

- at

least that is what

I

now want to argue.

Rewritten, we can interpret

(6)

as a precept of

rational bargaining:
Bl:

Rational persons ought (rationally) to reject, and

they would expect any other rational person to reject, a

given relative concession if no one need make such

a

large

relative concession.
There are alternatives to Bl:

The total cooperative

gain is the maximum total payoff that would be available to
a

group of potential bargainers were they to act on an

agreement strategy.

If Tom and Dan,
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for example, were to

.

reach agreement and cooperate, the maximum total payoff

available to them would be

a $100.00.

A maximin rule for

bargaining tells an agent to compare the minimum values of
each outcome and to settle for the outcome whose minimum is
the maximum value for all the minimums.

Now compare B1

with B2
B2

:

Rational persons ought to reject, and they would

expect any other rational person to reject, a given net

utility (that is, a utility
from an agreement outcome)

a

if

bargainer stands to receive
(i)

no one need have such a

small net utility, and (ii), distrubution of the total

cooperative gains by the maximin procedure in

(i)

results

in each bargainer receiving more than his prebargaining

payoff.

If

(ii)

is not satisfied,

then bargainers should

proceed in accordance with Bl.
B1 and B2 generate different results in bargaining as

the table on the next page illustrates.

Abel's and Mabel's

minimum cooperative utilities are 180 and 80 respectively
as indicated by the payoff each would receive if each were

to select 01.

$500.00.

Assume that the total cooperative gain is

Abel's and Mabel's maximum cooperative utilities

can now be calculated:
180 = 320.

UAmax = 500-80 = 420; UMmax = 500-

Having established minimum and maximum

cooperative utilities, relative advantages and relative
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Table

Agreement
Outcomes
Relative
Advantages

Utilities

Relative
Concessions

Utilities

Relative
Concessions

.

1

The Abel/Mabel Case

01

02

03

04

05

06

A

0

1

0

0.1

0.2

0

.

3

0.4

M

0

0

1

0.9

0.8

0

.

7

0.6

A

180

420

180

204

228

252

276

M

80

80

320

296

272

248

224

07

A

1

0

1

0.9

0.8

0

.

7

0.6

M

1

1

0

0.1

0.2

0

.

3

0.4

Agreement
Outcomes

Relative
Advantages

4

08

09

010

Oil

012

013

A

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0

0

M

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.71

A

300

324

348

372

396

250

M

200

176

152

128

104

250

A

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.71

M

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

0.29

.

9

.

29

concessions can now easily be determined in conformity with

definitions

(4)

and

(5)

given in section 1.3 above.

inspection B1 prescribes 08, and B2 013.

By

Were 013 not

a

possible outcome, B1 would once again prescribe 08, but B2

would now prescribe 06.

Suppose we change the example by

assuming that 01 yields Abel 260 units of utility, that
Abel can get this without cooperating.
B2 were omitted,

If clause

(ii)

is,

of

then since the total gain is 500, and by
120

.

assumption utility is fully transferable, B2 without clause
(ii)

would assign Abel 250 units

recieve by not cooperating.

would be

a

non-starter as

a

B2

,

-

less than he would

then, without clause (ii)

bargaining principle; no

rational person will employ a principle that might require

him to accept less than he could get by not bargaining.
if 01 affords Abel 260 units,

So

B2 requires the two to revert

to Gauthier's minimax rule.

Since B1 and B2 generate non-equivalent results, why

prefer the first to the second?

A suggestion in the texts

is that B1 enjoys a theoretical advantage over B2

Given the claims of the bargainers, what
concessions is it rational for them to make? To
answer this question we must first consider how
concessions are to be measured. The absolute
magnitude of a concession, in terms of utility, is
of course the difference between the utility one
would expect from the outcome initially claimed and
the utility one would expect from the outcome
proposed as a concession. But this magnitude
offers no basis for relating the concessions of
different bargainers, since the measure of
individual utility does not permit interpersonal
However, we may introduce a measure
comparisons.
of relative concession which does enable us to
compare the concessions of different bargainers,
and which thus gives us a basis for determining
(M by
what concession each must rationally make.
A,

134-135)

Hence, although we may not assume that the
numerical utilities of different persons are
comparable, we may assume the comparability of

relative advantage.

20
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The suggestion, then, is that B1 enables a comparison of
the concessions each bargainer makes without need to

postulate an interpersonal utility scale, or

a scale that

indicates how much one person likes one item relative to
how much other people like the same item.
hand, needs to presuppose some such scale.
B2

B2

,

on the other

Relative to Bl,

is therefore at a disadvantage since it is probably not

possible to make interpersonal utility comparisons.^^
Such reasoning, however, ought not to convince
to prefer Bl to B2

:

a

SFM

Gauthier informs us that in most cases

acting in accordance with MMRC will result in bargainers

selecting an agreement outcome that will require each to
make equal relative concessions. 22
•

.

Now suppose there is no

valid interpersonal scale of utility and rational
bargainers Tom and Dan select an outcome, 0*, that requires
each to make the same relative concession.

Assume, now,

that had there been a valid interpersonal scale of utility,
Dan would discover that by selecting 0*, he has conceded in

absolute terms

conceded

-

-

that is, in terms of the amount of utility

twice as much as Tom.

Given this possibility,

Dan may reasonably conclude that acting on the principle of

MMRC yields unfair results.

More to the point, however,

it

seems that measures of relative concessions (or relative
advantages) provide rational bargainers with no basis to

decide whether each is better or worse off relative to the
others in the absence of assuming some valid interpersonal
122

.

scale of utility

:

.

Given the assumptions of our conjecture,

Dan would not know whether he were better or worse off than

Tom in choosing 0* if there were no way to compare the

utilities afforded each by 0*.

It is no consolation to Dan

to know that he has made the same relative concession (or

equally, gained the same relative advantage)

in selecting

0* if their utility scales differ markedly.

Similarly, Dan

would be in no position to know whether he was doing better
(worse)

than Tom in selecting an agreement outcome that

afforded him

a

larger (smaller) relative advantage than it

did Tom, in the absence of a valid interpersonal scale of
utility.

If Dan's selecting an outcome that offers him a

larger relative advantage than it does Tom is no guarantee
that he is better off than Tom in so selecting, why should
he be in the least inclined to select agreement outcomes on

the basis of MMRC, or as

I

shall say, on the basis of

minimaxing, if persons' utilities are not comparable?

Matters could, of course, be rectified by postulating

a

scale that allows interpersonal comparisons of utility.

In

that case, though, B1 would be no more attractive than B2

since it would no longer enjoy the theoretical advantage it
is suppposed to have over B2

So it seems that B1 is an arbitrary constraint on

rational bargaining.

SFMs have been supplied with no

cogent reason to prefer it to B2
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.

MMRC

1.6

'

s

Second Competitor

The arbitrariness of B1 is accentuated by recognizing

that in addition to B2 it has other competitors.

introduce the notion of maximum shared gain:

Let's

For each

combination of strategies, take the total cooperative gain,
Then divide C by the number of participants.

C.

result "shared gain."

Call the

A combination of strategies

maximizes shared gain if no alternative combination has
higher shared gain.

Call the shared gain of such a

combination of strategies "the maximum shared gain."

So,

for example, the shared gain of the combination of

strategies, "CS1," that would result in 01 is (180+80)/2 =
130.

CS1 fails to maximize shared gain since the shared

gain of each other combination of strategies is 250.

Now

consider B3
B3

:

Rational persons ought to reject, and they would

expect any other rational person to reject, a given

agreement outcome if each did not receive from that
agreement outcome

a

utility equal to the maximum shared

gain
Were Abel and Mabel to act in accord with B3

,

they

would reject all outcomes except 013, the outcome that
affords each equal maximum shared gam.
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Since Abel is

a

maximizer, he might argue that he does

worse by acting on B3 than he does by following Bl.

B1

would require him to reject the outcome prescribed by B3
and to accept the outcome that gives him 300 utiles (or
dollars) and Mabel 200 utiles.

Why should he make

relative concession than Mabel?

a

larger

Since Mabel is also a

maximizer, she might retort that Abel places a premium on

equalizing shared gains.

Why is it any more rational to

prefer equalizing relative concessions than it is to prefer
equalizing shared gains?
than you.

Why should

I

"But

I

brought to the table more

then settle for an equal split of

the cooperative gains?" Abel might complain.

Mabel should reply:

Of course,

"You ought to because if we didn't

cooperate you'd be worse off.

(Assume a universe with only

two potential cooperators, Abel and Mabel.)

By accepting

250 utiles you still do better than you would in the

absence of cooperation."

Gauthier suggests that
"The fundamental rationale for the principle of
turns on an
minimax relative concessions
interpersonal comparison of the proportion of each
person's potential gain that he must concede.
However, were we to assume a measure of utility
permitting interpersonal comparisons, and were we
then to be tempted by some principle of equal
gain, we should remind ourselves that any such
temptation could be countered by a principle of
(M by A,
equal loss, in relation to one's claim."
139)
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On Gauthier's suggestion, Abel should rejoin that

rather than egualize total cooperative gains they should

equalize losses in relation to their claims.
a

But,

assuming

measure of utility permitting interpersonal comparisons,

to equalize such losses in relation to bargainers' claims
is just to act in accordance with Bl.

case,

for example,

In the Abel/Mabel

let x be the loss that is to be

equalized in relation to their claims.

The total

cooperative gain for all combinations of strategies
excluding the combination that would result in 01 is 500.
Abel claims 500 less Mabel's minimum cooperative utility

that is, he claims 500-80 = 420.

-

Mabel claims 500 less

Abel's minimum cooperative utility or 500-180 = 320.

If

losses from claims are to be equalized, then (420-x) + 320(

x)

= 500.

Since x = 120, losses are equalized when each

accepts the outcome prescribed by Bl.
course,

The point, of

is that by countering that they ought to equalize

losses in relation to potential gain, Abel has not offered
a

reason why it is any more rational to do so than it is to

equalize cooperative gains.
In summary,

it is not evident that the principle

of minimax relative concession "expresses the principle of

utility maximization in the context of bargaining."
A,

145,

151)

(M by

There is nothing in the theory of SM, for
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.

example, that compels favoring B1 over B3

.

.

At least,

I

see

no argument to show that it would be SM-irrational to adopt
B3

.

1.7

MMRC

/

Third Competitor

s

Shifting away from the argument in 1.4,

I

now want to

make some general comments on Gauthier's theory of
bargaining.

In particular,

in this section

I

want to

question Gauthier's assumption that minimaxing is the only
rational way to break a deadlock.

Since B1 is arbitrary in the sense explained, suppose
Tom and Dan act on a diffferent precept, B4
B4

:

A rational person ought to reject, and would expect

any other rational person to reject, a given agreement

outcome if that person need not obtain as small

utility

a

as she would were she to select that outcome.

If anything,

it seems B4 and not B1 is a corollary of SM.

But this aside,

deadlock.

if Tom and Dan subscribed to B4

,

they would

Tom would select the outcome that afforded him

$100.00 and Dan nothing, whereas Dan would select the

outcome that afforded him $100.00 and Tom nothing.
B4 may seem to be a non-starter.

Suppose Tom and Dan

are offered two unbreakable gold pieces, one worth $100.00
and one worth $101.00.

Any decision they reach about who

is to get which piece will be irrational according to B4
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But interestingly enough, B1 seems to suffer a similar

defect:
is $0,

If we assume that the prebargaining payoff of each

and there are only two possible outcomes

-

either

Tom gets the coin worth $101.00 and Dan gets the other,
or Dan gets the coin worth $100.00 and Tom gets the
other, would B1 not countenance an analogous problem as B4?
If one of B4 or B1 were true, then perhaps sometimes SFMs

would be no more successful in making agreements than in
escaping the PD.
Be that as it may, perplexed by their stalemated

situation and cognizant of the fact that entering into an

agreement is mutually advantageous, suppose star-gazers Tom
and Dan decide to break the deadlock.

Suppose,

further,

that Tom is aware of Dan's penchant for gambling and Dan is

also aware of Tom's similar passion, both having frequented
the same casinos in Monte Carlo.
Dan reasons with Tom:

In true gambler's spirit

"Gauthier's

a

conservative.

He

thinks that deadlocked SFMs like us should always minimax.

We're adventurous, why not flip

a

coin and winner take all?

Besides, notice an interesting fact about our situation.
If we minimax, the probability of each of us getting $50.00
is unity;

if we coin-flip,

the probability of one of us

getting a $100.00 is 0.5, and nothing in case one of us
lucks out,

is also 0.5.

The expected utility of

minimaxing, assuming our utilities are linear with money
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values and assuming we either both coin-flip or both
minimax,
[

is therefore 50X1 = 50 and that of gambling is

(0. 5X0) +(o. 5X100)

]

= 50.

So it is no more rational to

coin-flip than to minimax.

What say you we coin-flip?"

Suppose Tom and Dan do in fact coin-flip.

acted irrationally?
negative.

Have they

I'm inclined to answer in the

Their case,

I

think, strongly suggests that what

concessions it is rational to make partly depends on one's

dispositions (other than the disposition to be SM-rational)
and the dispositions of one's fellow cooperators.

this much is true:

At least

SM does not preclude one from being

disposed to being adventurous any more than it precludes
one from being disposed to conservativism.
a batch of

if

bargainers were disposed to gambling, then in

certain situations
SM-rational

In addition,

-

I

think it would be no less rational

-

to break a deadlock by coin-flipping than it

would be by minimaxing.
1.8

A Final Problem with MMRC

I

want to conclude by suggesting

a

final worry with

Gauthier's theory that has to do with the size of the total

cooperative gain.

Recall, the total cooperative gain is

the maximum payoff that would be available to

a

group of

bargainers were they to act in accordance with an agreement
strategy.

The size of the total cooperative gain plays

crucial role in Gauthier's theory since, given their
129

a

minimal cooperative utilities, it is only in relation to
the cooperative gain that SFMs can advance their claims.
It is then only in relation to these claims that they are

able to make concessions in order to secure agreement.

What exactly determines the magnitude of the total

cooperative gain in

a

bargaining situation?

set answer to this question.

There is no

In the case of Tom and Dan

the total cooperative gain is a gift they will receive

contingent on their agreeing to

a split.

In other cases

the total cooperative gain may be directly related to how

hard each member of a group of cooperators is willing to
work.

For instance,

in the absence of cooperation assume

Larry and Mo can each prepare five cakes.

together they can manage fourteen.

If they work

It is possible that

Larry works better with Curly than he does with Mo.

Although Curly may manage the same number of cakes as does
Larry were each to work on his own, together they would

produce seventeen.

In these cases potential bargainers are

cognizant of the size of the cooperative gain prior to
cooperation.

Furthermore, in such cases the decision to

bargain in one way or another has no effect on the

cooperative gain
outset.

-

the size of the gain is fixed at the

The problem bargainers face is to agree on

principle of distribution.

a

Now it seems that there may be

cases in which the very size of the cooperative gain may be

130

influenced by knowledge of how the gain
will be

-

is to be distributed:

-

whatever it is or

Suppose Larry and Curly

both stand to benefit from entering into an agreement.

But

Larry knows that Curly knows that he, Larry, will work much

harder if he were to make

a

smaller concession than Curly.

Larry just has this distinctive psychological or

motivational trait.

As a result of this peculiarity,

assume the cooperative gain would be much larger were Larry
to make a smaller concession than Curly than if they were
to make equal relative concessions as required by MMRC in

their particular case.

To illustrate, assume for

simplicity, that the initial prebargaining payoff of each
is 0 units.

Assume the cooperative gain (and hence the

cooperative surplus in this initial case) is 500.

Since

each contributes equally to the production of this gain,

MMRC awards to each 250 units.

Suppose Larry and Curly

agree not to split the gains equally; then Larry (but not
Curly) works harder with a resulting cooperative gain of
1000.

Suppose the two agree to divide this total so that

Curly receives 300 units and Larry the rest.

Assuming

Curly's prebargaining payoff remains unchanged, Curly does

better than he would have done had he not have agreed to
unequal splits, and in consequence, had he settled for

dividing the surplus of 500.

Larry,

first option, does better as well.

in relation to the

His gross payoff is

700; we may plausibly assume that his net gain is larger
131

than 250 units.

So cooperative gains do not need to be

fixed by factors independent of the bargaining process
itself.

Knowledge of the very principle that bargainers

are to use in distributing the cooperative gain may

influence its magnitude.

If this is all true,

then in the

relevant sorts of cases it may be SM-irrational for

bargainers to minimax.
To conclude,

I

have tried to establish that an

essential premise in Gauthier's argument that rational

bargainers will act on MMRC is arbitrary.

It is arbitrary

in the sense that if this premise is construed as some kind

of rational precept, there is no need to suppose that SFMs

would prefer this rational precept to competitors.

I

have

also tried to show, contrary to Gauthier, that there is

little if any reason to assume that minimaxing is rational
in every bargaining situation.

Are there more problems with Gauthier's ambitious
Let's assume the bargaining problem

contractarian project?
solved:

rational agreements are those sanctioned by MMRC.

Assume Butch and Sundance know this.
dilemma?

Will they escape the

Not unless they can overcome the "genuinely

problematic element in

a

contractarian theory."
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if you agree to have unequal shares."
Perhaps this
difficulty can be dealt with in some such way as this:
In
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CHAPTER

5

THE COMPLIANCE PROBLEM
1

.

1

The Issue

Gauthier tells us that
The genuinely problematic element in a
contractarian theory is not the introduction of the
idea of morality, but the step from hypothetical
agreement to actual moral constraint. Suppose that
each person recognizes himself as one of the
parties to agreement. The principles forming the
object of agreement are those that he would have
accepted ex ante in bargaining with his fellows,
had he found himself among them in a context
initially devoid of moral constraint. Why need he
accept, ex post in his actual situation, these
principles as constraining his choices? A theory
of morals by agreement must answer this question.
(M by A, 9)
He proceeds to "defend compliance with agreements based,

explicitly or implicitly, on the principle of minimax
relative concession."

(M by A,

158)

He says that

If our defence fails, then we must conclude that
rational bargaining is in vain and that cooperation, although on a rationally agreed basis,
we must
is not itself rationally required
conclude that a rational morality is a chimera, so
that there is no rational and impartial constraint
(M by A,
on the pursuit of individual utility.
158)

The classic PD nicely serves to illustrate the

"compliance problem" to which Gauthier calls attention in
these passages:

Butch and Sundance contemplate with a

sense of impending doom the matrix reproduced below.
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Butch

Confesses

Remains silent

Sundance
Confesses

1,1

Remains silent

0,10

Figure 5.1

10,0

9,9

Matrix 5.1

The numbers represent utilities with Sundance's preferences

recorded first.

As SFMs they know that they can do no

better than attain
more time.
each other.

a

suboptimal outcome.

The DA gives them

He even goes so far as to let them consult with

Perhaps by agreeing to do the cooperative

thing, they will be able to escape their plight.

But each

soon realizes that such an agreement will not further their

common end:

Suppose the two have been convinced by

Professor Gauthier's solution to the bargaining problem, in

simplified terms, the problem of rationally "selecting" one
of a number of non- equivalent mutually beneficial outcomes

that could result from agreement.'*'

Bargains reached in

accord with the principle of minimax relative concession
(MMRC)

,

the solution recommends, are rational.

Since this

principle, according to Gauthier, impartially constrains
the pursuit of direct self-interest and is "rationally
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justified," it also enjoys the status of being a moral
principle.

2

So suppose Butch and Sundance, having been

convinced by all this, agree during one of their

consultation sessions to do the MMRC-prescribed cooperative
thing - each will keep his lips sealed.

However, although

optimal, the ensuing outcome is not in equilibrium.

one party does his part
-

-

^

if

if he complies with the agreement

the other party can do better by defecting.

Since both

are SFMs it appears that compliance with the agreement

would be irrational even though making it were perfectly
rational
It is the failure of the outcome prescribed by

rational bargaining as conceived by Gauthier, to exemply
together, the properties of optimality and equilibrium,

that contributes essentially to the compliance problem.
The problem can be formulated this way:

Suppose it is

rational to enter into agreements which, if complied with,

would result in outcomes that are fair and optimal but not
in equilibrium.

Why should you comply with these interest-

constraining agreements?
A radio broadcast revives hope for the two felons.

They hear that similarly situated prisoners are rejoicing
all over.

These others are celebrating Gauthier's answer

to the compliance problem.

That eminent philosopher has

declared that it is rational to comply with the variety of
agreement that is of concern to them.
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But let's be more cautious than our revellers.

Morals

By Agreement suggests that this answer is open to a number
of interpretations.

Each merits scrutiny.

Once we have

carefully examined them, we will be in a better position to
judge whether the felons really have cause for all their
fanfare.

The PR-rationality of Compliance

1.2

In the introductory chapter of his book, Gauthier

explains that
A contractarian theory of morals, developed as
part of the theory of rational choice, has evident
strengths.
It enables us to demonstrate the
rationality of impartial constraints on the pursuit
of individual interest to persons who may take no
interest in others' interests. Morality is thus
given a sure grounding in a weak and widely
accepted conception of practical rationality [SM]
(M by A, 17)

The passage may be taken to indicate that Gauthier's

response to the compliance problem is that compliance with
the kind of agreement Butch and Sundance favor is SM-

rational
view.

.

But this, of course, could not be his considered

In terms of our example,

is the dominant strategy,

since confessing in the PD

Butch and Sundance could comply

only on pain of being SM-irrational

Gauthier's view is perhaps better explicated in the
following set of passages.
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we defend compliance, not just with agreements, but
with practices that would be agreed to or endorsed
on the basis of the principle of minimax relative
concession.
(M by A, 158)
We shall do this by demonstrating that, given
certain palusible and desirable conditions, a
rational utility maximizer, faced with the choice
between accepting no constraints on his choices in
interaction, and accepting the constraints on his
choices required by minimax relative concession,
chooses the latter. He makes a choice about how to
make further choices; he chooses on utilitymaximizing grounds, not to make further choices on
those grounds.
(M by A, 158)

The received interpretation of practical
rationality
identifies rationality with
utility-maximization at the level of particular
choices.
A choice is rational if and only if it
maximizes the actor's expected utility. We
identify rationality with utility-maximization at
the level of dispositions to choose.
A disposition
is rational if and only if an actor holding it can
expect his choices to yield no less utility than
the choices he would make were he to hold any
alternative disposition. We shall consider whether
particular choices are rational if and only if they
(M by A,
express a rational disposition to choose.
182-183)

Gauthier affirms that

a

SFM would adopt "constrained

maximization, as his disposition for strategic behaviour."
(M

by A,

170)

These passages may leave the impression that Gauthier
is defending the view that it is SM-rational merely to be

disposed to comply with agreements made on the basis of
MMRC.

But

I

think his view is more interesting.

For he

tells us elsewhere that his theory of morals defends the
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:

"rationality of actual compliance " with moral principles
(M

by A,

182-183)

To be disposed to comply with fair

agreements is consistent with not complying with them on

occasions when non-compliance is utility maximizing.
What, then,

passages?
First,

is the view advocated in this seguence of

It may be something like this (solution "PRS")

identify a rational disposition,

choices.

D,

for making

Next, establish the acceptability of a principle

of practical reason analogous to PR.
PR:

An act is rational if and only if it "expresses"

D.

Finally, show that PR prescribes as rational acts of

complying with agreements sanctioned by MMRC.
Notice that even if successful such an undertaking

would at most sustain the PR-rationality of compliance.

It

would not, contrary to what Gauthier seems to have
intended, ground morality "in a weak and widely accepted

conception of practical rationality:"

Assuming the

extensional non-equivalence of SM and PR, presumably such

a

bona fide "grounding" would require establishing both the

SM-rationality of making the kinds of agreement of interest
to this discussion, and the SM-rationality of complying

with such agreements.

Let's, nevertheless, assess this

interesting proposal directing attention primarily to its
first component.
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3

Constrained Maximization

Gauthier defends the position that the disposition to

constrained maximization

rather than to SM is the

(CM)

rational disposition for making choices.

An understanding

of his defense requires clarification of the two theories,

SM and, CM.

4

SM,

as explained in Chapter I,

that for any agent,
(for

s)

s,

is the theory

and any act, a, a is SM-rational

if and only if none of its alternatives has a

higher expected utility (for
easily formulated.

s)

than it has.

CM is not as

To facilate matters note that in

parametric contexts where one's choices do not affect
others' choices, SM and CM are extensionally equivalent.
In strategic contexts where each interacting agent chooses

her action partly on the basis of her expectations of
others' choices, CM requires that

Each person's choice must be a fair optimizing
response to the choice he expects the others to
make, provided such a response is available to him;
otherwise, his choice must be a utility-maximizing
(M by A, 157)
response.
A fair optimizing response is

one that, given the expected strategies of the
others, may be expected to yield an outcome that is
nearly fair and optimal - an outcome with utility
payoffs close to those of the cooperative outcome,
as determined by minimax relative concession.
by A, 157)
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5

(M

.

It appears that in strategic contexts where you expect

your fellow interactors to cooperate in achieving an

outcome that is fair and optimal, then provided such an
outcome is possible, CM requires that you do the

cooperative thing.

In those strategic contexts where such

an outcome is possible, but where you have no expectation
of your fellow interactors cooperating to achieve it, as

for instance could be the case were your fellow interactors
SFMs, CM requires that you do the SM-rational thing.

CM

tries to ensure that those disposed to cooperate are not

taken advantage of by potential exploiters.

strategic contexts where

a fair and

Finally,

in

optimal outcome is not

possible, CM again requires that you do what is SM,

.

rational
.

1.4

6

The Choice Argument

Gauthier's alluring argument that the disposition to
CM is rational is this:
To demonstrate the rationality of suitably
consider what a
constrained maximization we
rational individual would choose, given the
alternatives of adopting straightforward
maximization, and of adopting constrained
Taking others' dispositions as
maximization
fixed, the individual reasons parametrically to his
[He ought to reason as
own best disposition
Suppose I adopt straightforward
follows:]
maximization. Then I must expect the others to
employ maximizing individual strategies in
interacting with me; so do I, and expect a utility,
u.

Suppose

I

adopt constrained maximization.
144

Then if the others are conditionally disposed to
constrained maximization, I may expect them to base
their actions on a co-operative joint strategy in
interacting with me; so do I, and expect a utility
If they are not so disposed, I employ a
maximizing strategy and expect u as before.
If the
probability that others are disposed to constrained
maximization is p, then my overall expected utility
is

[pu'

(l-p)u].

+

Since u'is greater than u, [pu' + (l-p)u] is
greater than u for any value of p other than 0 (and
for p=0, the two are equal).
Therefore, to
maximize my overall expectation of utility, I
should adopt constrained maximization.
(M by A,
172

)

Although there is undoubtedly something very
persuasive here, in the end

utterly watertight. 7
,

I

feel the argument is not

To ascertain its shortcomings, let's

recast it into a form that makes it easier to evaluate.
do so,

I

first list a number of assumptions that

I

To

believe

it presupposes.
(1)

The choice between CM and SM is to turn on the

expected utility of adopting either conception.
selection of

a

The

particular conception is rational if and

only if no alternative has a higher expected utility than
it has for the agent in question.
a

The expected utility of

conception of rationality is to be identified with the

expected utility of the act of undertaking

commitment to that conception.
conceptions of rationality and
choice between them.

calculated as follows:

a

permanent

Suppose R and R* are
S an

agent contemplating

The expected utility of R for

S

a

is

Consider all the possible outcomes
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of choosing R.

outcome.

For each, consider the utility of that

For each, consider the probability of that

outcome given that R is chosen.

probability and the utility.

Multiply, for each, the

Add these products.

The sum

is the expected utility of R for S.
(2)

The utility of choosing a conception of

rationality is to depend solely on the utility of the
actions required by that conception.

8

This assumption

restricts the outcomes that are to be taken into account in
so choosing to actions.

The fact, for example, that the

choice of a particular conception,

R,

would maximize the

satisfaction of an agent's preferences in virtue of his

valuing acting in accord with the prescriptions of

is to

R,

be considered irrelevant when choosing among conceptions.
(The justification for this assumption will emerge shortly
in section 1.5 below.)
(3)

(PD-like)

situations

In every situation except Prisoner's Dilemma-like

situations of a certain kind
-

-

"salient PD-like"

CM and SM prescribe identical actions.

salient PD-like situation is

a

situation

(i)

A

with agents

who are directly aware of each others' rational
disposition, or who at least have a good chance in

identifying the rational dispositions of others; and

(ii)

in which the counterf actual independence condition is

violated.

This is the condition that no matter what choice
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either player makes, he would still make that choice no

matter what choice the other makes. 9
The rationale for this assumption needs explaining.

Gauthier claims that

(a)

To choose between SM and CM a person needs to
consider only those situations in which they would
yield different behaviour.
(M by A, 171)

And

(b)

These situations must satisfy two conditions.
First, they must afford the prospect of mutually
beneficial and fair co-operation, since otherwise
constraint would be pointless. And second, they
must afford some prospect for individually
beneficial defection, since otherwise no constraint
would be needed to realize the mutual benefits.
(M
by A, 171)

Assumption (3), it may be supposed, takes

(a)

into

account insisting that it is only with respect to salient
PD-like situations that CM and SM "yield different

behaviour."

In addition,

it may be thought that this

assumption also accomodates

(b)

since both the conditions

therein specified are met by salient PD-like situations, as
the example soon to be presented might be taken to

illustrate
Clause

(i)

in the specification of a salient PD-like

situation reflects Gauthier's admission that his argument
takes choosers to be either transparent or translucent.

They are transparent when "Each is directly aware of the
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disposition of his fellows, and so aware whether he is
interacting with straightforward or constrained

maximizers

(M by A,

.

Choosers are translucent when

174)

"their disposition to cooperate or not may be ascertained
by others, not with certainty, but as more than mere

guesswork." 10

(M by A,

174)

The need for clause (ii) may be rationalized in this
way:

Persons disposed to CM adopt a conditional

disposition that makes their strategies dependent on each
other.

In a PD-like situation,

for instance, CM-rational

Butch will cooperate with CM-rational Sundance if and only
if Butch is willing to cooperate in order to secure an

outcome that is fair and optimal, and he expects Sundance
to be so willing as well.

As Gauthier reminds us,

"the

probability of the others acting co-operatively
not]

independent of one's own disposition." (M by

[is
A,

172)

For suppose it were, and suppose the absence of all other

possible influences like causal ones that would literally
make agents' actions interdependent.

Then the

counterfactual independence condition would be satisfied.
In that case, however, a dominance argument Gauthier and

others have claimed, demonstrates that SFMs choosing

between SM and CM would choose the former.

consequence

-

11

It is in

if these philosophers are right - only in

cases in which the counterfactual independence condition is
not met that CM reputedly has a greater expected utility
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for an agent than SM.

It may be urged that this,

for

example, would be the case if each player's actions were

related to the other's actions in a way indicated by the

probability matrix in Figure 5.2.

Numbers in the matrix

Butch chooses
SM

CM

SM

0.99

0.01

CM

0.01

0.99

Sundance
chooses

Figure 5.2

Matrix 5.2

indicate conditional probabilities of
So,

a

choice on

a

choice.

for example, the conditional probability of Sundance's

(Butch's) choosing SM if Butch (Sundance)
0.99.

chooses SM is

The matrix shows that either player will choose

a

disposition if and only if the other player chooses that
very same disposition.

Assuming that in the future they

will be in the PD-like situation with payoffs specified by
the matrix in Figure 5.1, each player's utility matrix,

may be proposed, would be matrix 5.3.
on page 150 below.)

it

(This matrix appears

Expected utilities calculated on the

basis of the information contained in these two matrices
yield the desired results:

The expected utility of SM for
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each player would be = (1)(0.99) + (10) (0.01) =
1.09;

whereas that of CM for each would be greater,
(9) (0.99)

(0) (0.01)

+

= 8.91.

Butch chooses
SM

CM

SM

1/1

10,0

CM

0,10

Sundance
chooses

Figure 5.3

Given assumptions (1),

9,9

Matrix 5.3

(2),

and (3),

in a world with

no salient PD-like situations the expected utility of SM

for an agent and that of CM for that agent are identical.
(4)

(a)

In every salient PD-like situation CM and SM

prescribe different actions.
more)

(b)

In a world with one

(or

salient PD-like situations, the expected utility of

CM for an agent is greater than the expected utility of SM
for that agent.
(5)

Prior to choosing between CM and SM choosers know

that they will be in a world with at least one salient PDlike situation.
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On these assumptions it appears that the choice
of CM
is SM-rational.

Gauthier's argument for this, now recast,

is simple:

Chooser's choice (Chooser is

(1)

iorial ity is

a SFM)

of a conception of

rational if and only if none of its

alternatives has a higher expected utility than it has for
Chooser.
(2)

Among Chooser's choices, the expected utility of CM

for Chooser is higher than the expected utility of SM for

Chooser
(3)

Therefore, Chooser's choice of CM (and not SM)

is

rational
1.5.1

The First Problem with the Choice Argument
Is this "choice argument" sound?

I

don't think so.

Both premises are controversial.
First, assume premise

(2)

is true.

Then despite its

being the case that SM's expected utility for Chooser is
not as great as that of CM's for Chooser, a SFM like

Chooser should not select CM over SM.
be rejected.

Premise

(1)

should

This is so since the premise fails to take

into account the implications of the fact that rational

choices are not made from a "rationality-neutral"
perspective, but that they presuppose some such

perspective:

Consider what a choice of CM over SM would
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involve from the point of view of a SFM.

It is obvious

that a person's preferences in choosing a conception of

rationality will be influenced by her knowledge of what
that conception entails.

In her deliberations on whether

to choose CM a significant and relevant piece of

information is that sometimes CM will require that she

restrict the pursuit of her own wants.

Such restraint is

required if one is to carry through with the kind of

agreement that makes CM attractive.
pursuit of her own wants is, for
reason.

But to restrict the

a SFM,

to act contrary to

So available to such a maximizer will be the

information that there will be occasions when CM requires
her to act contrary to reason.

But then it seems

irrational for a SFM to adopt as her very conception of
rationality, one that will sometimes require that she act

contrary to the prescriptions of SM.

Similarly,

initial conception of rationality were CM,

irrational to choose SM over CM.

because SM as of

a

if one's

it would be

This would be so not

particular time of choice, has

a lower

expected utility (as we are now supposing) than CM.
Rather, the reason would be that when certain opportunities

present themselves, as perhaps in some types of PD with

trustworthy others, SM would prescribe exploitation.

behavior is rationally unacceptable to

Such

a CM.

Friends of the choice argument may reply in this way:
"It's true that SM requires that on each occasion of
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you choose the alternative that is best— for— you as
of that time.

If you are a SFM and you want to choose

rationally, you are commited to choosing in this way

cannot choose otherwise.

-

you

Maybe all this provides you with

some reason to refrain from choosing CM

-

you know,

for

example, that if you now choose CM you won't be able to

exploit gullible others in PDs.

But if you are moved by

this consideration, it can only be because you place

premium on acting consistently with SM over time.
the choice of CM (by assumption)

a

However,

is utility maximizing.

Forget about considerations of "temporal consistency."

Think only about utility!"
The right response here,

I

think, should be this:

might be true that the SFM places

consistently with SM over time.

a

"It

premium on acting

After all, to be

a

SFM

just is to do the best for yourself on each occasion of
choice.

But suppose, when confronted with the choice of

deciding between SM and CM, you then choose CM.

Then you

must place a premium on maximizing utility as of that time:
As a SFM you well know that your choice of CM as of then

will sometimes prevent you from doing the utility

maximizing thing in the future; in some PDs to come, you
will have to forgo maximizing your advantage.

choose CM, you must place

a

So if you

premium on maximizing utility

on one particular occasion of choice.
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You must think that

it is more important to maximize utility on this occasion

of choice, than it is to maximize utility on each (future)

occasion of choice.

Why is it any less rational, though,

to place a premium on maximizing utility at each choice-

point in time, than it is to place a premium on maximizing

utility at one choice-point in time?"
The approach

I

have attributed to Gauthier in deciding

among conceptions of rationality has a semblance of

plausibility but is misleading.

Its apparent strength

derives from the assumption that the utility of CM for

Chooser is greater than that of SM for Chooser.
as a SFM (and indeed as a constrained maximizer)

Chooser,
,

need not

(although she should as we will soon see) deny this.

It

isn't the case, as Gauthier reminds us, that the

constrained maximizer "taking

a

larger view than her

fellows" reasons "more effectively about how to maximize
.

.

.

A,

170)

the SFM,

From the point of view of

13

.

her utility," but she reasons in a different wav
a

.

(M by

constrained maximizer,

in those PD situations in which he violates his

rationally entered into agreements, acts irrationally.
From the point of view of a SFM, the constrained maximizer
in these same situations in which he complies with his

rationally made agreements, acts irrationally.

Premise

(1)

is insensitive to important differences to which Gauthier

himself calls attention in the way in which these two kinds
of maximizer reason.
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1-5.2

:

A Possible Second Problem

This rejection of premise
reader.

(1)

may fail to convince the

Even so, Gauthier's argument still suffers

defects.

That is because whether it is sound partly

depends on the cogency of assumptions

assumption

(2)

and assumption

Let's consider each in turn.

(4)

I

(1)

to (5).

Both

believe, are suspect.

In discussing the second,

I

proceed as if the fourth is beyond reproach.

Assumption

(2)

may impose an arbitrary restriction on

the outcomes that are to be considered in choosing among

conceptions of rationality.

Why restrict as it does the

relevant outcomes to actions?

An SM-rational agent,

for

instance, may value being a SFM just as she may value being

charitable or kind.

Choosing SM would maximize the

satisfaction of this particular preference.

To elaborate,

assume that some SM-rational agent values acting in accord

with the prescriptions of SM.

If such an agent were to

choose CM, she would know that in salient PD-like

situations she would have to act SM-irrationally

assumption

(4a)

tells us that in such situations SM and CM

prescribe different actions.

As we have already remarked,

from the point of view of a SFM, a constrained maximizer
acts irrationally in some situations of this type.

In

light of this knowledge and given her values, the choice of
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SM and not CM,

it would seem, would maximize the

satisfaction of her preferences.
Consider, secondly,

"Reasonable."

a'

SFM whom we shall call

Reasonable values acting on the basis of

rational precept RP.
RP:

If S ought (SM-rationally)

to do a at time tl, and S

cannot do a at tl without doing b at an earlier time to,

S

ought (SM-rationally) to do b at to.
Prior to choosing between SM and CM, suppose

Reasonable knows that he will find himself in
like situation.

a

salient PD-

Suppose the SM-rational thing to do in

such a situation is to confess whereas the CM-rational

thing to do is to remain silent.

In order both to act SM-

rationally and to act consistently with RP in the

dilemmatic situation to come, Reasonable must choose SM:
If he were to commit himself to CM he could not then act

consistently with these preferences.

Yet again, choice of

SM would maximize the satisfaction of Reasonable's

preferences
It is important not to loose sight of the fact that a

requirement of SM is that one consider all possible
outcomes of relevant alternatives in one's deliberations.
So preferences like the ones Reasonable has cannot be

discarded in deciding on the rational course of action in
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the absence of sound justification.

What could this

justification be, though, given that SM, at least in the
fashion interpreted by Gauthier, does not constrain the

content of agents' preferences? 14

Gauthier would probably reply that

I

have muddied the

waters here by adding extra payoffs in addition to those to
be gained by action in the PD-like situation.

He may

readily concede that certain individuals like Reasonable

with certain "nontraditional values" would not choose CM
over SM.

They would choose conversely.

They would so

choose because their idiosyncratic values would ensure that

their choice situation is no longer any interesting variety
of PD.

let's stipulate that there

In light of this rejoinder,

are no hidden payoffs:

The numbers in matrix 5.1 exhaust

everything that the choosers have at stake.
this proviso the choice argument,
It fails because assumption (4)
I

I

But even with

think, does not work.

is questionable.

In fact,

think both its parts are false.
A Third Problem with the Choice Argument

1.5.3

Reconsider the case of Butch and Sundance.

Assume

that the PD-like matrix in Figure 5.1 correctly portrays
the value of each possible outcome for each of these
agents.

Assume,

in addition,

that the two felons are

transparent so that matrix 5.2 is an accurate depiction of
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how the actions of each are related to the actions of the
other.

Assume,

further, that prior to being in the PD-like

situation Butch and Sundance agree to do the cooperative
thing.

In this example, to do the cooperative thing is

tantamount to keeping silent.

Since each is transparent

each will be aware of whether the other is disposed to
cooperate.
possible.

Transparency ensures that cheating is not
(M by A,

173-174)

If each is a constrained maximizer each will

cooperate.

receive

9

Each will honor the pre-PD agreement and will
points.

Now consider what will happen if each is

straightforwardly rational.
cannot cheat.

The felons know that they

Transparent Butch, for instance, cannot make

the agreement with the intention of later failing to carry

through.

He cannot because being transparent, Sundance

would know of the intention to be dishonest and would, from
the start, refuse to make the agreement.

must be emphasized:

Moreover, this

If all Butch knew about Sundance is

that Sundance is disposed to CM, Butch would be foolish,

merely on the basis of this information, to do the
cooperative thing.

As we saw earlier, to be disposed to CM

is consistent with doing the utility maximizing thing on

various occasions.

If Butch is not to be deceived - if as

of a particular time he is to have realistic expectations

of achieving a fair and optimal outcome, he must know
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something over and above Sundance's rational disposition.
He must know something about Sundance's intentions, and

something about Sundance's intentions to act on those
intentions.
one.

So the assumption of transparency is a strong

We must assume that not only does transparency

disclose the rational dispositions of agents, it also
discloses agents' intentions to act in certain ways on
specific ossasions of choice, and at least the likelihood
that they will act on these intentions on those occasions.

Now each knows that if he keeps silent so will the other
and if he confesses so will the other.
"

Such an

interdependency" of actions is an interesting conseguence

of transparency.

So if each does the cooperative thing and

remains silent each can expect
each can expect

point.

1

9

points.

If each confesses

It would therefore be

straightforwardly rational for each, in this PD-like
situation, to remain silent.
Suppose, now, that Butch and Sundance are choosing

between SM and CM.

Suppose they are told that they will

find themselves in a world with precisely one salient PD-

like situation, a situation exactly like the one just

described.

The discussion in the last paragraph should

make it clear that their utility matrix is matrix 5.4.
(See page 160.)

Expected utilities calculated by assuming

probabilities recorded in matrix 5.2 tell us that each will
fare no better as a constrained maximizer than as a SFM.
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Butch chooses
SM

CM

Sundance
chooses
SM

9,9

9,9

CM

9,9

9,9

Figure 5.4

Matrix 5.4

It won't help to assume that the PD situation in which

Butch and Sundance anticipate finding themselves will be an

authentic one in which the counterf actual independence

condition is satisfied:
confessing.

In such a situation SM counsels

But so does CM.

In an authentic PD, we cannot

assume any interdependency of action that could, for
example, result from the supposition that agents are

transparent.

Introduce such interdependency and the

counterf actual independence condition is violated.

Then

the actions of one partly "determine" the actions of the
other.

The resulting PD-like situation would conseguently

not be a real PD; it would in fact not be any different

from the dilemmatic situation in which we first supposed
the two felons to be.

So assume,

in this second case,

Butch and Sundance are not transparent

-

that

or at least assume

that each has no idea about the rational disposition of the
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other.

If agents' actions are not interdependent in any

such way as they would be if agents were transparent, then
the relevant utility matrix —
5.5.

think

I

—

would be matrix

Each as a SFM would confess and would receive

1

Butch chooses
SM

CM

Sundance
chooses
SM

1,1

1,1

CM

1,1

1,1

Figure 5.5
point.

Matrix 5.5

Each as a constrained maximizer would also confess

and would receive

1

point.

Hence, no matter what your

rational disposition, and no matter what the rational

disposition of your partner, you would do best by
confessing.

The result once again is that SFMs do not do

better than constrained maximizers in such authentic PDs.
To summarize results, in both inauthentic PD-like

situations and in genuine PDs in which deception is not
possible, transparent SFMs will do just as well as their

constrained cousins.

In the former sort of dilemmatic

situation both types of maximizer will "cooperate."
latter sort of situation they will refrain from
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In the

cooperating.

So it seems unlikely, as Gauthier believes,

that "because they differ in their dispositions,

straightforward and constrained maximizers differ also in
their opportunities,
latter."
1.5.4

(M by A,

[to cooperate]

to the benefit of the

173)

A Fourth Problem with the Choice Argument

Finally,

it's worth observing that assumption

(5)

forces a certain construal of the claim that CM is the

rational disposition for making choices:

Perhaps there are

some dilemmatic situations in which a constrained maximizer

would do better than

a SFM.

Assume there are.

Even so,

a

SFM who expected to find himself in a world devoid of these

kinds of situation would do no better by adopting CM than
by adopting SM.

any SFM

-

If it is Gauthier's intention to convince

even a one like Reasonable

-

that she would do

better under any conditions by becoming

a

constrained

maximizer, the choice argument won't help him.
To skirt this difficulty one might retreat to the more

cautious claim that it is SM-rational for agents with

certain values in certain situations to choose CM over SM.
I

have no quarrel with this weaker view.

But if the very

justification for CM consists in showing that any SMrational agent would do better by choosing CM over SM, then
it is the stronger and not the weaker claim that needs to

be sustained.

Similarly, if SM is to be abandoned for the
162
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reason that SM-rational agents would not choose SM over
competitor,

15

a

it is once again the stronger claim that

needs to be upheld:

Why suppose a principle of rationality

defective if choice of it is SM-rational for agents with

certain values in certain situations, but not so rational
for agents with a non-equivalent set of values in a

different set of situations? 16
The choice argument, it appears, is not free of

worries
1.5.5

A Problem with PR

Assume, contrary to what has just been concluded, that

the disposition to CM is the rational disposition for

making choices.
PR,

Then the principle of practical reason,

appealed to by the second componet of PRS is to be

interpreted as claiming that
An act is rational if and only if it "expresses" the

disposition to constrained maximization.
Barring questions of just what PR so interpreted

amounts to, Gauthier presents no argument in its defense.
He asserts that
If one's dispositions to choose are rational, then
(M by A,
surely one's choices are also rational.
186)
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17

But mere assertion constitutes no
reason for accepting PR.
Gauthier's defense of solution PRS is at
best incomplete.
1

*

CM-rationality of Compliance

6

Although the choice argument does not succeed
it is
evident that CM as a theory of practical
rationality
enjoins compliance, under certain conditions,
with fair
optimal practices.
So perhaps the solution to
the

compliance problem being sought is that it is CM-rational
to comply with agreements that are rationally
entered into.
In "Reason and Maximization," however, Gauthier
tells

us that CM is a moral principle. 18

Suppose,

that CM is "rationally justified."

Suppose it is interest-

in addition,

constraining, as it indeed seems to be; it reguires
compliance, under specific conditions, with agreements

based on the principle of minimax relative concession.
Suppose,

finally, that it is impartial.

Gauthier seems to

rely on different accounts of impartiality.
says that "a joint strategy

Sometimes he

is impartial because it is

acceptable from every standpoint, by every person
involved."

(M by A,

151)

At other times, he relies on

Rawlsian notion of impartiality

-

a

principles are impartial

just in case they are selected from an "Archimedean Point"

behind

a

"veil of ignorance."

If these suppositions are

all true, then on the criteria proposed in Morals By

Agreement

.

CM would again qualify as a moral principle.
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It

would in fact be a moral principle that is also
for rational choice.
j-eature

,

a

principle

But even if CM had this attractive

Gauthier would still encounter a difficulty:

The

rationality of compliance and so the rationality of being
moral would on the present consideration be sustained on
moral grounds.

This would defeat Gauthier's project of

generating morality "as a rational constraint from the nonrcoral

premisses of rational choice."

emphasis.)

(M

by A,

4,

my

Assume, then, that CM is not a moral principle

so that this worry does not arise.

This would not,

unfortunately, permit Gauthier to circumvent a new problem:

SM-rational agents will have been given no reason

whatsoever to comply with agreements they rationally make.
(Remember, the choice argument falls short of accomplishing

what it is meant to.)

Why should a SFM be in the least

moved by being apprised that it is CM-rational but not SM
so to comply with fair optimal practices?
A way out would be to argue that SM suffers a defect

not shared by CM, that SM maybe, fails to satisfy a

criterion any adequate principle of rationality must meet.
"Reason and Maximization" intimates such a criterion.

It's

the criterion that a theory of rationality is adequate only
if "self-supporting."

Several versions of this criterion

are amplified and evaluated in the next chapter.
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For now, we conclude that on its own the choice

argument fails to resolve the compliance problem,
the merrymaking of our felons is premature.
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Notes

Gauthier's theory of bargaining is presented in Chapter
in David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (1986), Oxford:
Clarendon Press. We discussed this theory in the last
1*

V,

chapter.

2.
Gauthier claims that "our concern is to validate the
conception of morality as a set of rational, impartial
constraints on the pursuit of individual interest."
(M by

A,

6)

3.
A Nash equilibrium outcome is the product of a set of
actions, one for each interacting person, such that for
each such person, there is no alternative action that this
person would prefer, the actions of all the others being
fixed.
4
I think it is misleading to take CM to be a rational
disposition.
CM, like SM, is a theory of rationality.
Just as one can be disposed to act in accord with SM, so
one can be disposed to act in accord with CM.
.

5.
6.

Gauthier explains that
We speak of the response as nearly fair and optimal
because in many situations a person will not expect
others to do precisely what would be required by
minimax relative concession, so that he may not be
able to choose a strategy with an expected outcome
But we
that is completely fair or fully optimal.
suppose that he will still be disposed to cooperative rather than to non-co-operative
(M by A, 157)
behaviour.

If something more formal is desired in the
characterization of CM, perhaps the following will suffice:
Let's suppose that each act is either performed in a
parametric context, in which case it is a "P-act," or in a
strategic one, in which case it is an "S-act." Then CM can
be formulated in this way:

For any agent, R, and any act,
and only if
CM:

(a)
(b)

a,

a

is CM-rational

if a is a P-act, then a is SM-rational.
if a is an S-act, then
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if

(i)
if there is an outcome, o, such that o is
the product of a set, A, of actions, one for each
interacting person, o is fair and optimal, and R
expects each interacting person to be ready to
cooperate in achieving o, then a is a member of A
and R's doing a, provided the other interactors
did the cooperative thing, would result in o; or
(ii)
if there is an outcome, ol, such that ol=o
in (i), and R does not expect each interacting
person to cooperate in achieving oi, then a is
SM-rational or
(iii)
if there is no outcome, o2
such that o2=o
in (i), then a is SM-rational.
;

,

I here part company with what many have said on the
choice argument: Richmond Campbell (Richmond Campbell,
"Gauthier's Theory of Morals by Agreement," forthcoming in
Philosophical Quarterly believes that transparent SFMs,
choosing between SM and CM, would choose CM. Edward
McClennen expresses a similar belief in his paper
"Constrained Maximization and Resolute Choice," forthcoming
in Social Philosophy and Policy
While Peter Danielson
takes the disposition to "reciprocal cooperation" and not
the disposition to CM to be the rational disposition to
adopt (Peter Danielson, "The Visible Hand of Morality,"
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1988), 357-384, pp. 375he seems to agree that when choice is limited to CM
378)
Gregory
and SM, the choice of CM is utility maximizing.
Kavka says that it "may will be true" that CM is more
rational than the disposition to maximize expected utility.
(Gregory Kavka, "A Review of Morals By Agreement," Mind 96
L. W. Sumner thinks that Gauthier
(1987), 117-121, p. 120)
"has made a very strong putative case for thinking" that "a
utility maximizer should not be a straightforward
(L. W. Sumner, "Justice Contracted," Dialogue
maximizer."
523-548, p. 544)
26 (1987)
Fred Feldman, in contrast, characterizing SM "in a
slightly unorthodox way" believes that SFMs won't do worse
than constrained maximizers in PD-like situations. See
Fred Feldman, "On The Advantages Of Cooperativeness,"
forthcoming in Midwest Studies in Philosophy especially
section 7.

7.

)

.

,

,

,

As Gauthier claims, "A disposition is rational if and
only if an actor holding it can expect his choices to yield
no less utility than the choices he would make were he to
See
hold any alternative disposition" (my emphasis)
182-183.
Morals By Agreement pp.
8.

.

,
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.

I owe this formulation of the counterf actual
independence condition to Professor Fred Feldman. See
Feldman, "On The Advantages Of Cooperativeness " section

9.

,

3.

10.
Gauthier is sensitive to the charge that to assume
transparency is to rob the argument of much interest as it
is not realistic to suppose that "real world" persons are
transparent.
For this reason, he explores the merits of
the argument when the choosers in question are
"translucent." I believe the argument has problems even
when transparency is assumed.
I will therefore restrict
discussion to the ideal case in which this assumption
holds
For a critical discussion of the choice argument in
"real world' contexts, see Richard J. Arneson, "Locke
versus Hobbes in Gauthier's Ethics," Inquiry 30 (1987),
295-316, section V, pp. 304-315.

See Morals By Agreement p. 173 and Daniel M. Farrell,
"Hobbes As Moralist," Philosophical Studies 48 (1985), 257I remain unconvinced by these arguments.
283, pp. 272-273.
I think that in PDs in which the counterf actual
independence condition is satisfied and in which deception
is not possible, SFMs choosing between SM and CM would
choose either. My reasons for so thinking are presented in
section 1.5.3 in this chapter.
11.

.

Gauthier agrees with this. See, for example, David
12.
Gauthier, "Reason and Maximization," Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 4 (1975), 411-432, p. 415.
13.

Morals By Agreement

.

pp.

169-170.

14.

Morals By Agreement

.

pp.

25,

34,

48.

Gauthier suggests this in "Reason and Maximization,"
429-430; in David Gauthier, "The Irrationality of
Choosing Egoism - A Reply to Eshelman," Canadian J ournal of
Philosophy 10 (1980), 179-187, pp. 184-185, and in Morals
By Agreement pp. 183-184.

15.
pp.

,

The interesting issue of assessing theories of
16.
practical rationality will be considered in much more
detail in the next chapter.

David Copp and Richmond Campbell draw similar
observations in David Copp, "Contractarianism And Moral
Scepticism," forthcoming and in Richmond Campbell,
"Gauthier's Theory of Morals by Agreement," respectively.
See, also, Holly Smith's discussion in her paper
"Gauthier's Moral Contract," forthcoming.
17.
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18.
In "Reason and Maximization," p. 432, Gauthier says
that "The policy of agreed optimization [i.e. the policy of
CM] may be identified with morality."

19.
See David Gauthier, "Moral Artifice," Canadian Journal
of Philosophy 18 (1988), 385-419, section 6, and Morals By
Agreement Chapter VIII, for Gauthier's account of Rawlsian
or "Archimedean" impartiality.
David Copp conducts an interesting discussion of
Archemedean impartiality in "Contractarianism And Moral
Scepticism," section 5. One conclusion he there argues for
is this:
.

[U]nless everyone in society is roughly equal in
power and productivity, schemes or arrangements
that would pass the test of contractarian
rationality [i.e. schemes or arrangements like the
Lockian Proviso or the principle of minimax
relative concession that would be rationally agreed
to (let's suppose) by SFMs] would not pass the test
of impartiality [they would not be selected by
rational agents behind a Rawlsian veil of
ignorance], at least not without qualification, and
schemes that pass an unqualified impartiality test
would not pass the rationality test.
(pp. 28-29)
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CHAPTER

6

ASSESSING THEORIES OF RATIONALITY
1

.

1

Introduction
In Morals By Agreement David Gauthier expresses an

intriguing view about rationality when he claims that
At the core of our rational capacity is the ability
to engage in self-critical reflection.
The fully
rational being is able to reflect on his standard
of deliberation, and to change that standard in the
light of reflection.
(M by A, 183)
In a similar vein,

in "Reason And Maximization" Gauthier

affirms that
Far from supposing that the choice of a
conception of rationality is unintelligible, I want
to argue that the capacity to make such a choice is
A
itself a necessary part of full rationality.
person who is unable to submit his conception of
rationality to critical assessment, indeed to the
critical assessment which must arise from the
conception itself, is^rational in only a restricted
and mechanical sense.

The notion of subjecting our beliefs and acts to

critical scrutiny is not too hard to grasp, but what about
the notion of subjecting our standards of critical scrutiny

themselves to critical scrutiny?

The trouble with the

latter notion seems to be that in assessing our standards
we cannot appeal to any higher authority

-

for there is

none higher than these very standards themselves.

Nevertheless, as is evidenced by the passages just cited,
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Gauthier not only believes that it is possible to raise
questions about the ultimate adequacy of these standards
but that "full rationality" demands that one do so.
In this chapter

what

I

offer a number of interpretations of

consider to be Gauthier's test for assessing

theories

- at

rationality.
1.2

I

least formally adequate ones
I

- of

argue that none is cogent.

Two Sorts of Evaluative Test
It is important to distinguish between two different

notions of an evaluative test for principles of practical
reason.

According to the "criterial notion" the test

specifies

a

necessary condition any formally adequate

theory of practical reason must satisfy.

In contrast,

the

"comparative test" allows us to determine which of two

competing theories, if any, is better.

A theory's being

better than a competitor is compatible with its failing to
meet
I

a

necessary condition of adequacy for any such theory.

distinguish these two notions since both,

suggested in the relevant texts by Gauthier.

I

believe, are

What

I

call

the "choice interpretation" of the evaluative test is

itself succeptible to two interpretations.

construed as propounding either

a

It can be

criterial or a

comparative test for assessing theories of rationality.
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.

The "self-referential" interpretation, unlike the first,

explicitly enunciates

a

criterial test.

To formulate the various interpretations, concede the

intelligibility of the claim that

person's conception of

a

rationality is something he can rationally choose to
change.

Assume that to choose among conceptions of

rationality is simply to choose among acts of undertaking
permanent commitment to one of them.

a

With this in mind we

can now attempt to elucidate the variants of the choice

interpretation
1.3

A Criterial Test

Gauthier explains that

a SFM,

choosing among

conceptions of rationality, will elect to abandon egoism in
favor of an alternative, "constrained maximization" (CM)
To demonstrate the rationality of suitably
constrained maximization, we solve a problem of
rational choice. We consider what a rational
individual [i.e. an SM-rational individual] would
choose, given the alternatives of adopting
straightforward maximization, and of adopting
constrained maximization, as his disposition for
strategic behaviour. Although this choice is about
interaction, to make it is not to engage in
interaction.
Taking others' dispositions as fixed,
reasons parametrically to his own
individual
the
(M by A, 170-171)
disposition.
best
[W]e suppose it possible for persons, who may
initially assume that it is rational to extend
straightforward maximization from parametric to
strategic contexts, to reflect on the implications
of this extension, and to reject it in favour of
(M by A, 183-184)
constrained maximization.
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In these passages Gauthier appears to be proposing

that non-equivalent substantive theories of practical

reason are to be evaluated on the basis of
choice among them.

The favored alternative

a
(

rational
s)

is the one

the choice of which is rational.
As a criterial test, CT, the choice interpretation

says this:
CT:

A principle of rationality is adequate only if choice

of it (presumably by any agent)

is rational.

CT faces an obvious objection.

A rational choice of a

theory of rationality is impossible without assuming some
theory,

itself an adequate one, as

a

basis for such

a

choice
The force of this objection is better appreciated once
it is elaborated into a dilemma.

evaluation be Tl.

Let the theory under

If choice of T1 is to be rational we

must assume some theory of practical reason, T*, as
for our choice.
not.

Then CT is a self-referential

criterion of adequacy.
formulated, though,

identical to Tl.
questioned.

basis

Now either T* is identical to Tl or it is

Suppose it is.

itself is flawed.

a

This criterion appropriately

is flawed as

I

argue below.

So CT

Suppose, alternatively, that T* is not

Then T*'s ultimate adequacy may itself be

On what basis do we establish its credentials
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as an acceptable theory of practical reason?

On the one

hand, T*'s adequacy cannot be assumed since the very

purpose of the test is to provide
for theories of rationality.

a

criterion of adequacy

On the other hand, a

consistent application of the evaluative test now under

consideration requisitions

a

rational choice of T* on the

basis of some other non-identical theory, T**.

But then of

course the adequacy of T** itself may be queried.
of regress,

1.4

On pain

it seems best to bow to this horn.

A Comparative Test

Although CT fails it's still open to

a

defender of the

choice intepretation to hold that this interpretation

enunciates

comparative test for theories of rationality.

a

The attractions of such a test, it may be claimed, are
evident:

A comparative test avoids the unpromising or

perhaps even impossible task of discovering and formulating

criteria of adequacy for theories of practical reason.

For

what else other than our intuitions could we appeal to to

discover such criteria if indeed there is anything to
discover?

But it is patent,

it may be held,

that our

intuitions are unreliable when it comes to making such
discoveries.

2

The most we can hope for in the face of

competing theories like SM and CM is to try to ascertain
which of them is better, and to attempt this by avoiding
any appeal to our questionable intuitions.
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.

To formulate the choice interpretation so that it

captures the notion of a comparative test, let's limit our

choice to two non-equivalent theories, T1 and T2

.

Then the

comparative criterion, CCO, recommends that
CCO

T1 is better than T2 if and only if a choice of T1 is

:

rational
But rational on what basis?

two possibilities.

Again, there appear to be

The choice of T1 may be rational on the

basis of either one of T1 or T2, or T3

,

on the supposition

that T3 is identical to neither T1 nor T2
The second alternative, however, isn't really one

since by assumption there are only two theories of choice,
T1 and T2

.

We are assuming that there isn't a further

theory that can be used as
them.

sound:

a

basis for choosing between

Even if there were, that theory would have to be

rational choices cannot, unless fortuitously, be

forthcoming from defective theories of rationality.
sound,

If

its being so could presumably be confirmed by a set

of criteria of adequacy for theories of rational choice.

But a powerful impetus for propounding a comparative test
as opposed to a criterial one, derives from scepticism

about there being any such set, and even if there were, of
our being able to discover it.
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So suppose T3 is identical to either T1 or T2

.

Then

the test would have to be construed in this fashion:
CC1:

T1 is better than T2 if and only if choice of T1 is

rational given one of T1 or T2 as a basis for choice.
CC1 encounters a difficulty:

Suppose the choice

between T1 and T2 is to be made on the basis of Tl.

Then

it seems that the supposition begs the question in favor of
Tl.

It seems to presume that Tl is better than T2 for

purposes of choosing between them.

The arbitrariness of

this sort of manoeuvre should be clear.
to resolve the problem in this manner:

One might attempt

The context of

choosing among conceptions of rationality, Gauthier tells
us,

is a parametric one.

Assume the extensional

equivalence of Tl and T2 in parametric contexts.

Then

these theories prescribe the very same actions in such

situations of choice.

Hence to use either as

a

basis for

rationally choosing between them is not to presume one

superior to the other and is therefore not to beg the
question in favor of either.
This solution to the problem, however, incurs costs.

The most obvious is that the criterion of adequacy for

theories of rationality as summarized by the choice
interpretation must now be construed as
not a general one.

a

restrictive and

The test limits itself to theories like

SM and CM that are extensionally equivalent in parametric
177
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contexts and has no application whatsoever to theories that

may not be so equivalent.

3

It may be possible to show, by

independent argument, that all "maximizing" theories of

rationality like SM and CM are in fact extensionally

equivalent in parametric contexts so that there is no worry
here.

But then again it may not.

In that case the

objection needs to be defused.
Here's a suggestion:

Why not first compare T1 and T2

relative to Tl, then relative to T2

,

and then evaluate on

the basis of CC2
CC2

For any theories, Ti and Tk, Ti is better than Tk if

:

and only if it is better as judged both by Ti and Tk.
Hence,

if Tl and T2 are extensionally equivalent in

parametric contexts, then one is chosen or they tie.
.

.

they are not so equivalent, then they tie.

If

4

There is a problem, however, with this suggestion as
well.

The problem, by the way, would persist even if it

could be shown that all "maximizing" theories are

extensionally equivalent in the relevant context.

In a

nutshell, the problem is that one and the same theory of

rationality may recommend different courses of action

depending on the characteristics of the choice situation.
The choice of theories of rationality, supposing

a

certain

theory as a basis for choice, is not invariant across all
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parametric choice contexts.
chapter,

5

As we saw in the last

and indeed as Gauthier himself emphasizes, under

certain conditions SM prescribes the choice of SM; under
others,

it may prescribe CM.

observation one must,

I

6

Confronted by this

think, conclude one of two things.

Either CC2 fails; or, eschewing this verdict, one must
assume the burden of explaining why certain choice

situations and not others are relevant to the testing of
theories of rationality.
below.
1.5

We shall have more to say on this

7

An Absolutist Self-support Test

Earlier works, in particular "Reason and

Maximization," lend support to another criterial test for

conceptions of rationality.

Roughly, the idea is that

theories of rationality are to be assessed selfref erentially.

After explaining that

a

rational egoist will reject

egoism in favor of CM, Gauthier tells us that

straightforward maximization is not selfsupporting; it is not rational for [a SFM] to
choose to be a straightforward maximizer.

g

On the plausible assumption that to abandon a theory of

rationality is to reject it as untenable, the passage
suggests that egoism is defective because it is not self-
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supporting.

This,

condition of

a

in turn,

suggests that

a

necessary

principle of rationality's being adequate is

that the principle is self-supporting.
The notion of self-support is introduced by Gauthier
in this way:

It is rational to choose a conception of
rationality if, given that conception of
rationality, it is rational to choose it.

The notion is ambigious.

It can be construed in either an

"absolutist" or a "relativist" fashion.

According to the

former,

ASS:

Principle of rationality,

R,

is self-supporting =df.

for any agent, under any conditions, the choice of R would

be permitted by R.

According to the latter,
RSS:

Principle of rationality,

R,

is self-supporting =df.

for any agent, under certain conditions, the choice of R

would be permitted by

R.

It appears that it cannot be to the ASS conception of

self-support that Gauthier subscribes:
meant to be self-supporting.

CM,

unlike SM, is

But on the absolutist

conception, there are conditions under which this is not
true.

Here's one.

head and threatens:

Suppose a terrorist puts a gun to your
"If you adopt CM,
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I'll kill you."

Under these conditions, CM prescribes that you ought not to
adopt CM.
1.6

So CM is not absolutely self-supporting.

Relativist Self-support Tests
Perhaps the self-referential principle endorsed by

Gauthier is SRI:
A principle of rationality, R,

SRI:

is relativistically self-supporting

is adequate only if R

("RSS").

SRI is singularly unhelpful since it leaves

unspecified the conditions under which adequate principles
of rationality are to be self-supporting.

To isolate these

conditions, it will be helpful to remind ourselves that in

situations of the relevant kind, Gauthier suggests that SM
but not CM is not self-supporting.
First, notice that for agents with a particular

psychological profile, SM may not fail in the required
way.

10

This becomes evident if we reflect on rational

agent Tom's disposition to maximize.

ardent SFM

.

Tom is a tenaciously

Ardent SFMs value being SFMs; they value being

the sort of person that has as her conception of

rationality SM.

Just as one may value being generous,

ardent SFMs value acting in accord with the prescriptions
of rational egoism.

Tenaciously ardent SFMs value being

SFMs much more than they value being any other sort of

181

^
maximizer.

Presented with the choice between any other

maximizing conception of rationality and SM,

a

tenaciously

ardent SFM would choose to remain such a maximizer.
In light of this counterexample, SRI may be amended by
a slight modification:

SR2
(i)

A principle of rationality, R, is adequate only if

:

given that R is one's principle of choice, and

(ii)

one

does not value being an R-rational person, it is rational
to choose R.
If one is a SFM,

for example, clause (ii)

of SR2 is to be

construed as saying that one does not value being
SR2 suffers at least two serious defects.

a SFM.

To explain

the first we need to distinguish between "teleological" and

"non-teleological" theories of rationality.

Teleological

theories place no constraints on the ends of rational
agents or on what rational agents may value.

SFMs,

example, espousing

-

a

teleological theory

-

SM

for

may value

...

the happiness of others, cooperativeness in PDs, or being
SFMs.

12

Non-teleological theories

.

in contrast,

constraining branding as irrational certain ends.
such theory,

are ends-

Some

for instance, may rule that it is irrational

to value being a tenaciously ardent SFM.
In adducing a principle of adeguacy for a class of

theories of rationality, it is desirable that the principle
be applicable to every member of this class.
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Without such

generality of applicability it would fail to be
of much interest.

In particular,

a

principle

it should not turn out in

the absence of any justification to the contrary, that such
a

principle preclude assessing theories of the relevant

kind merely in virtue of the values of those holding these
theories.

This is especially true if the theories in

question are teleological

-

such theories do not in any way

constrain the values of rational agents.
evident that SR2 fails in this respect.

It should be

Since Tom is

a

tenaciously ardent SFM, SR2 cannot be used by him to
evaluate SM.

Suppose that unlike Tom Dan does not value

being a SFM though he is such

available to him as

a

a

maximizer.

SR2 is then

principle of critical assessment.

Given Tom's values SM is self-supporting.

Given Dan's

values it may not be self-supporting and hence Dan but not
Tom may have to conclude that SM is defective.

Suppose,

now, that Tom undertakes "cognitive conversion therapy" and

as a result comes to loathe being a SFM.

In using SR2 to

assess SM, he may now have to conclude like Dan that it is

inadequate since it is not self-supporting.

How can the

mere fact of changing one's values call into question

teleological theory of rationality?

problem

I

a

Of course, the kind of

am trying to articulate would not arise if the

theories under scrutiny were non-teleological
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:

according

.

to these theories,

it might well be irrational to value SM

as Tom does.
It may be objected that this worry can easily be

dispelled by stipulating that the utility of choosing

a

conception of rationality depend entirely on the utility

produced by the actions required by the relevant
conception. 13
SR2 *
(i)

So SR2 should be rejected in favor of SR2*.

A principle of rationality, R,

:

is adequate only if

given that R is one's principle of choice, and

(ii)

the

utility of choosing a conception of rationality is to
depend solely on the utility of the actions required by
that conception, it is rational to choose

R.

The trouble with SR2 * is that clause (ii)

justification.

lacks

Why accept the restriction it imposes

especially if one is

a

tenaciously ardent R-rational

person?
Alternatively, it might be rejoined that the problem

would be avoided by wording SR2's right hand side

counter factually
SR2CF:

A principle of rationality, R,

is adequate only if

were R one's principle of choice for conceptions of
rationality, and were one a person who did not value being

R-rational, it would be rational to choose
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R.

6

SR2CF avoids the original worry only at the expense of

having no relevance at all in assessing teleological
theories given persons' actual values.

Why be impressed by

the results of an evaluative test if it requires us to

indulge in the fiction that we are fundamentally different,
in the relevant respect,
I

from what we actually are?

said above that SR2 has at least two defects.

second defect (which also afflicts SR2*

)

is that it cannot

be Gauthier's principle of self-support:

principle SM is not self-supporting.

On Gauthier's

But SR2 allows for

situations in which SM is self-supporting.

himself directs our attention to them.

Its

14

situations that meet certain conditions.

Gauthier
These are PD-like
The most

important of these conditions, for our purposes at least,
is the counter factual independence condition.

The

condition states that no matter what choice either player
makes he would still make that choice no matter what choice
the other makes.

15

SFMs who place no special value on

being such maximizers, choosing between SM and CM in such

PD-like situations, would choose the former.

A dominance

argument, Gauthier informs us, establishes this.

1

We need

not here concern ourselves with CM nor with the details of
the dominance argument.

17

For the point that needs

recognition is simply that if Gauthier is right, SFMs in
such PD situations who do not value SM, will choose SM over
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a

competitor

.

In these situations SM is therefore self-

supporting.

Under what conditions is SM non— self-supporting?

An

answer to this question will conceivably leave us in a

better position to formulate Gauthier's principle.

As

I

understand him, Gauthier argues that SM fails in the
required way in PD-like situations with "causal" dependence
and with agents who are directly aware of each others'

rational disposition or who at least have

a

good chance of

correctly identifying the rational disposition of others.

18

But merely specifying the condition in this way is not

enough.

One must also suppose, as we have seen, that the

choosers in question must not value being SFMs.

So perhaps

Gauthier's principle amounts to this:
SR3

:

A principle of rationality, R,

is adequate only if

given that R is one's principle of choice, R must be such
that in a PD-like situation with "causal dependence" and

with parties
(ii)

(i)

who do not value being R-rational, and

are directly aware of each others' rational

disposition or are at least in

a

good position to identify

the rational disposition of others, R is self-supporting.
SR3 seems incredible.

Why accept it as

adequacy for theories of rationality?

a

condition of

For starters,

suffers one of the same defects as does SR2

:

It implies

that the acceptability of a theory of rationality
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it

-

even

a

teleological one
rational agents.

-

crucially depends on the values of
But we saw that this is unacceptable.

For another thing, what's so special about PD-like

situations of the specified sort?

More specifically, why

is it that situations of this kind have any significance

when it comes to assessing theories of rationality?

Evidently the reason cannot be that in such situations SM
fails.

theory.

That would just beg the question against this

Perhaps the thought is this:

Persons in the real

world often find themselves in PD-like situations of the
type now under consideration.

It may be urged that

situations in which each benefits from mutual cooperation
in relation to mutual non-cooperation, but benefits from

non-cooperation whatever the other does, are situations of
this sort.
this:

The relevance of "causal dependence" may be

Assuming that each is directly aware of the rational

disposition of his fellows, or at least has

a

good chance

in identifying the rational disposition of his fellows,

persons disposed not to abide by their agreements to

cooperate when it is best for themselves to do so would be
excluded from cooperative arrangements they would find
advantageous.

Those not so disposed may be expected to be

included in such arrangements and so reap benefits which
are not otherwise available.
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.

Even if all this is true, we have failed to be given
any justification to believe that such PD-like situations
are relevant to testing the adequacy of principles of

rationality.

Such considerations would be relevant were

our condition of adequacy something like this:
SR4

:

A principle of rationality, R, is adequate only if R

does not preclude R-rational agents who are directly aware
of the rational disposition of others, and who do not value
R,

from cooperating when such agents find themselves in PD-

like situations with "causal dependence."
Notice, though, that SR4 is not a self-referential

criterion.

It does not,

about self-support.

principle.

for example, mention anything

It cannot therefore be Gauthier's

It is, moreover,

as controversial as SR3

A final comment on SR3 is worth making.

Its idea that

a

theory of rationality's failing to be self-supporting in

a

specified situation is reason enough to reject that

theory seems fundamentally misconceived.

It is a mundane

truism that a theory of rationality will probably prescribe
as rational different choices in different situations.

In

certain situations, for example, it may be rational for

a

SFM to adhere to her rationally made agreements; in other

situations

-

some PD-like ones perhaps

-

it may not be.

From this truism nothing seems to follow about the adequacy
or inadequacy of these sorts of theories.
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Why should

things be any different when the objects of choice are

conceptions of rationality?

Under certain conditions

a

theory of rationality may recommend itself as the object of
rational choice.
of this though,

Under other conditions it may not.
I

None

think, should lead us to believe that

there is anything out of the ordinary about the relevant
theory, any more than a theory's telling us to do different

things under different conditions should generate suspicion
about that theory.
1.7

An "In Between" Self-support Test
So far

tenable.

I

have argued that neither ASS nor RSS is

ASS runs afoul of "terrorist counterexamples."

RSS succumbs to, amongst other things, Tom-like cases.

But

it may now be objected that these two kinds of

counterexample would probably impugn any theory of
rationality.

For this very reason such counterexamples,

could be urged, are not very interesting.

it

They do not

indicate anything particularly amiss with, for example, SM,
or CM, or for that matter any theory of rationality.

Furthermore, at least the second of them is highly unusual
and perhaps even illicit:

It is surely a reasonable

demand, the objection may continue, that an evaluation of

a

theory of rationality should not be affected by our prior

valuation of that theory.

So although the rejection of ASS
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is justified,

one need not go as far as RSS

Why not

.

introduce a new "in between" notion of self-support, the
AASS or "almost always self-supporting" notion?

AASS

:

A principle of rationality, R, is adequate only if

for any agent under any nice R condition, the choice of R
is permitted by R.

A situation is nice R if and only if no agent in it

values or disvalues any agent's being commited to

and no

R,

agent tries to get any agent to be or not to be so
commited.

AASS,

it may be claimed,

and Tom-like objections.

escapes terrorist-like

It also satisfies the requirement

that SM but not CM fail to be self-supporting.

The last claim, however, is not true:
Gullible.

Consider SFM

Gullible is an "unconditional compiler,"

a

person who always complies with agreements rationally
entered into.

Assume Gullible values being such

Would she renounce SM in favor of CM?

a

person.

Probably not, since

CM enjoins compliance with fair and rational agreements

only with trustworthy others, and not with,

for example,

exploiters who will defect from such agreements when doing
so is utility maximizing.

To cope with this problem, the specification of nice R

could be broadened so that

a

situation is nice R if and

only if no agent in it values or disvalues being commited
to R, or to any non-trivial entailment of R, and no agent
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tries to get any agent to be or not to be so commited.
this won't do either.

another SFM

.

But

Reconsider friend Reasonable,

Reasonable values acting on rational precept

RP.

RP:

If S ought (rationally) to do a at time tl and S

cannot do a at tl without doing b at an earlier time to,

S

ought (rationally) to do b at to.
Prior to choosing between SM and CM Reasonable knows
that he will find himself in a PD-like situation with
Gullible.

He knows that the SM-rational thing to do in

such a situation is to confess, and the CM-rational thing
to do (let's suppose)

is to remain silent.

To act

consistently with RP in this PD-like situation, Reasonable
must choose SM:

If he commited himself to CM,

he could not

then act SM-rationally nor in a manner consistent with RP
in the expected dilemmatic situation.

So the choice of SM

and not CM would maximize the satisfaction of Reasonable's

preference to act consistently with RP.
Of course, one may elect to deal with this hurdle in

the same manner as one dealt with the former, by re-

specifying nice

R.

But it should be evident, or at least

highly suspect, that such

a

move would be ad hoc

absence of a non-question begging and non-ad hoc

specification of nice

R,

AASS is implausible.
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In the

1.8

Does Self-support Matter?
In the last couple of sections

I

have proposed and

evaluated various principles of self-support.

Of these it

is apparently only SR3 that reflects what Gauthier may have

in mind.

But even SR3

,

I

argued,

evaluating these principles

I

is controversial.

In

have not attacked the notion

of self-support per se, the notion held in common by each
of them.

Rather, my criticisms have been directed to other

specific features of each individual principle.

I

wish to

conclude by extending criticism to the concept of selfsupport itself.
Why might it be thought that a principle of

rationality's not being self-supporting is sufficient to
impugn that principle?

The guestion is pressing since the

inference from a principle of rationality's not being selfsupporting, to the conclusion that it is thereby
inadequate,

sequitur
R,

.

is obviously suspect if not clearly a non-

From the fact that

a

principle of rationality,

is not self-supporting in certain circumstances,

it does

not seem to follow - at least not on first glance and not

even on second
anything,

-

that R is not adequate.

What follows,

if

is that under those circumstances it is rational

by R's own terms not to undertake a permanent commitment to
R.

But this fails to provide legitimate grounds for
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questioning R's adequacy.

An extra premise is required to

sustain the charge of inadequacy, one to the effect that
If it is R-rational not to undertake a permanent commitment

to R, then R is not adequate.

This premise, however, is false or at least extremely

contentious.

If Gilligan,

for example, were so

psychologically constituted that were he to undertake
permanent commitment to R

-

a

supposing R to be his principle

of choice - he would suffer paroxysms of mental anguish,

would be R-rational for him not to do so.
of this, though,

it

Why should any

lead us to believe that R is defective?

A final reply to our question is this:

It is

desirable as "fully rational" agents to subject our
theories of rationality themselves to rational assessment.
However,
to do so.

it seems impossible to appeal to further standards

But then,

it might be urged,

the only way in

which we can assess our ultimate theories is selfref erentially - is it rational by the theory's own terms
for a person to choose it?

Grant it is not possible to assess utlimate principles
of rationality by appealing to further standards.

the response is flawed:

Even so,

Such impossibility does not entail

the view advocated by the reply.

Exactly how our basic

principles of practical reason are to be evaluated, if at
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all,

is a difficult and perplexing question.

But without

additional reasons than those provided by this reply, there
seems to be nothing compelling about the recommendation

that the sole means to assess ultimate principles is selfref erentially
1.9

.

The Unresolved Compliance Problem
I

ended the last chapter on this note:

Gauthier

cannot solve the compliance problem by relying on the
"choice argument."

That argument fails.

He might,

nevertheless, insist (correctly) that (under specific
conditions)

it is CM-rational to comply with your

rationally made agreements.

If you have made a rational

agreement with your trustworthy partner to do the

cooperative thing in

a

PD-like situation, then CM requires

that you comply with that agreement.

If you are a SFM you

should not be impressed by this fact, not unless you have
been given reason to believe that SM but not CM is
defective, or that CM is

a

better theory, in the light of

an acceptable comparative test, than SM.

The evaluative

tests for conceptions of rationality that we have

considered in this chapter won't help here.
show that SM is defective.

They do not

Nor do they establish the

superiority of CM to SM.
The compliance problem remains a problem.
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Notes
1.
David Gauthier, "Reason And Maximization," Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 4 (1975), 411-433, p. 431.

2.
Aware that his substantive theory of justice will
conflict with our moral intuitions about concrete cases,
Gauthier tells us to trust his theory over our intuitions.
(David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (1986), Oxford:
Clarendon Press, p. 269)
Presumably, he would adopt a
similar position with respect to the role of our intuitions
in assessing theories of practical rationality.

3.
The extensional equivalence of CM and SM in contexts of
choice for theories of rationality may be explained in this
way:
CM, among other things, expresses a principle of
interdependent action - action on the basis of agreement
with others:

[A] person acting interdependently acts rationally
only if the expected outcome of his action affords
each person with whom his action is interdependent
a utility such that there is no combination of
possible actions, one for each person acting
interdependently, with an expected outcome which
affords each person other than himself at least as
great a utility, and himself a greater utility."
["Reason And Maximization," p. 427]

4.

Gauthier explains that "to act independently is to act
("Reason And
interdependently with oneself alone."
Independent action is therefore a
Maximization," p. 427)
special case of interdependent action. As a consequence,
with respect to independent action, CM and SM are
extensionally equivalent.
Here's an explanation of these results. Suppose,
first, that T1 and T2 are extensionally equivalent in
parametric contexts. Then there are three possibilities:
Then T1 is chosen and
Both recommend a choice of Tl.
(i)
Both recommend a choice of T2
(ii)
so Tl is better.
Both
(iii)
Then T2 is chosen, and so T2 is better.
Then neither is better than the
recommend either Tl or T2
Suppose, next, that Tl and T2 are not
other - they tie.
extensionally equivalent. Then Tl is not better than T2
I'm calling this outcome "a
and T2 is not better than Tl.
"
tie
.

.
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:

See Chapter

5.
6.

5,

section 1.5.2, this thesis.

In Morals By Agreement

this

,

181-182, Gauthier says

pp.

If we fall into a society - or rather into a state
of nature - of straightforward maximizers, then
constrained maximization, which disposes us to
justice, will indeed be of no use to us, and we
must then consult only the direct dictates of our
own utilities.
In a world of Fooles, it would not
pay to be a constrained maximizer, and to comply
with one's agreements.
In such circumstances it
would not be rational to be moral.
But if we find ourselves in the company of
reasonably just persons, then we too have a reason
to dispose ourselves to justice.

7.

See sections 1.6 and 1.7 below.

8.

"Reason And Maximization,"

p.

430.

9.

"Reason And Maximization,"

p.

429.

10.
If this is true, then in the interests of accuracy RSS
should be interpreted thusly:

RSS:
Principle of rationality, R, is self-supporting =df.
for some agents, under certain conditions, the choice of R
would be permitted by R.

Howard Sobel makes a very similar observation on page
11.
685 in J. Howard Sobel, "Interaction Problems for Utility
Maximizers," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1975), 677688
.

Gauthier holds that the content of a person's
12.
Morals By
preferences is beyond rational assessment.
Agreement pp. 25, 34, 48).
(

.

The concept of the expected utility of a conception of
13.
rationality may be elucidated in this way: The expected
utility of a conception of rationality may be identified
with the expected utility of the act of undertaking a
permanent commitment to that conception. Suppose R and R*
Suppose S is an agent
are conceptions of rationality.
contemplating a choice of conceptions. The expected
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utility for S of R is calculated in this fashion: consider
all the possible outcomes of choosing R.
For each,
consider the utility of that outcome. For each, consider
the probability of that outcome given that R is chosen.
Multiply, for each, the utility and the probability. Add
these products. The sum is the expected utility of R for
S.

a

Clause (ii) of SR2* restricts the outcomes of choosing
principle of rationality to actions.

14.

Morals By Agreement

.

173.

p.

I owe this formulation of the counterf actual
independence condition to Professor Fred Feldman.

15.

Morals By Agreement, pp. 172-173.
In the last chapter
(section 1.5.3), I expressed reservations about this
conclusion of Gauthier's. I there suggested that in PD
situations that satisfy the counterf actual independence
condition and in which deception is not possible, SFMs
choosing between SM and CM will be indifferent between
these two theories.
16.

For an explanation of CM, see footnote
17.
section 1.3, Chapter 5, this thesis.

above, and

5

in Morals By Agreement p. 172, and
18.
See Argument 2
Again, I disagree
the subsequent discussion on p. 173.
In PD-like situations with transparent
with Gauthier here:
SFMs, and in which deception is not possible, such
maximizers will again choose either theory when confronted
with a choice between SM and CM. See Chapter 5, section
1.5.3.
I will proceed, though, as if Gauthier is right
that in such situations, SM fails to be self-supporting.
(

)

.

.

I have
See Morals By Agreement p. 173 and p. 183.
19.
different views about this matter that I present in section
1.5.3 in Chapter 5.
,

197

CHAPTER

7

THE RATIONAL CREDENTIALS OF THE CHOICE THEORY OF MORAL

JUSTIFICATION
1

.

1

Introduction
The moral sceptic and his collegue

-

Hobbes' Fool,

question the rational credentials of morality.
they do more.

In fact,

They reject all moral requirements as

"unjustified," because these requirements interfere with

their pursuit of self-interest.

Considerations of rational

self-interest, they believe, provide the sole legitimate

grounds for action.
(and of others)

The contractarian strategy of Gauthier

to convince the amoralist otherwise,

is to

show that acknowledgment of at least some moral constraints
is required by the very conception of reason endorsed by

the amoralist.
The last couple of chapters have raised

about the rational credentials of

rationality itself.

a

a

question

theory of practical

If we are to believe Gauthier,

are different standards of reason.

there

There is the standard

of SM accepted by the Fool and his sceptical friends and

there is its rival, CM.

In adopting this position,

Gauthier does the Fool one better:

While the Fool eschews

morality, he acccepts reason as unproblematic.

scepticism

-

Gauthier's

at least his initial scepticism, extends even
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further

-

theories of practical reason themselves fall

within its ambit.
To successfully deflate the Fool's amoralism, then,

Gauthier must undertake at least

a

two-fold task.

Not only

must he show that morality can be "derived" from a theory
of practical rationality, he must also establish the

acceptability of the very theory of reason on which

morality is to be "founded."
Morals By Agreement offers

a

unified contractarian

scheme for the "justification" of both a morality and

theory of practical rationality.
Gauthier,

I

In so doing,

a

In this final chapter on

look more closely at this justificatory scheme.
I

continue

-

in part - the discussion of the

last chapter on assessing theories of practical

rationality.

But

I

now come at this issue from a slightly

different angle.
Theories of Moral Justification

1.2

One of the central tasks, if not the central task, of

Morals By Agreement is
to seek to prove
that principles of action that
prescribe duties overriding advantage [i.e. moral
(M by A,
principles] may be rationally justified.
2

)
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The issue of what we mean when we say that a morality is

"justified" is interesting because controversial.

A few

possible answers are these:
The epistemic answer says that a morality, M, is

justified for

a person,

S,

at time, t,

if and only if S is

epistemical ly justified in believing that M is true at
In other words,

a

t.

justified moral theory is one that we are

epistemically justified in accepting.
Another answer is the moral one.

A moral theory, M,

is justified for S at t if and only if it is morally right

for S to accept M at t.

In this case,

some higher order

moral theory would be required to determine whether it

would be morally right for

S to

accept M at t.

A third answer might be a sort of "best from the point

of view of our intuitions" answer.

The idea here is to try

to see that you have landed on a set of beliefs that you

will be able to "live with" come what may.

Perhaps what is

here being sought is a moral theory that seems to capture

how we really feel about morality at the deepest level.
The "functional" answer assumes that

function and that it is justified for

morality has

a

S at t

a

if and only if

it fulfils its function at t.

The last on the list of possibilities

"abstract rationality" answer.

I

canvass is the

According to this answer,

moral theory M is justified for S at t if and only if it
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would be rational, in some sense of 'rational,
accept M at t.

better for

S

if S were to accept M than if S were to accept

Alternatively, perhaps S's preferences

would be satisfied to
S to

for S to

Maybe S's life, for instance, would go

any other morality.

were

'

a

greater extent than they would be

choose some other theory.

would be rational for you to accept

From the fact that it
M,

it does not follow

that you have any evidence that M is true.

You may well

have plenty of evidence that M would maximally satisfy your

preferences if you were to choose it.

But that is

different from having evidence that M is true.

It is in

this respect that this "choice" conception of justification

differs in an essential way from the epistemic one.
I

believe the notion of justification appealed to in

Morals By Agreement is the abstract rationality one.
fact,

In

Professor Gauthier appears to use something like this

notion to justify not only moralities but, paradoxical as
it may seem,

theories of rationality as well.

1

I

argue in

this chapter that this conception of justification

generates problems for Gauthier and like-minded theorists
who endorse a view of values as "subjective."

It also

engenders difficulties for theorists who espouse an
"ob j ectivist " axiology.

show three things:

(1)

More specifically,

I

attempt to

Choice theory in conjunction with

an objectivist axiology runs afoul of the "morality is not

itself justified" (MJ) objection.
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This is the objection,

roughly, that from the fact that a person is justified in

accepting a morality, possibly because choice of that

morality for the person is rational, it does not follow
that that morality is itself justified relative to that
person.

If values are objective, there may well be reasons

rejecting a morality as unjustified, even if choice of
that morality for any person is rational.

(2)

When the

object of justification is a theory of rationality, and if
choice theory appropriately modified is held in conjunction

with

a

subjectivist axiology and

a

criterion specifying

a

necessary condition of adequacy for theories of
rationality, choice theory is also open to an MJ-like
objection.

(3)

justification is

In cases in which the object of
a

morality, and the choice of a morality

is to be made from a set of theories,

some of which are

moral and some of which are not, choice theory in

association with a subjectivist axiology is again

vulnerable to an MJ sort of objection.
1.3

Gauthier

'

s

Abstract Choice Theory

This section elaborates the version of choice theory
to which Gauthier subscribes.

Although the passage does

not explicitly mention anything about justification, it's

fairly clear that Gauthier advocates choice theory when he
says
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Rawls' idea, that principles of justice are the
objects of a rational choice, is indeed one that we
shall incorporate into our theory
[W]e shall
represent the choice as a bargain or agreement
among persons
[W]e claim to generate morality
as a set of rational principles for choice.
We are
committed to showing why an individual reasoning
from non-moral premisses, would accept the
constraints of morality on his choices. (M by A, 5)
,

The justification of a morality, Gauthier tells us, is
to proceed in relation to a group of rational egoists whose

goal is to maximize individual value.

Somewhat

surprisingly, Gauthier believes that goal must be achieved
by validating "the conception of morality as a set of

rational,

impartial constraints on the pursuit of

individual interest."

(M by A,

8,

my emphasis.)

The

rationale for constraint is contractarian:
Morals by agreement offer a contractarian
rationale for distinguishing what one may and may
(M by A, 9)
[T]he appeal to rational
not do.
state,
with new clarity and
choice enables us to
would agree ex ante
rational
persons
why
precision,
general
what
principles,
constraining
to
characteristics these principles must have as
objects of rational agreement, and why rational
persons would comply ex post with the agreed
(M by A, 10)
constraints."
The "weak and widely accepted" theory of rational

choice on the basis of which individuals are to select

principles is straightforward maximization
remind ourselves about SM.

(SM)

.

Let's

On this theory a person chooses

rationally if and only if she maximizes her expected
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utility.

(M by A,

some action,
r

^e

a,

182)

The utility of an outcome, O, of

for some agent, S,

— xpected utility of an action,

is the value of 0 for S.
a,

for some agent,

S,

can be conceptualized as a measure of the extent to which
the various outcomes that could result were

S to

do a,

would satisfy S's considered preferences for those
outcomes.

Considered preferences

.

Gauthier says, are those

"that would pass the test of reflection and experience."
(M

by A, 31, 21-26)

The expected utility of

a

for S is to

be calculated by appeal to probabilities on S's evidence

regarding the extent to which the various outcomes of

a

would generate satisfactions of S's considered preferences.
The abstract rationality conception of justification,
CT,

underlying Morals By Agreement can now be formulated

more perspicuously in this fashion:
CT:

A morality, M,

is justified in relation to the members

of a group if and only if it is rational for each member of

that group both to accept M and to comply with

M,

given

their considered preferences and their particular

circumstances of choice.

I

2

said that Gauthier appears to use a version of

choice theory to justify not only moralities but theories
of rationality as well.

He argues that "constrained

maximization" (CM) is to be preferred to SM on the grounds
that the former and not the latter would be chosen (under
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suitably specified conditions of choice) by SM-rational
agents if they were to choose between them.

Let PR be

either a theory of morality or a theory of rationality.

Then (abridging for convenience) Gauthier would probably
accept principle CTR:
CTR.

PR is justified in relation to the members of a group

if and only if it is rational for each member of that group

to accept PR.

The link between rational choice theory and the choice

theory of justification should now be evident.
in addition,

There is,

an interesting connection between rational

choice theory

- at

least the kind of maximizing theory held

by Gauthier - and value theory, and in consequence, an

interesting connection between the choice conception of

justification and axiologies.

Let me first sketch this

connection and then elucidate the theories of value
commanding our interest.
I

explained that Gauthier accepts

a

theory of rational

choice that identifies rationality (at least in parametric
contexts) with the maximization of

utility.

a

person's expected

Think of expected utility in the manner

recommended as

a

measure of

a

I

person's preferences for

various possible outcomes realizable in action.
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Gauthier

.

equates this measure with value.

He holds that outcomes

have value in virtue of being desired or preferred.
It appears to be Gauthier's view that any SM-rational

agent, selecting among principles that are to govern his

interaction with others, would select the principle of

minimax relative concession (MMRC)
a

3

principle of distributive justice.

MMRC, he tells us,

is

Furthermore, he

believes that any constrained maximizer but no SFM

,

would

comply with MMRC's "interest-constraining" prescriptions
when called upon to do so.

So at least part of CT as

conceived by Gauthier, the part saying that any rational
agent would accept a moral principle, is to be understood
as claiming that the selection of a particular morality

would maximize the value of each member of that group.

We

can properly speak of each member's value since Gauthier

believes that the expected utilities of individuals are not

interpersonally comparable.

(M by A,

134,

135)

As far as

compliance is concerned, matters are more complicated.
Here

I

think CT must be construed as saying that it is CM-

rational for each member of a group to comply with a moral

principle that it is SM-rational for each to select,

provided the others are ready to comply as well.
In contrast to Gauthier's "subjectivism,"

"objectivism" denies that value is "created" by preference.
On this rival view, states of affairs can have value

independently of being preferred or desired by anyone.
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1

Rationality would then be concerned with the maximization
of such "objective" value.

The notion of maximizing

objective value would, of course, have to be explained in
an acceptable fashion.

CT would then have to be

interpreted as recommending that

either

s imp ic iter

a

morality is justified

or in relation to a group of persons if

and only if if there is no alternative having a higher

degree of objective value than it has.
1.4

Subjectivism and Objectivism
The distinction between subjectivism and objectivism

needs refinement in order better to apprehend the contrast

between the two.

Gauthier explains that

To conceive of value as dependent on affective
relationships is to conceive of value as
subjective
(M by A, 47)
.

Value on this conception is a measure of
[considered] preference.
A measure depends for its
existence on what it measures - no preference, no
value
[OJbjects or states of affairs may be
ascribed value only in so far as, directly or
indirectly, they may be considered as entering into
relations of preference. Value is then not an
inherent characteristic of things or states of
in a manner
affairs, not something existing
quite independent of persons and their activities.
Rather, value is created or determined through
preference.
(M by A, 46-47)
A consequence of this view is that
a state of affairs is characterized not by a single
value, but by a set of values, one for each person
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into whose preferences it does or may enter.
Value
does not afford a single uniform measure of
preference but a measure relative to each valuer.
(M by A, 25.
See also p. 49 in this work.)

The passages show that the subjectivist theory in

consideration is complex, having many tenets the most
significant of which for our purposes are these:
SI:

Value cannot exist independently of persons.

S2

States of affairs have value only in relation to the

:

desires,

feelings, hopes, fears, aversions etc. of persons.

More succinctly, states of affairs have value only in

relation to the affections of persons.
S2 specifies the particular feature of persons that

according to this variety of subjectivism is essential to
the existence of value.
S3:

The value of a state of affairs for a person is

identical to the value, if any, that that state of affairs
has for that person.
a

person, P,

A state of affairs, SI, has value for

if and only if P has a considered preference

for SI.
A variant of this kind of subjectivist theory holds that a

state of affairs has value for
is desired by the person.

stressed is that

a

a

person if and only if it

On either variant, what is to be

thing has its value relative to a person

208

iri

virtu© of the fact that the person values the

Preferences or desires, we might say, create value.
States of affairs, if they exemplify what we could call
"derived value" in relation to some person, do so in virtue
of the fact that the person prefers them.

On this view,

values are to states of affairs as secondary properties
like redness are to physical objects.

types of subjectivist theory.
however, to which

described.

I

I

There are other

The kinds of theory,

confine attention are the ones just

shall hereafter take 'subjectivism' to denote

theories of this sort.

Opposed to subjectivism is objectivism.
To conceive of value as objective is to conceive of
it as existing independently of the affections of
sentient beings
(M by A, 47)

The objectivist may insist that there is a
necessary linkage between sentient beings and
value, holding that value provides the norm for our
affections. The proper object of preference is,
and is necessarily, the good.
But this link, on
the objectivist view, is not found within sentient
affection, but ties that affection to something
else which in itself affords the ground of the tie.
This other terminal of the link (and we shall not
impose on the objectivist a particular account of
what it is) must be independent of sentient beings
and their affections, even though linked to them.
In our discussion, we shall designate this alleged
(M by A, 56)
other terminal, obi ective value
.

Departing somewhat from the characterization of

objectivism summarized in these passages, an objectivist
need deny neither SI nor S2.

An objectivist hedonist,
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for

example, may contend that if there were no sentient beings

and their affections, nothing could have value.

objectivists would reject both SI and S2.

believed that the

11

Other

Thus if one

form" of The Good endows states of

with value, and that there is no necessary

connection between persons' affections and The Good

.

then

one would have no reason to accept either SI or S2.

The common strand of all objectivist theories is the

denial of the "derived-value" thesis, S3.

States of

affairs, according to these theories, do not have value in

virtue of being desired or preferred by anyone.

This

should be clear in relation to theories of the platonic
variety, an example of which we just noted.
like objective hedonism also deny S3:

that the state of affairs,

S,

A hedonist may hold

Tom takes pleasure in surfing

at time t, has intrinsic value.

value,

But theories

If S did in fact have

if it were intrinsically good,

it would be so

independently of being desired or preferred by anyone, Tom
included.

That is of course not to deny that S's goodness

may cause some person, perhaps Tom, to desire it.

person's desiring

S,

But some

or deriving pleasure from S, the

objectivist insists, cannot "endow"

S

with value.

We may

now formulate objectivism in this way:

Objectivism:

The value of a state of affairs,

objective property of

S.

F is an obi ect ive
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S,

is an

property of

S

=df. S has F, and S does not have F in virtue of
any

perons

s

desiring

from S, or

-

S,

or wanting S, or deriving pleasure

generalizing somewhat barbarously

-

seeing to

it that S has "derived value."

1-5

A Preliminary Observation

Consider the choice theory of justification, CT, held
in association with a subjectivist account of value.

CT

(abbreviated for ease of exposition) states that a
morality, M, is justified in relation to the members of
group, G,

a

if and only if it is rational for each member of

G to accept M.

Embracing

a

subjective account of value,

Gauthier imposes no substantive constraints on the states
of affairs rational agents may prefer and so value.

Indeed, he holds that the contents of persons

preferences cannot be rationally assessed.
26,

34)

7

considered

(M by A,

25,

Given this freedom from constraint, it is

unlikely, as

I

argued in Chapter

5,

that SFMs will

unanimously choose the same moral principles to constrain
their interactions.

The reason for this, roughly, being

that their considered preferences for states of affairs,

unless by an happy coincidence or as

a

mere matter of

contingent fact, will not all be identical.

In that case,

no morality would be justified for the relevant group.
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This preliminary observation aside, there is an

objection to the necessary and sufficient conditions on
moral justification enunciated by CT that

I

now wish to

develop.

I

first show how this sort of objection

objection

-

afflicts CT held in combination with an

objectivist theory of value.

I

-

the MJ

then argue that when the

object of justification is either a morality or
rationality, choice theory in conjunction with

a

theory of

a

subjectivist axiology, together with certain additional
considerations, succumbs to a similar problem.
1.6

Choice Theory and Objectivism

Consider

a

simplified version of choice theory, CTS,

according to which
to a person, S,

a

morality, M, is justified in relation

if and only if the choice of M by S is

rational.

Does S's rational choice of M suffice to justify

M itself?

Is such rational choice even necessary to its

justification?

The answers are fairly evident if CTS is

considered in conjunction with an objectivist account of
value.

Suppose "platonic" objectivism is true so that the

form of The Good determines what is good.

Suppose,

further, that there is no necessary connection between

person's preferences and The Good

.

In Gauthier's

terminology, assume that value does not provide

a

"norm"

for our preferences; the proper object of our preferences
is not necessarily The Good

.

Then it is entirely possible
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that although S's choice of M would be justified because
rational, such a choice would not serve to justify M
itself.

There could well be independent reasons that

undermined the tenability of M itself, reasons in one way
or another having to do with objective value.

might be useful.
true,

An example

Since we are assuming objectivism is

let's also not implausibly assume that there is

true morality, act utilitarianism.

a

Let act utilitarianism

be the theory that an act is right if and only if none of
its alternatives has a higher utility than it has.

utility af an act,

a,

Let the

be the result of subtracting all the

units of intrinsic badness, if any, from all the units of

intrinsic goodness, if any, that would result if
performed.

a

were

Ignoring certain complications, let relativism

be the theory that an act is right if and only if it is

permitted by the conventions of its society.

Suppose

choice of the latter and not the former theory would

maximize S's expected utility if
the two.

were to choose between

S

Then it should be clear that although S's choice

of relativism would be rational, this theory would not

itself be (objectively) justified

stipulation, is false.

-

relativism, by

If values are objective,

then it

seems proper to require that a theory be justified only if
it bears some important relation to objective value.
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Suppose objective value did provide
preferences.

In fact,

a

norm for our

assume these to be true:

states of affairs, Si and

Sj

For any

and for any agent, p, p

,

prefers Si to Sj if and only if si is better than Sj
any states of affairs, Si and

Sj

,

For

.

Si is better than Sj

if

and only is Si has a higher degree of intrinsic goodness

than S j

.

Now, once again, suppose the choice of M were to

maximize the satisfaction of S's, in fact anyone's,
considered preferences and so were to gualify as rational.
In this case wouldn't M itself be justified?
so:

I

don't think

There is a difference between the objective value of

the choice of M, and the objective value of the actions M

tells you to do or the objective value of M itself.

It

would be true that if the choice of M were maximally to
satisfy anyone's considered preferences, its choice would
be objectively better than the choice of any alternative.

But that,

I

think, wouldn't support the further distinct

desideratum that M itself were justified.
here.

I

may be wrong

Suppose, then, that in the case now under scrutiny M

itself were justified.

Even then there is a problem:

M

would be justified on what is now the supposition that it
were beter than alternatives.

That it would be better in

this fashion, though, would be an objective fact, true

independently of any choice of any person.

Assume, now,

that objective values do provide a norm for preferences,
but assume also that most rational preferences happen to
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violate the norm.

Then rational choice of a morality does

not guarantee that the morality is objectively justified.
So it seems that if values are objective, a rational

choice of a morality does not show the morality itself to
be justified.

At best, it shows that the choice of the

morality is justified.

If I am right about this,

then the

abstract rationality account of justification is not
neutral among conceptions of value.

6

It may be held in

association with an objective theory of value only on pain
of falling prey to the foregoing objection.
1.7

Choice Theory and Theories of Rationality

Gauthier uses the abstract rationality theory to
defend not only moralities but theories of rationality as
well.

So let's evaluate the appropriate form of choice

theory as it is used in this capacity.
a

simplified version of CTR, CTRS

of rationality, PR,

,

To do so, consider

which says that a theory

is justified in relation to a person S

if and only if the choice of PR by S is SM-rational.

addition to being
also be

a

being such

a

In

principle of rational choice, PR may

moral principle as it may satisfy criteria for
a

principle.

for example,

So,

if PR constrains

one's pursuit of self-interest, is ’’rationally justified,"
and is "impartial," Gauthier would probably acknowledge

that it is a moral principle.
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(M by A,

3,

4)

I

introduce

this complexity because Gauthier believes that the choice
of CM and not SM (under specified conditions)

maximizing for any SM-rational agent.
Furthermore

is utility

(M by A,

157-189)

he believes that CM is a moral principle.^

,

There are two main variants of CTRS that demand
attention.

There is the variant that results if CTRS

stands on its own, and the one generated if CTRS is held in

tandem with

a

rationality.

criterion of adequacy for theories of
We examined something very similar to the

first of these variants in sections 1.3 and 1.4 in Chapter
6.

In these sections we discussed CT and various

modifications of CT

.

CT says that a theory of rationality

is adequate only if choice of it is rational.

If we

replace 'adequate' with 'justified,' then CT so amended is
part of CTRS; CTRS implies that a necessary condition of

theory of rationality's being justified in relation to

a

a

person is that choice of the theory by that person is
rational.

But we saw that CT is defective.

So the first

sort of variant of CTRS must also be defective.

Now consider the second variant.
in conjunction with
a

(i)

criterion of adequacy,

a

Suppose CTRS is held

subjectivist axiology, and (ii),
C,

for theories of rationality.

The criterion may be something like this:

A theory of

rationality is adequate only if absolutely selfsupporting.

The notion of absolute self-support is to be

understood in this way:

Principle of rationality,
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R,

is

absolutely self supporting — df. for any agent under any
conditions, the choice of R would be permitted by R.

it is

reasonable to require that a justified conception of

rationality at least satisfy
any such conception.
in this respect?

a

criterion of adequacy for

How can a justified conception fail

In light of this constraint, CTRS may be

modified to the view that
PR is justified in relation to S if and only if

choice of PR by

S

is rational,

C.

Formulated in this way,

problem with CTRS* may now be fairly obvious.
a

the

and (ii), PR satisfies

Call this principle CTRS*.

guarantee that

(i)

a

There is no

precept of practical rationality will

satisfy both conditions

(i)

and (ii).

A precept that

satisfies condition (i), for instance, may fail to satisfy

condition (ii).

In such a case,

although the choice of the

relevant precept would be justified, the precept itself

would not be justified.

Let's consider an example.

Let PR

be CM and let C be the criterion of absolute self-support.

Then CTRS* tells us that CM is justified in relation to
some agent,

S,

just in case S's choice of CM maximizes S's
Gauthier,

utility, and CM is absolutely self-supporting.
as

I

said before, argues that any SFM, and so

S,

would

(under appropriate conditions) choose CM as his conception
of rationality if presented with the choice of adopting
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either CM or SM.

Assume he is right about this.

But CM,

as we saw in the last chapter (refer to section 1.5 of this

chapter)

,

is not absolutely self-supporting:

terrorist puts

a

If a

gun to your head and threatens:

"If you

adopt CM, I'll kill you," CM prescribes that you ought not
to adopt CM.

In such cases, the choice of CM would be

justified because rational.

CM,

however, would not be

justified, at least not by the lights of CTRS*, because CM
is not absolutely self-supporting.

In addition, CTRS* has another problem.

It has the

same defect that undermines the first variant of CTRS, one
to which we alluded above.

1.8

Choice Theory and Subjectivism
The criticism of choice theory just discussed might be

thought to be of limited interest.

It is,

after all,

primarily meant to show that Gauthier cannot consistently
endorse the appropriate form of choice theory when the
object of justification is

criterion of self support.

a

rationality, and some
It is also designed to caution

us that theories of rationality cannot be justified in the

way in which choice theory recommends.

with choice theory do not end here.

I

But the problems
want, now, to

evaluate its credentials in the most general and
interesting of cases.
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Suppose one wishes to answer Hobbes' Fool who

challenges the rationality of being moral.

The Fool

insists that there are certain situations in which one must
act either irrationally or immorally.

Some prisoner's

dilemma situations may be situations of this sort.
Suppose,

further, that the challenge is to be met by

showing that fully rational persons, SM-rational persons,

would voluntarily agree to restrain their maximizing
activity by choosing to be moral.

In Gauthier's words,

the

challenge is to be met
by demonstrating that
a rational utility
maximizer, faced with the choice between accepting
no constraints on his choices in interaction, and
accepting the constraints on his choices required
by [a particular moral principle, MMRC]
chooses
the latter.
(M by A, 158)
,

If this strategy to meet the Fool's challenge is to

succeed, some of the principles among which rational agents

are to choose, as the passage acknowledges, must be

principles requiring no restraint on maximizing activity.
That is, the alternatives among which rational agents are
to choose must not be restricted to moral principles.

In

the sorts of cases when choice among alternatives is so

restricted, choice theory loses much of its theoretical
appeal.

For much of this appeal,

I

think, derives from the

hope that the challenge of the moral sceptic like Hobbes'
Fool can be answered by showing that it would be rational
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for any individual, and so for the rational sceptic

himself, to choose to be moral.
So consider the interesting case like the one

discussed by Gauthier and arguably by Hobbes, where
rational agents are to select principles of practical

reason from an "impure set" that has both moral and nonmoral principles as elements.

CM and SM,

might be the members of one such set.

for example,

Let's allow that

some of the members in the impure set are principles that

qualify as both moral principles and principles for
rational choice so that we can accomodate the possibility
that "to choose rationally, one must choose morally."
by A,

4)

(M

Now let's evaluate choice theory, held in

conjunction with

a

subjectivist axiology, in cases where

the putative object of justification is a morality to be

selected from an impure set.
It would be misleading to formulate the version of

simplified choice theory here appropriate in this way:
CT*:

A morality, M,

is justified in relation to S if and

only if S's choice of M is rational.
CT* is misleading because it fails to alert us to the fact

that choice of a morality is to be made from an impure set.
A better formulation would be this:
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CTheory:

only if

P is a justified morality in relation to S if and
(i)

the choice of p by S from an impure set is

rational, and (ii), P satisfies necessary and sufficient

conditions for being

a morality.

If we are concerned to answer Hobbes' Fool, choice of

principles must be made from an impure set.
records this requirement.

Clause

Since principles are to be

selected from an impure set, it is possible that
choice may result in

a

a

rational

principle that is non-moral.

order to be a justified morality

whose choice is rational must be
moral one.

(i)

In

though, the principle

.

a

principle that is

a

Clause (ii) is sensitive to this demand.

Formulated in this appropriate fashion, however, it
appears that CTheory is afflicted with one of the same
sorts of difficulty that is damaging to CTRS*:

guarantee that

a

principle that satisfies the condition

specified by clause

in CTheory also satisfies the

(i)

condition specified by clause (ii).
be helpful.

There is no

Again, examples will

Let the members of the impure set from which

principles are to be selected be SM and CM.
"interest-constraining."

It is therefore,

agrees, not a moral principle.

SM is not
as Gauthier

If any morality,

then,

is

justified CM must be justified, since it is the sole moral

principle in the impure set now under consideration.
However,

in Chapter 5,

we saw that under certain conditions
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the choice of SM and not CM is rational.

A person, S, who

values acting in accord with SM and who hates CM, for
example, would do best if he were to choose SM.

another example:

Suppose

S

Here's

knew that he would find himself

in exactly one PD situation in which his partner, Gullible,

would do the cooperative thing come what may.
again do best if he were to settle for SM.
but not CM,

S

could exploit Gullible.

S

would

By adopting SM

In these cases,

although the choice of SM would be justified because
rational, the object of choice would not itself be a

justified morality.
results.

Desperate:

CTheory,

it appears,

yields incorrect

To evade this worry, one might invoke Desperate:

For any impure set,

and any agent

s,

#,

and any member, pi of

if s's choice of pi is rational,

#,

then pi

is a moral principle.

Desperate is false as the examples above demonstrate.

Not

only is it false, it cannot be appealed to with propriety

without begging the question against Hobbes' Fool.
If CTheory is the correct version of abstract

rationality theory underlying Morals By Agreement

,

then

I

think that this theory of moral justification is in need of
serious amendment.
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1.9

A Rumor

Gauthier has failed to provide Butch and Sundance with
adequate justification to believe that they will be able to
escape the PD.

Even if they were to become constrained

maximizers, they would do no better than they would have

done had they remained straightforwardly rational.

Even as

constrained maximizers, the rational thing to do in the
authentic PD in which they are is to confess.
A note from the underground surreptitiously reaches

our felons.

It urges them not to loose hope.

Word has

leaked out that resolute agents can overcome PDs.
any truth to this rumor?

Is there

We'll find out in the next

chapter
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CHAPTER

8

RESOLUTE CHOICE
1

.

1

Introduction
Edward McClennen has recently argued that the one-shot

PD is "resolvable." 1

it is resolvable in the sense that

fully rational agents are able to do whatever it takes to

achieve an optimal outcome.

His solution to the dilemma is

meant to provide rational agents who face such

with

a

rationale for cooperation.

a

dilemma

It would also provide,

if tenable, what we might take to be a vindication of the

claim that it is rational to be moral.

McClennen tells us that (like David Gauthier) he has
"become persuaded that there is a need for

a

reappraisal of

the requirements of rational choice as typically

presented."

(PD and RC,

95)

Unlike Gauthier who

(according to McClennen) argues for cooperation by

appealing to the notion of maximizing expected utility at
the level of dispositions to choose,

(Ibid.)

he argues for

it on the basis of "maximizing utility at the level

of

particular choice, but that this utility is

contextually dependent on the nature of the choice
situation."

(Ibid.)

His arguments are, consequently, of

special interest to this thesis.

believe not

-

for reasons that
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I

But do they succeed?

will shortly present.

I

.

McClennen provides a diagnosis of what he conceives to
be the central problem with SM, a problem he thinks
that
clearly surfaces when the theory is extended to "dynamic
choice situations" in which agents are called upon to make
a

sequence of choices over time.

SM,

It is this shortcoming of

he believes, that ultimately prevents SM-rational

agents from escaping the dilemma.

He then proposes his

solution which appeals to the notion of rationality as
"resolute choice."
In this chapter

I

begin with an explanation of the

problem McClennen finds with SM

-

in a nutshell,

that SM

fails to satisfy a criterion of adequacy for conceptions of

rationality.
choice.

I

then summarize the theory of resolute

Finally,

I

challenge McClennen's claim that

rational agents who choose resolutely do better in PDs of

certain variety than do agents who choose in

a

straightforward fashion.
1.2

McClennen's Assessment of SM
The fault with SM, at least with the theory as it is

normally construed, McClennen thinks, has to do with its
requiring that
[persons
on each occasion calling for decision,
or selves] maximize with respect to an antecedently
and exogenously specified preference function given
(again from the perspective of that same occasion
for decision) the expected behavior of the other
[persons or selves]
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a

,

An example of decision making in dynamic contexts will

help illuminate the difficulty.

Consider the case of

Ulysses and the Sirens.
As Ulysses approaches the island of the Sirens, he
has no desire to be detained by them; but if he
acts on his present preferences (to get home as
quickly and as inexpensively as possible)
he faces
a problem.
He is informed that once he hears the
Sirens, he will want to follow them.
Since here
now he does not desire to have this happen, he
precommits.
He buys wax to stop up the ears of his
sailors, good strong hemp with which to have
himself bound to the mast, and (what is perhaps
most costly of all) arranges for his first-mate to
act as his agent
[this tale]
It may be objected that
describes a case in which the self is thought to be
temporarily overcome by some irrational (or non[w]e have only to suppose
rational) force.
But
that Ulysses realizes that he is in a situation in
which he can predict that his preferences will
(PD and RC, 98-99)
undergo a specific change.
,

In tree diagram form, Ulysses' problem looks like this:

(c)

Ignore Sirens
(

(a)

Sail on

0 node

1

(nl)

(d)

0

(b)

Give in

Figure 8.1

02
(Worst)

01

Precommit

node 0 (nO)
time = to at nO

03
Best)

(Second best)

time = tl at nl
Ulysses' Tree Diagram
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In such "dynamic" contexts of choice the SFM acts as

what McClennen calls

a

"sophisticated chooser."

agent chooses at the outset

-

node

0

Such an

in our example - a

plan consisting of a sequence of actions that maximizes the

satisfaction of the preferences of his present self against
the expected independent maximizing behavior of his future
self.

Assume Ulysses is

a

sophisticated chooser.

What

sequence of actions should he select at the first choice
point in his decision tree?

Ulysses then has three

alternatives that we may represent as ac, ad, and

If he

b.

were to choose the course of action that is best from the

vantage point of nO

,

he would choose ac.

But Ulysses is

aware that this plan of action is not feasible.
aware that if he were to reach node

1,

He is

he would be in the

grips of the singing sisters and so would be unable to do
as the best-from-nO plan requires.

c

Expressed somewhat

differently, Ulysses as a sophisticated chooser is

cognizant that his future self at nl will act in accord
with the best-from-nl plan available to it then.

Knowing

this, he now knows that ac is not feasible for his present
self.

But as of to each of ad and b is feasible.

Ulysses is
that time.

a

Since

maximizer, he does best by choosing b as of

McClennen summarizes the sophisticated approach

to dynamic choice in this way:
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"

[sophisticated] chooser regiments his ex ante
choice to his projected ex post choices. That is,
he makes a projection of how he will be disposed at
nl to choose from the options available at nl, a
projection that is presumably independent of how he
is disposed at nO to choose from the plans
available at nO and he takes this projection to
condition the feasibility of plans available at nO.
(DC and R, 9)
a

,

It will be helpful to introduce some terminology:

Assume that agent,

which

s

s,

is in a dynamic choice context in

has to make a sequence of choices over time.

Assume that s's problem to choose among the various courses
of action can be represented by a tree diagram.

Call the

choice situation that this diagram describes "s's decision
tree

.

(1)

A plan is a set of directives that specifies what is

to be done as of a time at each choice point in a decision

tree.

2

An agent implements a plan if and only if she acts

in accord with each of its directives.

Let T be a decision tree and let A be a set of plans
pi,

,pi,

in T.

,ti be the times corresponding to nl,

let tl,

Assume in other words, that
any i>l,

,ni be the nodes in T and

Let nl,

s

will be, if

at ti+2 and so on.

s

s

,ni.

will be at nl at tl and for

ever is, at ni+1 at ti+l, at ni+2
it will be

To facilitate matters,

helpful to think of a plan as an ordered n-tuple of
actions,

P,

available at

a

time to

s

members in P = the number of nodes, as of
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The number of

in T.
a

particular

.

time, at which s could be in T.

So,

there are eleven nodes nO,
T,

,alO.

if at to

,nlO at which s could be in

then the plans available to

members, aO,

for example,

s as of to

will have eleven

Assume, in addition, that were s to

implement such a plan at to,

s

would do aO at to, al at tl,

and so on.
(2)

The expected utility of plan p for

s

in T is the sum

of the s-expected utility of all the actions in
p.
(3)

Plan p is a dequate for

if as of t,

t,

in T as of time t if and only

no alternative plan for s in T has a higher

expected utility for
(4)

s

3

s

than p.

Plan p is best for s in T as of t if and only if as of
p's expected utility for

expected utility for

s

s of all

in T is higher than the

other plans then available to

s

Assume, to simplify matters, that as of any time there
are always plans that are best for
(5)

Plan p

_is

s

in T.

feasible for s in T as of t if and only if

as of t, each of the actions that p specifies s do at each

node in T is such that

s

can then do that action.

To ascertain whether a plan is feasible as of
we can (unrealistically) view

s as

a time,

determining whether at

each choice point the plan prescribes an action that

then able to perform.

If s comes across some plan-
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s

is

prescribed action at some node that

s

believes

s

won't then

be able to do, s discards the plan as not feasible.

Best plans need not be feasible.

From the vantage

point of nO, ac is Ulysses' best plan.

But this plan is

not feasible for him as it requires that he ignore the

Sirens at tl, something he cannot then do.

These definitions permit

sophisticated choice
tree, T.

.

a

concise characterization of

Let ni be a node in s's decision

Then as a sophisticated chooser,

s

selects and

implements the best of the feasible plans available to

s

in

T at ni as of ti.

We are now in a better position to understand

McClennen's reservations about SM.

The SFM acts as a

sophisticated chooser in dynamic contexts.

Sophisticated

choice presupposes a separability principle, "SEP."

principle governs

a

in a decision tree.

This

rational agent's subsequent preferences
It requires that

what determines preference at any point in a
sequence of decisions to be made is what would
govern preference at that point, were the agent to
confront that choice de novo as a new decision
problem, i.e., not against the background of any
(CM and RC, 20)
previous decisions.
.

SEP has implications for what plans are feasible for

agents in sequential choice situations.

It is SEP,

for

instance, that constrains the set of plans available to

Ulysses at his point of initial choice.
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As

I

understand McClennen, SEP is unacceptable.

The

constraint it imposes on rational dynamic choice is
therefore also unacceptable.

SEP is not acceptable because

it violates a criterion of adequacy for conditions that

constrain rational choice.

In most general terms the

criterion is this:
rational choice
[is] choice of efficient means
to given ends
I propose to adopt a strong form
of this criterion, according to which a given
condition does not qualify as a constraint on
rational choice unless it can be shown that
violating the condition involves the agent in
choice of means insufficient to his ends. That is,
I take the existence of a pragmatic argument for a
given axiom as not merely sufficient for its
qualifying as a rationality condition but as
necessary
(DC and R, 12)
.

Reformulated, the criterion says that a condition,

C,

on

rational choice is adequate if and only if it involves the
agent in a choice of means sufficient to his ends.

criterion can be amplified,
a

I

think,

theory of rationality and let C be

presupposed by

R.

C,

in this way:
a

The
Let R be

condition

that is, is a necessary condition of

R.

Crit:

C is adequate if and if only if there is no

alternative to
C,

R,

R*,

such that

(i)

R* does not presuppose

and (ii), R*-rational agents do better in certain

situations

-

"hard case situations"
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-

than R-rational

.

.

agents, and (iii) R*-rational agents do at least as well as

R-rat iorial agents in all situations other than hard case
ones

Understood in this way, Crit really specifies
adequacy for theories of rationality.

a

The general

intuition underlying Crit may still be unclear.
following passage,

I

standard of

The

believe, sheds some light on this

matter.

such [a sophisticated] agent, unlike the resolute
agent, must forego certain opportunities or expend
valuable resources. This is to say that parametric
reasoning works against such continuing interests
of the agent that agents who are capable of
adopting and carrying through on plans will do
better, over time, than do those who always reason
parametrically.
(CM and RC, 16-17)

—

Taking our cue from this passage, we can now finally
formulate McClennen's worry about SM:

SEP violates Crit.

Since SM is commited to SEP, SM is inadequate.

There are

hard case situations in which those who can only choose in
an SM-rational manner will fail to do as well as those who

are capable of being resolute.
To assess this central claim of McClennen's, we need
to say something about hard case situations, and we need to

compare and contrast resolute choice with sophisticated
choice
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0

1

.

3

,

Hard Case Situations
PD-like situations of

certain sort and relevantly

a

similar sequential choice situations are the two varieties
of hard case situations.

Reconsider Ulysses' case.

Think

of his present and future selves as discrete agents
each

with "its own agenda of preferences."

if we think of one-

person sequential cases in this way, then it is fairly
simple to see that such cases display important

similarities to PDs.
PD matrix 8.2.

As a basis for comparison, consider

Numbers represent expected utilities with
Butch

Confesses

Remains silent

Sundance
Confesses

1,1

Remains silent

Figure

10

(b)

0,10

9,9

(c)

(d)

8.2

Matrix 8.2

Sundance's utilities ranked first.
and

(d)

,

(a)

Think of (a),

(b)

,

(c)

as "agreement outcomes" that would result were

Butch and Sundance

-

both SM-rational agents

-

to agree to

act in a certain fashion and then act in the agreed-on

manner when called upon to do so.
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Assume Gauthier is right

,

in supposing that the principle of minimax relative

concession (MMRC) governs the ex ante agreement that
underlies

a

fair and rational cooperative venture.

4

Then

Butch and Sundance, acting on MMRC will both elect to

remain silent; they will do the cooperative thing.

On the

assumption that MMRC "expresses the principle of utility

maximization in the context of bargaining," 5 choosing in
accord with the principle should satisfy Butch's and

Sundance's strongest ex ante preferences

preferences to cooperate.

-

their

Now suppose the time comes when

each is called upon to comply with his ex ante agreement.

Each has as his strongest preference at this later time,
the preference to do whatever will maximize his own utility

regardless of the behavior of the other.

That is, the

preference of each at this time is determined by SM.

Matrix 8.2 illustrates that no matter what the other does,
each in light of the preferences each now has does best by
not complying.

So an argument from dominance yields the

result that each should now confess.
In both this case and the Ulysses' case agents or

selves (whatever the case may be)

as SFMs, maximize with

respect to the preferences they have at discrete times.
addition,

In

in both cases there is a need to coordinate the

preferences between past and future selves if the gains of
an optimal outcome are to be enjoyed:

If Butch and

Sundance each has as his strongest ex ante preference and
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as his strongest ex post preference the preference to

cooperate, each would be able to comply with the mutually

beneficial interest-constraining agreement.

Similarly,

if

it were possible for the preferences of Ulysses' present

self and those of his future self (when the latter existed)
to be coordinated, Ulysses' would be able to disregard the

singing Sirens and sail right by the island.

McClennen's claim is that resolute choosers do better
than SFMs in cases similar to the ones just considered that
meet these conditions:

(1)

Each agent (or self) knows or

has reasonable grounds for supposing that every agent (or
self)

is rational.

(2)

Agents (or selves) are

"transparent" to each other.

That is, an agent is directly

aware not only of the rational disposition of others, but
is also aware,

or at least has good assurance, of how the

others will act, given their estimation of how the agent
will act.

Deception is therefore impossible.

satisfy condition

(2)

Cases that

are those in which the counterfactual

independence condition is violated.

Recall, the condition

states that no matter what choice agents (or selves) make,
an agent (or self)

still makes that choice no matter what

choices the others make.
for example,

This condition would be violated,

if Butch's actions were related to those of

Sundance's in a way depicted by matrix 8.3.
below.

(See page 237

The numbers indicate conditional probabilities of
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a

choice on a choice.)

In cases such as these,

Butch will

cooperate with Sundance if and only if Butch wants to do
the cooperative thing and he expects Sundance to want to do
the same as well.

Butch

Confesses

Remains silent

Sundance
Confesses

0.99

0.01

Remains silent

0.01

0.99

Figure 8.3
1

.

4

Matrix 8.3

Resolute Choice

McClennen tells us that resolute choice involves
the notion that the agent is a being who continues
over time, with concerns that have some continuity
to them.
Such an agent can be understood to view
himself as deliberating over alternative plans
i.e., seguences of choices to be made over time and
subject to various contingencies, as choosing some
particular plan, and then proceeding, at least in
the normal course of events, to make specific
choices (at different points in time) that serve to
execute or implement the plan chosen. What is
characteristic of such an agent is that his ex post
preferences among available actions are disciplined
or shaped by what he judges, from the perspective
of plans taken as wholes, to be the best plan to
pursue.
If such an agent is successful in this
regard, then it can be said that what he chooses ex
.
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post to do is consistent with what he resolved (or
planned) to do.
Such an agent can be described as
a resolute chooser.
(CM and RC, 16)

While the sophisticated agent disciplines ex ante
choice to his projection of ex post independently
based choice, the resolute agent disciplines ex
post choice to ex ante choice of a plan.
(DC and
R,

10)

Sophisticated choosers do the very best they
can, given the constraints imposed by the need to
adjust present choice to future given behavior.
This is what Ulysses does and what most of us do.
But
such an approach to choice involves a
retreat to second-best
If Ulysses manages to
save himself from the cursed isle by means of wax,
hemp, and agency arrangements, still he could have
done even better if he had simply resolved to sail
right by the island and pay the singing sisters no
mind.
But so, also, if rational players who know
each other to be such do well enough by devising
various precommitment schemes or other devices to
provide one another with incentives to cooperate,
they could do better still by simply resolving to
(PD and RC, 101)
so cooperate.
From these passages it is possible to extract an

account of resolute choice

decision tree,

T.

:

Let ni be a node in s's

Then as a resolute chooser,

s

selects

and implements the best plan at s's disoposal in T at ni as
of ti

Compare resolute choice with sophisticated choice.
a

sophisticated chooser,

s

selects and implements the best

of the feasible plans available to s in T at ni.

In terms

of our examples, sophisticated Ulysses at nO implements

plan b.

In contrast,

As

resolute Ulysses saves himself the
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cost of precommitment

,

resolves to ignore the Siren's song,

and then ignores their song.
nO plan,

ac.

g

He implements the best-from-

Similarly, each of resolute Butch and

resolute Sundance selects the plan which calls for an agent
to make and keep the interest-constraining agreement, and

then proceeds to implement that plan.

SFMs Butch and

Sundance, however, each end up confessing.

In this way

resolute agents do better than SFMs similarly situated, at
least so seems to claim McClennen.
1*5

Straightforward Maximizers versus Resolute Agents
This last claim of McClennen's can be challenged.

Consider a hard case PD-like situation with SM-rational
agents Butch and Sundance.

Each knows that the other is

SM-rational and each is transparent to the other.

Transparency ensures that the counterf actual independence
condition is violated.

We may consequently take matrix 8.3

as accurately portraying the way in which Butch's actions

are related to Sundance's actions:
and only if the other does.

only if the other does.
as we remarked earlier,
It is not possible,

Each will confess if

Each will remain silent if and

Under conditions of transparency,
it is not possible to dissemble.

for example,

for Butch to make an

agreement with Sundance to remain silent with the intention
of not later doing his part.

Being transparent, Sundance

would be aware of this intention of Butch's and would
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refuse to make the agreement in the first instance.

Assume

that matrix 8.1 is the relevant utility matrix, but this

time assume that numbers represent not expected utilities
but just plain utilities with Butch's values listed first.

The expected utility of confessing for each party is
(

1)

(

0

.

99 + ( 0 01)
)

.

(

10)

= 1.09.

This is less than the

expected utility of cooperating for each which works out to
(

0)

(

0

.

01) = (9

)

(

0

.

99

)

= 8.91.

On the assumption that it is

SM-rational for each to make an agreement to do the

cooperative thing, SM, under the present assignment of

probabilities and utilities, requires that each keep the
agreement.

SFMs will therefore do the "cooperative" thing

in this hard case situation.

But then they would do no

worse than they would have done had they chosen resolutely.
For presumably the best plan available to each at the

outset calls for each to make and keep an agreement to do
the "cooperative" thing.

Consider the case of Ulysses.

If Ulysses'

selves are

transparent to each other, then Ulysses' present self
(let's imaginatively suppose)

is aware of the rational

disposition of his future self and (let's suppose again) is
aware of what his future self will do.

Ulysses will

therefore sail on and ignore the Sirens if and only if he
now has the desire to do this and he now expects his future
self to have a similar desire as well.
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But then choosing

resolutely or choosing in

a

sophisticated manner will once

again yield identical results.
Consider, now,

a

really hard case situation in which

though Butch and Sundance know each other to be SMrational

,

they are not transparent to each other.

So

assume that in this authentic PD situation the

counterf actual independence condition is satisfied.

The

SM-rational thing to do here is to violate the agreement to
do the cooperative thing.

As

I

understand McClennen,

resolute choosers in this situation would also fail to
adhere to the interest-constraining agreement.

They would

renege since the best plan at the disposal of these agents

sanctions violation:
to implement.

Suppose Butch is debating what plan

Assume that of the interesting

possibilities, he could implement either the plan that
calls for cooperation, or the one that prescribes reneging.

Which of these is best for him?

cooperative thing.
the latter plan.

Suppose Sundance does the

Then Butch does best by implementing

Suppose Sundance reneges.

Then again

Butch does best by implementing the second plan.

No matter

what Sundance does, Butch does best by implementing the
second plan.
Butch.

This plan, it seems, is therefore best for

Since positions are symmetric, the plan is best for

Sundance as well.
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It appears,

to collect results, that transparent SM-

rational agents do no worse than transparent resolute

agents in PD-like situations in which the counterf actual

independence condition is violated.

The same is true of

"opaque" SM-rational agents in authentic PDs.
It is evident that something has gone wrong here.

These are not the results anticipated by McClennen.
Suppose,

in light of this observation, McClennen is

construed as recommending that even in these very hard PD
situations, resolute choosers would adopt and implement

a

plan that requires making and keeping an agreement to

remain silent.

The notion of what plan is best, assuming

such agents still select and implement best plans as of
time and a place, would require reinterpretation.

a

It might

then be claimed that such resolute choosers would do better
than would SFMs in a similar position.

This claim,

however, would once again be mistaken:

Resolute choosers

of this sort would not, contrary to what this proposal

assumes,

find themselves in an authentic PD.

The

"preference problem" ensures that this is so.
1.6

The Preference Problem

The preference problem arises because of certain

special features of authentic PDs.

If agents are to be in

this sort of PD, at least two things must be true.
the counterfactual independence condition must be
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First,

satisfied.

Second, assuming there is a "cooperative"

outcome, agents must rank their preferences for outcomes

from most preferred to least in this fashion:

(1)

Unilateral noncooperation;

(2)

mutual noncooperation;

unilateral performance of the

(4)

mutual cooperation;

(3)

act the mutual performance of which would result in the

cooperative outcome.

Rational agents who face an impending

PD may prefer ex ante to cooperate.

They may, for example,

find it advantageous to make an interest-constraining

agreement.

But if their ex post preferences to keep the

agreement are stronger than their ex post preferences to

violate unilaterally, then it seems that they would not be
in a genuine PD.

The problem of the PD, after all, has its

roots in the fact that agents have preferences that they

rank in the manner just delineated.

We may now formulate a

necessary condition for being in an authentic PD:
NCPD:

If agents are to be in an authentic PD,

these agents

must have have PD preferences that are "standardly ranked."

McClennen's discussion of rational cooperation
generates a problem about preference because McClennen
sometimes gives the impression that resolute choosers could
be in an authentic PD even though they fail at the relevant

time to have preferences that are standardly ranked.
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Responding to

a

worry of the economist Sen, for example,

McClennen says
One can mark here what appear to be two distinct,
although closely connected issues. One concerns
whether certain ways of arguing that rational
agents should cooperate in a Prisoner's Dilemma
situation might be dismissed on the grounds that
the reasons cited imply that those who are so
disposed do not face a genuine Prisoner's Dilemma.
The second is whether some particular account of
how persons might come to cooperate in such a
situation could be faulted on the grounds that it
"resolves" the problem in an purely ad hoc manner.
It would seem, for example, that those who are
concerned about the welfare of others, and who are
led thereby to act in a cooperative manner can be
said, in so behaving, to reveal their concern for
others.
However, if one supposes them to cooperate
for that reason, then they do not really face a
Prisoner's Dilemma. Moreover, such a "resolution"
of the problem has the air of being ad hoc
The model I have proposed is not subject to
either of these objections. Following Sen, I start
with the assumption that the agents' preferences
for outcomes conform to the pattern of a classic
Prisoner's Dilemma situation. I simply move from
there to challenge the distinct assumption that
preferences for outcomes, abstractly considered,
must be taken as controlling for preferences over
(CM and RC, 18-19)
actions and, hence, for choice.
.

He further informs us that

Again, it may be argued that what counts against my
model is that the very concept of preference itself
implies that the agent will be disposed, at each
choice point in time, to choose an alternative that
is maximally preferred and that the plan the agent
adopts must have the property that it calls upon
the agent to make choices at each choice point that
are consistent with the preferences he has at that
Call this the principle of Dynamic
point in time.
This principle is clearly one to
Consistency.
(CM and RC,
which my proposed model is faithful.
19-20)
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Finally,

in a footnote to a sentence in a passage in which

McClennen gives

a

reinterpretation, in terms of choosing

resolutely, of Gauthier's claim that an agent can behave as
a

constrained maximizer, McClennen explains that
Since on the account offered here a rational agent
does not ever act contrary to the preferences he
has for actions at the time of choice, and,
correspondingly, does not choose other than a
utility maximizing action, it is perhaps misleading
to describe him as a constrained maximizer.
He
maximizes in an unconstrained sense his preferences
for available actions, although not his preferences
(CM and RC)
over (separably considered) outcomes.

How do we interpret "maximally preferred" and "utility

maximizing action" in the last two passages if we are to
suppose, consistent with what the first passage seems to

suggest, that the relevant resolute agents would in fact be

There are a number of interesting

in an authentic PD?

possibilities intimated by McClennen himself.

These appeal

to preferences that have as their objects different

outcomes

Assume that

a

number of agents expect to find

themselves (together)

in a PD at some future time and are

now at the first nodes in their decision trees.

When faced

with the problem of coordinating with each other, they may
have preferences for the implementation of plans whose

consequences are judged to be best.

Such agents treat

their preferences "among feasible sets of actions as
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sensitive to more than just their preferences for the

corresponding outcomes of those actions."

(CM and RC,

15)

On the other hand, they may have preferences for outcomes

"abstractly considered"

-

outcomes of actions that could

result at a particular point in time if those actions were

performed at that time.

Such preferences are shaped by

a

concern for outcomes that still remain realizable in the
future and are not, unlike the former preferences,

sensitive to any decisions that have been made in the past.

Clearly we have here two different sorts of preference, the
first sort having as object the implementation of plans,
and the second, having as object "outcomes abstractly

considered."

Call the first sort "p preferences" and the

second sort "o preferences."
In the passages just cited, McClennen suggests that

resolute agents like resolute Butch and resolute Sundance,
facing a coordinating problem, choose "an alternative that
is maximally preferred."

What sort of preference is being

referred to here, a p preference or an o preference?
Alternatively, is it p preferences or o preferences that
such resolute agents take "as controlling for preferences

over actions and, hence, for choice"?

Suppose it is o preferences.

Suppose, that is, that

Butch and Sundance act in conformity with their o

preferences.

Then if they are in an authentic PD they will

end up not cooperating.

As a result they fare no better
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than they would if they were sophisticated choosers.
Suppose, alternatively, that the relevant preferences are
p

preferences.

Suppose, that is, that they discipline their

preferences "to conform to a plan whose consequences [they]
judge to be superior."

(CM and RC,

20)

On the possibility

that interests us here, the best plan in some sense of
'best' calls for resolute agents to cooperate.

So assume

that Butch and Sundance, acting to satisfy maximally their
p preferences,

do the cooperative thing.

not be satisfied.

Then NCPD will

It won't be satisfied because Butch and

Sundance have as "controlling" or as maximally preferred ex
post preferences to cooperate and not ex post preferences
to do the noncooperative thing.

ranked" PD preferences.

They have "non-standardly

Since both are rational,

I

am

assuming that their ex post preferences to cooperate are
stronger than their ex post preferences to defect.

I

am

not supposing the converse is true and that they simply
fail to act on their strongest preferences at the time of

decision.

If they were to fail in this way,

be rational.

they would not

Since NCPD specifies a condition that is

necessary if agents are to be in an authentic PD, these
resolute agents won't be in such
There is

a

a PD.

third possibility.

Why not suppose that

agents have both p preferences and o preferences?

Having o

preferences ensures that they are in an authentic PD.
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But

.

when it comes time for action, these agents act on their p

preferences
I

believe McClennen would not endorse this position,

as the last two passages cited strongly intimate.

Further

evidence that he would reject this third option is provided
by the following passage:

the suggestion that a rational agent will, at a
certain point in a decision tree, choose other than
what she prefers at that point plays hob with the
whole notion of revealed preference:
if the agent
chooses A rather than B, then there is a perfectly
appropriate sense in which what the agent really
prefers (the preference revealed by choice) is A
rather than B.
(PD and RC, 102-103)
If

I

am right about the preference problem, then a

heavy explanatory burden is placed on

a

theory of

rationality, R, according to which R-rational agents can

escape an authentic PD.

Presumably,

if such agents are

able to escape this type of dilemma, and not something that

resembles but is not an authentic PD, they must have non-

standardly ranked PD preferences.

If they have non-

standardly ranked PD preferences, an explanation is owed of
how these agents would be in an authentic PD in the first
place.

Such an explanation is not impossible to come by.

In fact there is a way to interpret resolute choice that

provides just what is needed:

Maximizing conceptions of rationality such as SM are
often held in conjunction with the thesis that the contents

248

of individuals' preferences are beyond
rational assessment.

This is, for example, Professor Gauthier's
conviction

7
.

Since this "non-constraining" thesis and a theory
of the
maximizing variety are logically independent, the one
may
be held without the other.
Suppose one renounces

the non-

constraining thesis.

Then one might try to defend a notion

of "rational preferences" or "context sensitive

preferences."

it might,

for instance, be urged that not

all preferences are rational and that what preferences it
is rational to have partly depends on the situation one is
in.

Whatever this notion of rational preference amounts

to,

if it is to contribute to a resolution of an authentic

PD,

it must minimally entail both that an ex ante

preference for cooperation is rational as is an ex post

preference to act cooperatively.

Now one could identify

rationality with the maximization of one's rational
preferences.

This alternative to SM

-

"ASM"

-

might be

some such theory according to which an act is rational if
and only if none of its alternatives maximizes the

satisfaction of its agent's rational preferences to

greater extent than it does.

a

ASM could then be used to

demonstrate the rationality of cooperation in one-shot PDs.
The connection between ASM and resolute choice might not

unreasonably be claimed to be this:

Not all preferences,

according to this way of conceptualizing matters, including
-

presumably

-

"standard" ex post PD preferences to act
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noncooperatively, are rational.

But an ex ante PD

preference for cooperation and an ex post PD preference
to
act cooperatively are rational.
Agents who resolve

to act

cooperatively and then act on that resolve when the time
comes can be understood to be acting on their rational
preferences.

standard ex

The solution conceives agents as having
arite

and standard ex post PD preferences.

ASM-

rational agents act, however, in conformity with the subset
of these preferences that are rational, and not in

conformity with the preferences that are strongest.
strongest preferences an agent has at
those that are rational at that time.

a

The

time need not be
The solution would

therefore be one to an authentic PD.
It is premature,

whether such

a

of course, to pass judgment on

solution would be acceptable.

significant is that

a

solution along these lines stresses

that if rational agents

term

-

What is

-

'rational' in some sense of the

are to escape an authentic PD, it must not be the

case that the strongest preferences these agents have at

a

time of choice are those that are "controlling for choice."

This is something, however, that McClennen does not seem to
accept.

He seems commited to the view that at each choice

point in time, rational agents choose alternatives that are

maximally preferred.
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In conclusion, contrary to what McClennen appears to

believe, SM does not violate Crit.

In hard cases in which

each agent is transparent to all agents and knows that

every agent is rational, SFMs do no worse than resolute
choosers.

In situations of this kind,

it is

straightforwardly rational to do the "cooperative" thing.
In really hard authentic PD situations,

SFMs again do no

worse, nor do they do any better, than resolute choosers

who have non-standard ex post PD preferences.

The reason

this time being that such resolute choosers would not in
fact be in authentic PDs.
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Notes
1.
See Edward F. McClennen, "Prisoner's Dilemma and
Resolute Choice," in Paradoxes of Rationality and
Cooperation eds., R. Campbell and L. Sowden (1985),
Vancouver: The University of British Columbia Press, 94104; Edward F. McClennen, "Dynamic Choice and Rationality,"
forthcoming; and Edward F. McClennen, "Constrained
Maximization and Resolute Choice," forthcoming in Social
Philosophy and Policy
Page references to these works
appear in parentheses in the text, beginning from the first
to the third, as follows:
(PD and RC, page number); (DC
and R, page number)
(CM and RC, page number)
.

;

2.
In pages 3 and 4 in "Dynamic Choice and Rationality,"
McClennen tells us that

A plan specifies what is to be done at each
subsequent choice point in the decision tree that
might be reached, given previous choices specified
in the plan, and various contingent events.
3.
There may be a problem with this definition, as
Professor Feldman indicates: Suppose my sequence of action
is like this:
al
>a2
>a3
>outcome o.
Suppose these are
all true:
If I were to do al, I would get outcome o.
If I
were to do a2, I would get o.
If I were to do a3, I would
get o.
Suppose the value of o for me is 10 points. Then
the expected utility of the plan prescribing the above
sequence of actions is 30 points. This seems wrong.
To evade this problem, let's sitipulate - arbitrarily
I realize - that no such sequences of action occur in s's
decision tree.

—

—

—

David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (1986), Oxford:
4.
Clarendon Press, p. 14.
5.

See Morals By Agreement

.

p.

145 and p.

151.

Some best plans,
A potential worry here is this:
6.
unlike feasible plans, seem to require that agents act in
Plan ac, for example, requires that
ways that they cannot.
Ulysses ignore the Sirens. How can rationality require
that one do what one is incapable of? McClennen responds
in this way:
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[R]esolute choice enjoys two advantages not enjoyed
by sophisticated choice.
First, while
precommitment is typically costly, resolute choice
has the attractive property that it can achieve
whatever precommitment can achieve without the
costs in question.
Second, the specific use to
which resolute approach has here been put turns on
the idea of disciplining future choice to
holistically oriented evaluation of the whole
sequence of choices to be made.
In contrast the
sophisticated approach involves tailoring our
choice of a whole plan to projected independent
determined choices at subsequent stages. The
former, it seems to me, is the more promising view:
it invites us to think of ourselves as more than
merely (passive) predictors of our own future
choices, as capable of disciplining future choice,
when to do so can be shown to be in our interest.
In such cases, a retreat to a sophisticated
approach seems very much like an admission of
weakness of will. While the inability to carry
through in certain situations may be a fact about
human nature, it is unclear why a theory of how to
behave in the face of such an inability (namely, to
adopt a sophisticated approach) should be taken as
other than a theory of how best to proceed under
["Dynamic
conditions of imperfect rationality.
Choice and Rationality," p. 17]

7.

Morals By Agreement, pp. 25, 26, 34.

Richard Brandt, for example, argues for something like
See Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the
Right (1979), Oxford: Clarendon Press, especially Chapter
Derek Parfit has an interesting discussion on whether
6.
desires can be "intrinsically rational" or "rationally
required" in section 46 in Derek parfit, Reasons And
Persons (1986), New York: Oxford University Press.
8.

this.
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CHAPTER

9

CONCLUSION
1

.

1

Doom

I

Chapter

1

.

2

am the source of sad news:
8.

Butch and Sundance read

Each ends up spending ten years in jail.

The Contractarian 's Dilemma
I

want to conclude with some general comments on why

I

think the contractarian approach to "justifying" morality
is unlikely to succeed.

"contractarian approach,"

When
I

I

speak about the

have in mind primarily

contractarian theories of the type advanced by Gauthier.
So let's review the essential features of that approach.

On Gauthier's scheme a morality is to be justified in

relation to the actual (considered) preferences of rational
agents.

The task is to show that no matter what the

preferences of these persons, they have reason to be moral:
Each, concerned with furthering her own good, would do best

for herself by conforming to the morality that is the

outcome of

a

rational bargain among them.

Rational

bargaining specifies the terms of rational agreement
specifies the content of a particular morality.

-

it

Gauthier

must demonstrate that compliance with this morality, the

morality that is the "product" of rational bargaining, is
advantageous to all parties concerned.
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Toward this end,

the strategy is to show that these persons would comply

with the interest-constraining reguirements of the agreedupon morality as, roughly, it is in their long-term
interest to do so.
This type of contractarian approach is particularly

engaging because, if successful, it promises to accomplish
two very noteworthy goals:

(i)

It generates morality "as a

rational constraint from the non-moral premises of rational
choice."

(M by A,

4)

(

ii

)

It shows that the apparent

conflict between considerations of morality and those of
rational self-interest is merely apparent.

There is no

real clash here because on this approach moral principles

are a subset of rational principles of choice:

"To choose

rationally, one must choose morally."

4)

(M by A,

If we keep these two goals in mind,

I

think it is easy

to see why this type of contractarianism will probably

founder.

Gauthier begins his project by assuming that the

agents in relation to whom a morality is to be justified
are SM-rational.

accomplished:

This is essential if "goal (i)" is to be

SM as a "weak and widely accepted" precept

of rational choice makes no pretense to being a moral one.

Furthermore, it is presupposed at the outset, or it must be
so,

that SM is not

it were,

a

defective standard of rationality.

there would be little reason to be interested in

the outcome of a bargain among SM-rational agents.
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If

Moreover, since CM and SM are extensionally
equivalent in

non-strategic" contexts of choice, any defect in SM would
also infect CM.
It's evident, though, that Gauthier
'

believes CM to be beyond reproach.
The major hurdle, however, that such SM-rational

persons face, as Gauthier tells us, is not rational
bargaining, but rational compliance with the injunctions of
the morality that is the outcome of rational bargaining.

The problem of compliance arises because these injunctions,

being moral ones, are interest-constraining.

The PD serves

as a nice device to show that it is not SM-rational to

comply with the prescriptions of the agreed-upon morality:

MMRC requires that you do the cooperative thing in
PD,

a

(real)

SM proscribes such action.

Gauthier endeavors to solve the compliance problem by
"reinterpret ing] the utility-maximizing conception of
[

practical rationality"

(M by A,

182):

It's certainly CM-

rational to comply with the requirements of MMRC (under

specified conditions) provided your fellow interactors are

trustworthy constrained maximizers.

But this way of

resolving the compliance problem introduces

a

complexity.

There are now two rival standards of reason, SM and its
competitor.

I

suggested earlier that if you are

a SFM,

will not be moved by this solution to the problem of

compliance, not unless you have been given reason to

believe that CM is superior to SM.
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Gauthier tries to

you

s

supply such

a

"

reason by arguing that as a SFM it would be

rational for you to change your very conception of

rationality

-

you would do best for yourself if you were to

become a constrained maximizer.

Perhaps we can take the

choice argument as indicative of some sort of evaluative
test for assessing theories of rationality.

reservations about the choice argument.

I

suppose the choice argument sound.

Gauthier countenances

expressed

But the worry with

Gauthier's brand of contractarianism that
interested in formulating arises,

I

I

am now

think, even if we
In fact,

I

think

a dilemma:

Either there is a sound argument, or an acceptable

evaluative test, that establishes the superiority of CM to
SM,

or there is not.

than SM

-

it '

Suppose there is.

Then CM is better

the legitimate standard of reason.

is a moral principle,

it's interest-constraining.

But CM
I

think

it's precisely because CM has this feature that compliance

with the interest-constraining requirements of MMRC is CMrational

.

On the supposition that CM is better than SM, or

that CM is really the standard of rationality, Gauthier can

sustain the claim that moral principles are
rational principles of choice.

a

subset of

But the cost, of course, of

arguing in this way should be obvious:

The contractarian

argument would loose much of its interest since it would
fail to accomplish "goal

(i)

;
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it would fail to derive

morality from the non-moral premises of
rational choice:

theory of

a

SM but not CM is such a non-moral theory.

Assume there were some alternative to SM
of rationality, R, that had these features:

compliance with the prescriptions of MMRC

,

-

a

principle

R requires
R is not a moral

principle, and R is superior to SM by the lights of some

cogent evaluative test.

1

evade the first horn?

The answer, unhappily, is "No."

Wouldn't Gauthier then be able to

R were not a moral principle, then "goal

If

(ii)" that

Gauthier's contractarian theory strives to achieve would
have to be abandoned.

It would not be true that to choose

rationally one must choose morally.
Suppose, then, that there is no evaluative test, or if

you want, suppose the choice argument fails.

Then once

again Gauthier's contractarianism collapses:

It may be CM-

rational to comply with the interest-constraining

prescriptions of MMRC, but as

a SFM,

you will have been

provided with no reason whatsoever to adhere to these

interest-thwarting requirements.
1

.

3

Conclusion
"Should

I

be moral?" Glaucon, or Hobbes' Fool, or the

moral sceptic, might ask.

If we take these people to be

asking "Is it rational to be moral?" or "Is it prudentially

obligatory to do what's morally obligatory?" the answer is
clear.

It is not.

The PD,

I

think,
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is inescapable.

.

Notes
1.
I'm not sure a theory of this sort is possible,
But
assume, for the sake of argument, that such a theory
exists
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